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The ANTIOCH REVIEW

"Why should there not be a patient confidence in the ultimate justice of the people? Is there any better or equal hope in the world?"

—ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

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EDITORIAL

ONE OF THE CHIEF VALUES of "More War-Time Taxes—Less Fiscal Mythology" by John C. Sparks in this issue is the prevailingly blue light which by implication it throws on our entire thinking about the war and on our entire war effort. What a difference it would make in the morale with which we go about our daily tasks if we had by this time made up our minds frankly to pay the costs as we go. The fact that we do not even realize what is ahead of us, the fact that many of our best taxpayers are croaking over the $25 billion we expect to pay this year in taxes when three times that sum should be collected, is unwelcome testimony that our minds are still at peace and not yet rooted in the war.

Fiscal realism is unbearably pertinent at a moment when the present tax bill is receiving its last rites in Congress. Week after week the best efforts of first the House Ways and Means Committee and then the Senate Finance Committee have resulted only in peace-time tinkering and tampering. Over all these proceedings has hung the stale redundant pall of "horse and buggy."

On related economic fronts the picture is similar. Take the sale of war bonds, for example. Month by month the Treasury Department has stuck by its scheme of voluntary purchases; and month by month the totaled returns have stuck at less than a billion. Whatever lustre may once have shone about the purpose of this campaign is now dimmed. Examine the poster of the mother and her children: "I Gave a Man—Won't You Give Ten Per Cent of Your Income?" Ten per cent! And the tone is plaintive.

Or consider farm prices and the wages of industrial labor. For months now there has been a defeatist pulling and hauling over these two great elements in our social economy. In this time the collective minds of organized labor and and the farm bloc have never risen above the strategy

of a delaying action or of mere ignoble defense. Not even Secretary Wickard has been able to move farm leaders from 110 per cent of parity; and labor has allowed itself to be transfixed by a campaign of villification in the press. There was a time when either of these groups might have faced its dilemma straightforwardly and presented a national program which would have confounded its critics and drawn applause. Labor, in particular, could have used the prestige which would have accrued to it from a self-imposed proposal for stabilization of wages—with important specific provisos that other economic groups sacrifice their advantages also. But that opportunity has passed, and if a halt is to be called to the spiraling of prices and wages (and if it is not already too late), it will have to be called by legislation and by presidential fiat.

Yet the most sinister enemy of our national morale lies in another quarter. Not long ago Price Administrator Leon Henderson made a comparison of wages, farm income, and corporation profits. Without subtracting taxes, he noted, wages and salaries have advanced 72 per cent, gross farm income 70 per cent, and corporation profits 400 per cent since 1939. On the basis of that comparison he inquired whether we were fighting for freedom and victory or for profit.

The National Association of Manufacturers had an answer for that one when, almost concurrently with Mr. Henderson's statement, it issued a chart comparing the above figures for wages and farm income (*before* taxes) with the probability that corporation profits for 1942, *after* taxes are subtracted, will probably be less than those for 1941. Those business interests that feared the war in the first place and have recently been blowing up the tax bill into something supposed to be confiscatory have the same answer. So also does such a popular columnist as Paul Mallon. Mr. Mallon is a particularly pertinent example, for he has repeatedly urged in his column the necessity for an all-out war effort. Listen to Mr. Mallon when he gets down to such methods of the war effort as paying taxes:

> The basis of our capitalistic democracy, the one we are fighting for, is profits. . . .
>
> Everyone knows there is a point at which taxation becomes nationally suicidal. . . the point at which business production ceases to be profitable.
>
> When that point is passed, labor can get no wage increases, the opportunity for work must shrink and the system of production bends and breaks.
>
> The senate committee hearings have shown that point was not only reached but passed in the house bill in many corporate instances. . . .

This is peace-time thinking with a vengeance! Toward the close of this fiscal year, after we have bought all the civilian goods that are available, after we have paid all the taxes that are levied or now proposed, and after we have bought all the war bonds on our present voluntary basis, there will still be $40 billion kicking around the country which can be put to no good use except bidding up prices or creating black markets. We wonder if Mr. Mallon would seriously argue that none of this $40 billion will be represented by corporate profits. If a quarter or even a tenth will be thus represented, surely it should be taxed away with all the rest of that surplus income. Not to do so argues that profits have become a holy entity and a national shibboleth.

But the failure of Mr. Mallon and of those interests who agree with him has deeper consequences than the fact that within its scandalous accounting $40 billion can disappear just as though it didn't exist. That failure begins with a nineteenth-century fixation about profits. It continues through the impossibility of considering our total economy instead of the economy of individuals and of separate business concerns. And it logically ends with losing the war.

The effect of that failure on national morale is incalculable. The idea that we are fighting for profits has up to now had far too much to do with our war effort on the home front. And if that idea were generally known and believed in by the younger generation who are already engaged or about to be engaged in mortal combat, it would immediately demoralize their fighting spirit. In that connection we should do well to remember the lesson of World War I. Our military participation then did not last long enough to bring disillusion during the war itself. But when the combat was over and the soldiers returned home, the discrepancy they found between the democracy which they had been pledged to and the profits which had actually been won by the few was too great to allow them further interest or participation in the peace.

We must realize that total war means total economy and total taxation, and we cannot let any appeasement of business interests or any barrier of economic clichés lie in the way of that realization. Not to look at the national war economy with the utmost measure of realism means impairment of a spirit which has hardly yet begun to fight. And surely no one needs to be told by this time that without an upsurge in our fighting spirit fascism can win out.

MORE WAR-TIME TAXES—LESS FISCAL MYTHOLOGY

By JOHN C. SPARKS

THE HOUSE WAYS AND MEANS COMMITTEE emerged from eighteen weeks of deliberation with what was described as a record-breaking war-time tax bill. Regrettably, their emergence did not in itself mean that the problem of paying for the war had actually been solved. On the contrary, the fruits of their labors suggest, as I should like to argue, that the task of forming a war-time fiscal policy in tune with economic realities has not even been faced.

Since we have only begun to fight the war, the committee's work has likewise only begun. Consequently, tragic as their present fiscal policy may be in both its inadequacy and its future implications, opportunities to correct it will recur. It therefore seems fruitful to argue a series of propositions which, if actually as self-evident and incontrovertible as they seem, merit the committee's studied consideration in their next attack on the war-time fiscal problem. For contrary to the whole conception of the committee proposals, these propositions lead inexorably to the conclusion that we not only should, but can, pay for this war as we go.

The magnitude of the fiscal problem is made clear by a few round figures. In the New Deal period, as an annual average over the fiscal years 1933-34 through 1937-38, the federal government had a tax revenue of $4.3 billion, whereas it spent $1.8 billion on military and $5.7 billion on all other functions. With revenue obviously below outlay the difference was borrowed, and by 1938 the national debt stood at $36.6 billion. We may call these the peace-time figures. In the defense and war period non-military outlay has not increased notably, the estimate for 1942-43 being $7.5 billion. But although military outlay jumped from $6.3 billion in 1940-41, to $26 billion in 1941-42, even so prodigious an increase was just a beginning. Estimates for military outlay in 1942-43 are now set at $70 billion with an upward revision imminent. Where and how will the government obtain the fantastic amount of money it will spend? This, in a word, is the problem of paying for the war.

Our Political and Economic Systems Set the Stage

Two governing factors confront us at the outset, and the first is our political system itself. The Constitution says, "All bills for raising revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives; but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments. . . ." Parliamentary practice has established this constitutional provision to mean in fact that the twenty-five members of the House Ways and Means Committee and the twenty-one members of the Senate Finance Committee enjoy the power to determine what our fiscal policy will be.

The President may exert influence through administration leaders in the Congress. He may propose a complete administration tax bill through his Department of the Treasury—the reservoir of the government's expert fiscal knowledge and its accumulated fiscal experience. Treasury experts may spend months in testifying, advising, persuading, and pleading before the two committees. But the practical fact remains that the forty-six members of these two committees have the final decision on what goes into the tax bill and what stays out.

The extent of their power is manifest in the unfinished story of the 1942-43 tax bill. The Treasury estimated a federal outlay of $70 billion for military and $7.5 billion for other purposes. Estimating a tax revenue of $18.1 billion from old sources, they went to the Ways and Means Committee with a tax bill designed to raise $8.7 billion in new taxes. Despite the modest character of this request, the committee for reasons of practical politics turned down almost every major reform proposed and thereby cut out some $2 billion. Neglecting possible changes resulting from current Finance Committee deliberations, the Congress is therefore authorizing the Treasury to collect $24.3 billion in old and new taxes, while $53.2 billion must be borrowed to meet a total outlay of $77.5 billion. This, in a word, is our war-time fiscal policy.

The second governing factor is our production-distribution system, which constitutes the economic environment in which any tax program, no matter by whom conceived, must necessarily operate. It determines what is possible in a tax program, and a fiscal policy designed without scrupulous regard for the way this system functions is as futile and irrelevant as a dietary policy which ignores the ruling facts of physiology. Our concern centers in the twin concepts of *national income* and *national pro-*

duction—in the relationship between the money income we as a nation receive and the commodities and services we produce. Comprehending this relationship is indispensable for the reason that while a war is actually fought with materials and services, paying for the war is conceived in terms of money.

We produce in any given year an aggregate of commodities and services which we call our *national production.* On a comparative basis of 1935-39 dollars, this aggregate was worth $68 billion in 1929, $45.7 billion in 1933, and $89.1 billion in 1941. Excepting the indeterminable economic value of such things as housewife services, odd jobs, and illegal activities, these figures represent the net value of everything we produced. But viewed another way they also represent our *national income.* For where does money income come from? It has to come ultimately from the sale of production on the market. Depending upon what kind of personal service or capital they have contributed to the productive process, what is taken in is distributed to individuals in the form of wages, rent, interest, and so on. Some of these payments, like wages, are made in advance of the actual sale of production, while others like profits must wait upon the final sale before their magnitude is known. But all of the payments ultimately come from what is taken in from the sale of production, and all of what is taken in is distributable to individuals. The aggregate of these individual money incomes is the national income, and at the same time amounts to a claim to the national production which it equals in value.

Viewed this way in terms of national totals the situation is obvious enough. Yet confusion arises surprisingly often because people insist on viewing the national situation in terms of their own personal businesses. And since much of one's business income represents *costs* rather than *net income,* it is easy to assume by projection that much of the total income from selling the national production is likewise costs and not net income to anybody. The error obviously lies in not recognizing that what is costs at one stage of the productive-distributive process is net income at some preceding stage.

The basic identity in value between national production and national income means four things primarily. *First,* in our production-distribution system the sale of production provides the money income needed to buy

the production. *Second,* the income so provided is necessarily equal in value to the production. *Third,* the whole of the national income is required to buy the whole of the national production. *Fourth,* the national income is the only normal or naturally created buying-power available to buy the national production. While many factors will in practice disturb the diagrammatic exactitude of these statements, we may justifiably accept them as working descriptions of our production-distribution system.

The organic connection of all this to the fiscal problem now emerges in all its simplicity. We produce and sell our national production of commodities and services, and whoever receives the money income can alone buy the production. Consequently, when the government requires a certain value of this production, it must first obtain an equal value of the national income in order to buy it. It must necessarily go where the money is—to the individuals to whom the national income has been distributed. What it takes away we call taxes. In the simplest possible view, then, taxes are the portion of the national production of commodities and services which the government uses and which it buys with a similar portion of the national money income extracted from individuals.

The Commonsense Facts of Our Predicament*

First, in economic terms we automatically pay for the war as we go. When we view the problem of paying for the war in the light of the way our production-distribution system functions, we see that in terms of the materials and services consumed we have no alternative. For if in the fiscal year 1942-43 our national production is worth $115 billion, and if war materials and services account for $70 billion of this, then we shall spend 61 per cent of our entire national production on fighting the war and have 39 per cent left for everything else. The real cost of the war, in any commonsense view, is the part of our national production we have to give up. And we have to give it up now for the obvious reason that a war can be fought only with the finished production on hand—the accumulations of past production we did not consume and current production we do not consume but devote instead to fighting. These war-consumed materials and services *are* the economic cost of the war.

**Editor's Note*: We gratefully acknowledge permission to include in several of the following sections material which first appeared in *The Nation,* June 6, 1942, in the author's article, "We Must Pay For The War As We Go."

Second, as a nation we cannot shift the war cost to future generations. This is so except to the limited extent that war damage actually continues into the future. The soldiers maimed and the areas devastated during the war must be maintained and rebuilt in the future out of then current production, and to this extent the future bears a kind of war cost. But this has nothing to do with the current cost, with the production that has to be given up now because the war that consumes it is going on now. This reflects the simple fact that a panzer division cannot be stopped this year with the dive-bomber production of a generation hence. And there is nothing the nation can give up a generation hence that will make what we have to give up now a whit more or less.

Third, only the government buys bullets and bombers. It is important to recognize this explicitly. The government, the nation, is the only possible buyer of the war materials and services which will account for 61 per cent of our total national production. This is but recognizing that while we as individuals produce the national production and receive the national income provided by its sale, we as individuals do not buy tanks or bombers or the services of soldiers.

Fourth, where is the money going to come from? If the government must buy 67 per cent of our total national production for war-plus-normal activities, it must also obtain 67 per cent of our total national income, and there are only two basic ways to do this. If it taxes the income out of the hands of original receivers the money changes hands permanently. If it borrows the income instead there is a promise to repay the money in the future. But the money can be obtained by *either* taxing *or* borrowing. The choice is the important thing. There is not the slightest question about the government having to take the 67 per cent of our national income by one means or the other. The only question is whether it should take the money for keeps or promise to give it back. For this is the only relevant distinction between taxing and borrowing.

Fifth, to the nation it does not matter which method is employed. If $77.5 billion are taken in taxes, the government will buy $77.5 billion of our $115 billion of national production, use these commodities and services in its war-plus-normal activities, and leave us the remaining $37.5 billion of income to buy the remaining $37.5 billion of production. And alternatively, if the government borrows its $77.5 billion, the same $77.5

billion of production will be consumed by its war-plus-normal activities, leaving us the same $37.5 billion of production to live on. In the case of borrowing, when the time comes to retire the war bonds the Treasury will collect from us in taxes the face value of the bonds and pay us back exactly the same amount in exchange for the bonds. For the nation as a whole it will be an elaborate ritual of taking money out of one pocket and putting it back in the other. In either case, taxing or borrowing, the government gets the same and we keep the same and the nation pays for the war in the process of fighting it.

Sixth, to the individual it matters greatly how his income is taken. If he is taxed the money is gone for good. But if he lends the same amount by buying war bonds he will in ten years, when the bonds are retired, get back his original amount plus 33 per cent in accumulated interest. The advantage to the bondholder originates in the circumstance that while only a minority of citizens will own the bonds being retired, the whole nation will pay the necessary bond-retirement taxes. So even if the individual bondholder's postwar tax burden is, say, as much as 33 per cent greater because of the bond-retirement levies than it would otherwise have been, he will still get back the whole of the amount he started with. In contrast, those who hold no bonds will pay the extra bond-retirement levies and get nothing back. They, as individuals, will still be paying for the war. Paying for the war by borrowing is, then, a way to postpone until after the war the determination of which individuals in the nation shall ultimately bear the burden of the war cost. It is a way for bond-buyers to shift much of the money cost of the war to future taxpayers.

Seventh, but everybody knows that buying war bonds is a sacrifice. It is said that war-bond buyers voluntarily deny themselves the equivalent value of purchases, that after the war they simply get back what they patriotically denied themselves during the war, and that the interest paid is the public reward for abstinence and sacrifice. Contrarily, those not buying war bonds selfishly use their surplus income for personal benefit. This argument suggests that war-bond buyers, rather than attempting to shift the burden of war costs, sacrifice the most, while the non-buyers are those evading any burden.

Ignoring the issue of personal motives, the essential point is that no one can "voluntarily abstain" from buying something he cannot buy. For

an ordinary consumer whose income is the same now as it was two years ago, and who used to spend $500 a year on automobiles, refrigerators, tires, radios, and sugar, it is nonsense to pretend to any voluntary or virtuous abstention from continuing to spend his $500 a year on these items. This consumer now has only five major alternatives in using his surplus $500. If he does not (a) pay it in taxes, or (b) buy war bonds with it, he can (c) save it in cash, or (d) use it to pay off private debts, or (e) use it in effect to bid up the prices of available commodities and services. As actual consumer purchasing power this surplus income is manifestly fictitious. For all there is on the market representing it is war production which only the government buys.

Eighth, if the surplus income is retained as cash deposits: Using Treasury estimates of $115 billion for national production—$77.5 billion for war-plus-normal government needs and $37.5 billion for civilian needs, and $24.3 billion for the government tax revenue—let us assume that individuals buy no war bonds. This would leave $90.7 billion of income in the hands of individuals, $53.2 billion more than they need to buy the $37.5 billion of civilian production available.

If the $53.2 billion are retained by individuals as cash deposits, the government, with a tax revenue $53.2 below expenditures, must borrow from the banks. After the war the taxpayers must repay this, while the surplus-income owners will have title to the cash deposits. In three or four years of our stupendous war expenditure the aggregate accumulation could easily be $150 to $200 billion. That it could serve as a stimulus to postwar production cannot possibly justify such an accumulation. For this kind of a reserved buying-power fund is technically possible, of course, only at the cost of burdening postwar taxpayers with a public debt of a like amount plus interest. Moreover, the unprecedented national income which makes such an accumulation possible is due basically, not to individual business acumen or initiative, but to the demands of the national emergency. It is unthinkable that any group should be permitted to siphon off such a postwar cash reserve out of our national expenditure for survival.

Ninth, if the surplus income is used to pay off private debts: The money so used is current income which could be subject to taxation. The debtor's net position is improved by the amount paid, but the creditor

receives money which must be considered a return of capital rather than current income and which is therefore not taxable. So here again the government can get hold of the money only by borrowing. Surely release from indebtedness is no more tolerable than any other form of personal economic betterment resulting from the war, especially since the reduction in total private debt automatically means an increase of like amount in the total public debt, which occurs when the government borrows the money.

Tenth, if the surplus income is used in effect to compete for goods: Individuals would have the $90.7 billion of income to buy the $37.5 billion of available civilian production. Actually consumers do not normally compete directly by offering higher prices. Instead, for any number of justifiable and unjustifiable reasons, prices are raised by sellers in the presence of a consumer willingness to pay higher and higher prices rather than do without. But the practical result is that consumers pretend that $37.5 billion of commodities and services are really worth $90.7 billion and pay out their income accordingly. Clearly the aggregate of consumers get the same volume of production, no more. But beyond this absurdity, the prices of all production will inevitably rise sympathetically, with the result that the government will require not a total of $77.5 billion in money but considerably more.

To get what it needs beyond the $24.3 billion of tax revenue, the government must force the creation of bank credit and borrow from the banks. The over-all result is that during the war the price system is disastrously distorted, while the aggregate of consumers get no more for their total expenditure than if they had left prices alone and paid their entire surplus income in taxes. After the war the taxpayers must repay the borrowed billions plus interest to the banks. And this public debt will be exceptionally large because the inflated prices of government purchases will have forced the government to borrow an inflated number of dollars.

Eleventh, the commonsense facts point uniformly to one conclusion. Still thinking in terms of national totals, we believe it clear that the government should not borrow anything. For no matter which borrowing route to the necessary money is used, future taxpayers will be saddled with the debt while a privileged minority will be benefited to an equal

amount in the form of cash deposits, liquidated private debts, or cash savings in the form of war bonds.

The obvious conclusion is that the government should logically take in taxes the proportion of our national income required to buy its share of our national production. It should take in taxes all of our national income except what we require to buy the civilian production available. There is no utility in our keeping more, since this is all we can use. For we as a nation are restricted in our individual expenditures to the volume of civilian commodities and services produced, and we could not buy a single item beyond this if we had a billion dollars apiece.

Then Why Aren't We Paying the Money Cost of the War As We Go?

Disagreement on tax program details is not the main stumbling block. For we have never gotten so far as the point where this difficulty would arise. The great impediment has been simply that neither taxpayers nor responsible government officials have ever seriously considered the possibility of paying the money cost of the war as we go. They have not chiefly because of an ingrained and unquestioning acceptance of what are, it seems certain, basic misconceptions of the two major elements in our problem—taxes and war-time income. Preliminary to any discussion of policies, then, a radical readjustment in the way we look at these two things is necessary. But once we accomplish this readjustment in mental attitudes we shall find that a proper war-time tax program will evolve automatically out of the specific requirements of economic reality.

We taxpayers live in a kind of dream world. It seems likely that as individuals we make our first mistake in thinking of war-time income as being identical in character with income at any other time. We think of it naturally as *ours,* as being the legitimate reward for services rendered. But on reflection we see that there is an intrinsic difference between war-time and ordinary personal income.

In peace time, speaking generally, each dollar of income represents a dollar's worth of commodities or services sold on the market. The size of our individual incomes presumably depends upon our personal skill, effort, and initiative in creating products and in persuading people to buy them. And very importantly, someone gets the benefit of a dollar's worth of product for every dollar of income we receive, while we get

the benefit of as much of the products of others as we have income to pay for.

In war time we continue to act as if all this remained true. This is mainly because we continue to think and act in terms of money; we continue to produce, buy and sell, and receive our income in terms of customary dollar values. Yet when we reflect on what actually goes on in our war-time economy, it is clear that these peace-time concepts and procedures are quite inapplicable. For in war time perhaps half of us receive our money incomes from producing what we as individuals have no use for. These are the war materials and services which only the government buys. Moreover, the amount of business that each enterprise does, the amount of employment that each worker gets, do not in war time depend upon individual skill, effort, or initiative in creating products and in persuading people to buy them. For it is the war emergency alone that has made the government an insatiable buyer. The problem is production, not selling, and with few exceptions the only limit to business is the capacity to produce what is required by the war effort.

Thus the realities of the nation's situation are boldly apparent and unambiguous. We must produce all we are capable of producing. Out of an unprecedented national production the government must take more than half to fight the war, and the government must take more than half of our similarly unprecedented national income to buy its share.

If each of us actually worked over half of his time without pay on war production for the government, and less than half with pay on civilian production for himself, the realities of his individual situation would be equally apparent and unambiguous. But as it is perhaps half of us work full time on war production alone, while the rest of us work on civilian production alone. Regardless of which kind of job we get, we are hired in the ordinary way and our wages, rather than being lower, are as high as usual or higher. There is nothing to jolt us into realizing that we are not employed in our normal business of producing things to consume ourselves or to exchange for the products of others. There is nothing to make us comprehend that all of us collectively are in fact hiring half of us to produce what none of us buys or uses or gets any direct personal benefit from. There is nothing to make us comprehend that those of us who remain in civilian production must share what we

produce with those who work exclusively on war production, in order to support them while they produce what we are blowing up in the war.

It is irritating to get hold of our income payments once, as if they belonged to us, and then have to turn over a large proportion to the government in taxes. But when the government's war-plus-normal activities consume 67 per cent of our total national production, then each of us is *in fact* working 67 per cent of his time without pay for the government and only the remainder of the time for himself. When we get this through our heads it will not occur to us to resent the government's taking an average of 67 per cent of our personal income in taxes. On the contrary, we shall suspect that there is something very wrong indeed if it takes any less. We shall realize that the first-we-receive-income-and-then-turn-over-two-thirds-in-taxes system is simply our complicated mechanism for dividing our national production between the war-plus-normal needs of the government and our own civilian needs.

This kind of mental readjustment is required of us individuals in order that a realistic war-time tax program may be understood and acceptable. But it is no less necessary to the Congress and the Treasury, because the development of a fiscal policy in tune with economic realities is impossible without it. In addition, these two governmental agencies, especially the Congress, need to make another and equally indispensable change in patterns of thinking which is not required of us. This change is connected with the technique of levying taxes.

The Congress and the Treasury are inhibited by fiscal mythology. These agencies so far have simply been trying to decide how much of the money cost of the war can and should be met by taxation, and how much by borrowing. But implicit in their approach are two fallacies, one born of ambiguity and the other of an historical illusion.

The ambiguity arises from assuming almost without examination that we could not possibly pay the full money cost of the war as we go and from confusing what is true for the individual with what is true for the nation as a whole. That is, there would seem to be an implicit assumption that a war like the present one simply costs more than can be paid for in the present, that we should pay as much as we can now, but the rest will have to be spread over the future. There is even the implied rationalization that since future generations will profit from the national

security won in the war, they should be expected to bear some of the cost. We have already examined the fallacies involved in this kind of assumption.

The offending historical illusion is that in war finance the Treasury should properly take in all it can in taxes, but that this can never be enough to meet the war expenditures, so the deficit must be met by borrowing—by selling bonds. This attitude is patently based on a misconception. How could there possibly be any question, as this historical illusion implies, about there being enough current taxable income to yield all that the Treasury requires? The income-receivers have it because they cannot avoid having an aggregate income equal in value to the national production. If individuals have the surplus to lend, to buy bonds, it should be plain to anyone that they have identically the same surplus to pay taxes. And to take this national surplus in taxes cannot conceivably deprive the aggregate of taxpayers of anything. For it is by definition surplus income—there is nothing to be bought with it except war production which only the government buys.

What is clearly required is that the Congress and the Treasury, like individuals, think and act in terms of commodities and services. They would start from the basis of national totals—the total volume of production that the government must get hold of, and the total volume that can remain in civilian hands—and work back from these. And the tax system that they design should obviously be one that will adjust itself automatically to any change in the respective totals. If the government needs 40 per cent of the national production, the tax system should bring in 40 per cent of the national income; and if conditions change to where the government needs 70 per cent, the tax system should automatically bring in 70 per cent.

That this involves a profound transformation in patterns of thinking is clear from a glance at the present method of tax levying. The House Ways and Means Committee, having rejected the relatively advanced reforms proposed by the Treasury, looked around for alternative taxes. They decided among other things to raise the excise tax on cigarettes from 6½ to 7 cents a package, estimating that the increase would bring in an additional $6.5 million. But what does this kind of tax levying amount to? If cigarette smokers react by smoking less, no added revenue

will be realized. If they continue their normal consumption of cigarettes but reduce proportionately their purchase of other taxable commodities, one type of revenue will go up while another goes down. If the new tax happens to fall on those income-receivers who do not possess the surplus income represented on the market by war production, the tax is unjust. And if it happens to fall precisely where the surplus income is, it would be a miracle of coincidence.

The root difficulty is that this entire approach to tax levying is based upon taxation concepts which, though classical and respectable, are quite irrelevant where the government requires 50 to 70 per cent of the total national income. When all that it required was 5 to 10 per cent, it was practicable to extract it indirectly through excise taxes on the purchase of individual commodities. In choosing both rates and the items to be taxed, it was relevant to take account of such concepts as the "law of diminishing total revenue"—the rule that people react to successive increases in excise rates by buying progressively fewer of the articles taxed, so that too high a rate will bring in a lower total revenue than will a lower rate. Although this whole conception of taxation is anachronistic, it seems clear that the Congress is still thinking in these terms. They speak of "drying up the sources of revenue" if taxes are raised too high. But a proper war-time tax program does not depend upon anybody buying anything. It depends exclusively upon a nation of individuals receiving the national income, which can be depended upon with some certainty.

The President's proposal to limit retainable personal income to a flat $25,000—a popular and plausible enough proposal on the surface—suffers from the same defect. Everything beyond the $25,000 was to be taken in taxes. But if $25,000 is less than an individual needs to meet his fixed obligations and to buy his equitable share of the civilian production available, the proposed tax would be inequitable. And if $25,000 is more than the individual needs for these purposes, the tax would not be enough.

What these tax proposals illustrate is that war-time taxes cannot be set properly or accurately from the tax end. They have to be set from the commodities and services end—by taking in taxes everything except what the income-receiver can be allowed to retain, rather than allowing him to retain everything except what the aggregate of countless in-

genious little taxes happens to extract from him. Put another way, a proper war-time tax system cannot consist of deciding on an amount of money to be spent, then levying a multiplicity of taxes in the hope that they will bring in something approaching this amount without being too inequitable in incidence, and then making up the deficit by borrowing the surplus income which escaped the tax net. Too much is at stake for us to depend upon such a haphazard calculus of imponderables. The resulting revenue is too low. The amount of surplus income that escapes the tax net is too high. The amount that has to be borrowed is too high. The inequality of tax incidence is too great. We have got to escape from the realm of fiscal mythology into that of economic realities.

The Basis for a Proper War-Time Tax System

Controlling principles begin to emerge. It seems clear that the most fruitful approach to developing a war-time tax program is the simplest one. We shall drive straight for the objective which the present program fails to achieve through circumlocution. The foundation on which to build consists of three grand totals: (1) the total national production, which must be divided between (2) the total production required by the government for war-plus-normal activities and (3) the total production that remains for civilian use. The first total is obviously the governing one. Except for production carried over from previous years, it represents *all that is available* for both the government's use and our own.

The next step is to divide this key total into its two constituents. With the total national production for the fiscal year 1942-43 estimated at $115 billion, and with government expenditures set at $70 billion for military and $7.5 billion for non-military functions, the government's share of production amounts to $77.5 billion, leaving a civilian share of $37.5 billion. Since we know that the $115 billion of national income is distributed originally to individuals, we know that the government must go to individuals to get the $77.5 billion of income required to buy its $77.5 billion share of national production.

From this the first working principle of a realistic tax program emerges. The first requirement is that the entire national income actually be subject to taxation. For obviously the government cannot take $77.5 billion in taxes if less than this is legally subject to taxation. We are not

concerned here with any "clever little schemes" to avoid or evade taxation. The point is that present law permits a large portion of national income to escape any liability to taxation. It is legally exempt.

Thus we must first adopt a general criterion or formula composed of two principles. *First,* the whole of the national income must be made legally subject to taxation. *Second,* no deduction can subsequently be permitted the individual in calculating his net income for tax purposes unless what is deducted turns up somewhere else as taxable income. That is, every individual or business enterprise should properly be permitted to deduct from gross income the actual costs incurred in making the income. But either the deduction is for capital consumed in the productive process, in which case it is not a part of the net national production which we need to make wholly taxable; or the deducted costs will turn up as taxable income for somebody else as we go back from stage to stage in the productive process. As the general working rule, then, no deductions would be permitted unless they could meet this test. What are the categories of income now legally exempt from taxation which do not meet this test? Out of the dozen or more of the most serious legal loopholes, most of which the Ways and Means Committee refused to close despite conclusive arguments by the Treasury experts, we need note only a few of the most controversial in order to give point to our principle.

Tax-exempt government securities. Even by 1937 there were $65 billion of tax-exempt local, state, and federal securities. This means that taxpayers paid taxes, about $2 billion of the taxes were paid out by the governments as interest, and that this interest-income to individuals was exempt from taxation. Regardless of the historical reasons why this condition came about, there no longer remains any legal, economic, or moral reason why such a privileged position should be accorded to a special class of income.

Joint returns. The only equitable taxing unit is the spending unit. If the family is the spending unit, as is almost invariably the case, it is the family income that should be taxed. There is nothing but injustice in a situation where a single income-receiver maintaining one family spending unit, should pay higher taxes than are paid by an identical family spending unit in which the income is received by two persons who, by

reporting their incomes separately, place themselves in lower tax brackets and thereby pay a lower aggregate tax.

The abused privilege of deducting expense accounts from gross income. It is not news that expense accounts have always been padded with expenditures having no legitimate connection with business. But when the difference between income and expenses is retainable profit, enterprises find it quite feasible to keep expense accounts at a minimum. Especially now, when the excess-profits tax so severely limits the maximum retainable profit, abnormal sums are being spent in the guise of expense accounts. The abuse is the more flagrant when it is recalled that in war time so much of business comes to the enterprise without the normal expenditure of promotional money, so that legitimate expense accounts should have dropped to a minimum.

Legitimate costs of doing business are properly deductible, and one simple statute should prevent most of the abuse. The employing enterprise should be made legally responsible for the authenticity of all expense accounts approved for payment by themselves. Obviously it is administratively impossible for the government to audit all individual expense accounts for every enterprise in the country. But legal liability plus the requirement of as detailed and accurate records as the government requires of its own employees, added to the real possibility that at its leisure the government will get around to an audit, would make business enterprises as eager to keep expense accounts down during war time as they are during peace time when low costs mean high profits.

There are other categories of income—oil business income withdrawn from tax liability by the depletion allowance, insurance company investment income, and undistributed business profits, to name only a few—which are as important as those noted. But enough has been said to indicate the problem involved and what has to be done.

Taxation and the Individual

The basis for calculating individual taxes: Once the whole of the national income has been made legally subject to taxation, the final step is to allocate the total tax among income-receivers. We recognize that actually the task is not the allocation of the tax burden, but rather the allocation of the civilian commodities and services available. There will be

only $37.5 billion of civilian production for all of us in 1942-43. This amounts to less than $300 worth annually for each individual, and when we as a nation get down to such a low total stock of commodities and services, we face the task of seeing to it that everyone gets his equitable share.

Clearly, when a social criterion like equity is brought into play as a governing factor, we should have no misunderstanding of meaning or motives. There is no implication that the war emergency be used as an excuse to promote equalitarianism. What is definitely meant is that when both unprecedentedly high income and unprecedentedly little civilian production result simultaneously from our national struggle for existence, no one can be permitted to use a fortuitously high income-position to obtain more than his necessary share of what is available. Our standard of equity aims not at equality of consumption as an end in itself, but at as near to equality of consumption as is necessary to achieve a relative equality of sacrifice.

Under an unqualified pay-as-we-go tax policy, income-receivers would receive an aggregate money income of $115 billion, retain an aggregate of $37.5 billion to pay for civilian commodities and services, and pay an aggregate federal tax of $77.5 billion. How would the individual's share of the $77.5 billion tax bill be calculated? The general clue lies in any personal budget. Assume that a family normally spends a $2400 income as follows:

Food	$480	Automobile	$120
Rent	480	Other travel	60
Clothing	240	Tobacco	60
Household operation	180	Reading	60
Furnishings	120	Taxes, gifts	120
Medical care	120	Savings	240
		Miscellaneous	120

A glance tells the story. For the duration of the war the automobile is out, most of the new clothing and furnishings are out, and so on. They are out because they are not obtainable. The income normally absorbed by these items when they are produced, must now be used by the government to pay for war materials and services which are being produced instead. After retaining the amount necessary to pay for his equitable share of what is still available, which is surely the maximum to which

any income-receiver is entitled, the excess or surplus money income must go to the government. For it is the aggregate of precisely these surpluses that amounts to the $77.5 billion which the government needs.

There are manifest differences in the budgetary requirements of different individuals and income-groups. One man will pay $200 a month for rent while another pays $20. One will have fixed obligations of $50,000 a year in insurance premium payments, interest, mortgage payments and so on, while another has $50. One will be supporting his wife, three children, and two invalid relatives, while another will be supporting only himself. Obviously, in calculating what each class of income-receivers may retain, allowances must be made for all variable factors. The statistical task is complicated but quite feasible; for basically the calculation problem is the same as the one long experienced in setting allowable deductions under our present income tax law. Government agencies—the Treasury, the Bureau of the Budget, the Bureau of Labor Statistics, the National Resources Planning Board, the Census Bureau—have all of the data and expert personnel necessary to calculate the tax schedules with considerable precision. And when all of the calculations are finished, the aggregate of income-receivers would be retaining $37.5 billion of their money incomes and paying $77.5 in federal taxes.

Status of past accumulations of savings and of new borrowings: The basic policy must necessarily be supplemented by a prohibition against the use of past accumulations of savings and against the obtaining of new loans in any form, except in case of *proved need*. It would be futile to try to balance spendable income and buyable goods and services, if injection of added buying-power from these sources were permitted. The exception for proved need, while taking care of emergency situations and people who live on savings rather than on income, would keep the use of this class of buying-power at a minimum. And it will have to be kept down because new savings, which in normal times neutralize to a great extent the disruptive effects of dishoarding, will have been stopped.

Private debt cannot be retired except as previously planned. Many individuals and corporations, rather than lose all benefit from surplus current income, might use it to retire debts rather than pay taxes. Taxable current income would thus become untaxable cash deposits on capital account, and the government would have to borrow the money. This pro-

vision, while permitting all private debt liquidation to proceed at the normal rate, would prevent any wholesale liquidation out of surplus current income.

The problem of security in the immediate postwar period: Both individuals and corporations must be gotten through the period of disorganization that will accompany the transition from war-time to peace-time production. With this very real problem in mind, the Treasury is now promoting war bonds and stamps as a backlog of savings for postwar contingencies. A valid point is involved here, and permitting the purchase of up to $5000 in war bonds in lieu of taxes should give the necessary degree of postwar security to individuals. In effect, this amounts to permitting individuals to save up to $5000 of current income for emergencies, as a kind of insurance, which amount will be paid to them in the postwar period by those individuals who are well enough off to pay the necessary bond-retirement taxes. This permission would not be extended to those who had a substitute backlog in the form of, say, cash deposits or cash-value in insurance, and there should be a limit of, say, 20 to 40 per cent on the proportion of an annual tax payment for which bond purchases could be substituted. The bonds would not be cashable in the postwar period except in case of proved need, and after a period of perhaps three years, after the reconversion to peace-time production had been accomplished, all uncashed bonds would be canceled since their main purpose and function would have been fulfilled.

Business enterprises offer a different problem altogether. It might be feasible to permit enterprises to buy war bonds in lieu of taxation up to the amount required by them to meet their fixed charges during the first few postwar years. This would enable them to avoid being thrown into bankruptcy during the reconversion period. Much better, in my view, would be a policy of considering postwar reconversion as a national responsibility. Enterprises have converted to war production because of national or governmental necessity. The capital required has wherever necessary been supplied or lent by the government. Reconversion on the basis of capital similarly borrowed from the government would seem a logical and equitable next step. The essential distinction between these enterprises and individuals, in the matter of being permitted to save current income for postwar contingencies, is that the individuals are allowed up to $5000

which they can spend only for consumption and only if necessary, whereas the business enterprises would be saving for capital investment which would make theirs a permanent saving. The government should undertake to see to it that reconversion capital is available in the postwar period to each enterprise unable to raise the necessary capital privately through the banking system or otherwise. But beyond this, with the possible exceptions mentioned, the government should take in taxes all corporate net income not reinvested or distributed to individuals.

Collection of the war income tax at the source would be indispensable. This is so for two reasons. First, the kind of war income tax proposed would include millions of people who have never paid an income tax in their lives, so that collection at the source would be the only administratively feasible method. Second, considering the widespread habit of paying income taxes out of current rather than from past income laid aside, collection at the source is the only feasible method of preventing current income destined for tax payments from ever getting into circulation. Tax payments should be deducted at the time the individual is paid his income, no matter what the payment period, and whatever adjustments are necessary can be made at the end of the year by the Treasury. An incidental but important benefit would be the more rapid collection of taxes.

We must simply note the existence of two further problems. First, state and local taxes must clearly come out of the $37.5 billion of income retained by individuals after paying federal taxes of $77.5 billion. There is at least a possibility that these taxes should be collected along with federal taxes and turned back to the states. Second, it would have to be decided whether the present federal excise tax system should be abandoned and the whole of the $77.5 billion taken in income tax, or whether the excise revenue should be retained intact, and only the balance of the $77.5 billion taken in income tax. Although the tax system proposed here suggests that the income tax is the only tax necesary to the federal government, the dislocations and administrative difficulties involved in a precipitous abandonment of the excise system might well be so enormous that it should be retained.

Inflation and price-fixing: It will be recognized that with such a pay-as-we-go-by-taxation program as is here proposed, there could be almost no inflation or price-fixing problem for the simple reason that none

of the inflationary factors would be in effect. There can be no inflation problem where there are only $37.5 billion in money to buy $37.5 billion in civilian commodities and services, and only $77.5 billion in money to buy $77.5 billion in public commodities and services. Under this kind of program the only major function of such an agency as Mr. Leon Henderson's O.P.A. would be to ration scarce commodities and services on the grounds of equity. On the industrial side, there would likewise still be need for a priorities or rationing system to handle the distribution of scarce raw materials. But in no case would there be any inflation or price-fixing problem of any dimensions.

The Moral Case

The nature and magnitude of the present war effort give to the phrase "taxation according to ability to pay" its most ultimate meaning. With the almost fantastic national production of $115 billion, there will be fewer commodities and services produced for the maintenance of the population than there were at the depth of the depression when we produced much less than half as great a total. Increasingly as the war goes on the nation requires every scrap of production that everyone can spare beyond the minimal requirements of maintenance. Put another way, this means that increasingly, in order that the government can pay for its progressively larger share of our total production, the nation requires every cent of income that anyone can spare beyond what he must use to buy the necessities for maintenance. *All he can spare.* If he can spare it to buy war bonds he can spare it to pay war taxes.

The ten million men being rapidly drawn into the fighting forces cannot bargain or argue about what they can afford to spare in the war effort. Many people, feeling half guilty and half pleased about how well they are doing out of the war, resent this comparison. But they cannot evade it. The obligation of sacrifice is not the exclusive prerogative of young men in good health. Fighting men cannot continue their occupational training, or improve their positions, or save money to invest in postwar security, as millions of civilians are doing. We as a nation compel them through an Act of Congress to *spare* everything a man can give, including their lives. And to make this exaction the government is not forced to promise, as it is in the case of war bonds, to repay at 2.9 per cent cumulative interest the cash value of what is given up.

The fighting man is compelled to contribute *the whole of his current life* to fighting the war for all of us. In return he is provided with simple maintenance. Surely, in all equity, the civilian's obligation is no less. He should be expected to contribute the whole of his current life, too, in return for maintenance. This means that no matter what function he performs in the nation he cannot justifiably feel himself imposed upon if he is asked to contribute *the whole of his current income* except what is required to pay for simple maintenance. Until his contribution reaches this point he has not even equaled the monetary sacrifice of the fighting man; and at no time is he called upon to match the physical sacrifice of risking or losing his life.

In mortal danger the nation acted through its Congress. Through the Selective Service Act it ordered every man of proper age to register for service and to join the armed forces and fight when directed. It peremptorily yanked every fighting man out of his normal occupation, deprived him of his normal income, removed him from the association of his family and friends, and put him in a training camp or Australia or Ulster or Panama or North Africa to fight for his own life and that of the nation. It said that for a fee of 6 per cent it would pay his insurance premiums, but that by a year after the war he must repay everything. If after the war he cannot find a job or keep up his own insurance payments, *c'est la guerre*. During service he will be paid $50 a month plus maintenance. As for dependents deprived of his support, the nation will pay his wife $28 out of his $50 plus an additional $22, with a small addition for others. They must live as best they can on this, regardless of their normal standard of living.

The fighting men accept all this. They accept their historic responsibility. Millions of other men and women cannot fight as soldiers or are counted more valuable to the war effort in other capacities. But this circumstance surely makes their responsibility no less. Immunity from armed service is not a carte blanche release from the obligation to sacrifice. In all equity, the nation has as much right to draft the steel corporation executive, the coal miner, the airplane worker, or the farmer to perform his war production function at $50 a month plus maintenance, as it has to draft the fighting man on the same terms. I wonder if enough people appreciate this.

We compel the fighting man to sacrifice what he does regardless of his present convenience and regardless of what happens to him after the war. Our national survival requires this. But what applies to him applies with equal force to every individual and business enterprise in this country. We have got to sacrifice for the war alone an average of 61 per cent of our money incomes. There is nothing sancrosanct about a civilian worker or a businessman or a corporation. There is nothing unique about them that gives them a right to demand in the present only treatment that is consonant with postwar security. If they arrive in the postwar world with their jobs or enterprises impaired, *c'est la guerre,* too. Like the fighting men we must take our chances with the future. And meanwhile, if the future we fight for is to be ours instead of a travesty of what should have been, we must pay the money cost of this war as we fight it.

Economic realities make this the only defensible course open to us. Equity requires that we follow it. All that stands in our way is the counsel of despair—the counsel of the "impossibilists" who say it is *politically impossible.* I hope the members of the Congress realize that nothing is politically impossible that the people will, that their best interests require, and that the Congress has the courage to enact. I hope especially that the forty-six members of the Finance Committee and the Ways and Means Committee realize this before it is too late. We ask our responsible leaders to lead. They alone can legislate, as we cannot. Theirs is the duty, the responsibility, and the power. What we ask for in high places is a political courage and an intelligence of action commensurate with the occasion. With this we can pay for this war as we go, for its absence so far is all that has stood in our way.

THE NORTH-AMERICAN NEGRO

By LUIS ALBERTO SANCHEZ Y SANCHEZ

ON THE TRAIN from Los Angeles to Chicago the negro porter is in my compartment making up my berth. He looks at a small volume on my desk and says, almost mystically, "Walt Whitman!"

I hand him the book.

He opens it and reads, drinking in the words with his eyes. Then he tenderly replaces the book on the desk, open at "When lilacs last in the dooryard bloomed . . . ."

In the afternoon he hovers about me as if he wanted to say something. I look at him out of the corner of my eye. He is tall and thin, with high cheek bones and a sad look in his eyes. He is slightly bald and walks softly, smiling to himself.

"This negro is an educated man," I say to my wife.

My wife has seen many students, black and white, working their way through college as waiters and chauffeurs. She answers:

"Probably."

By the morning of the third day the porter and I have become friendly. Sheepishly he offers me a bundle of papers. The first sheet is a song—words and music by Vernon Ray. Two more songs—words by Vernon Ray. Finally a roll of poems; one of them excellent, ironic; others penetrating and melancholy.

"You are Vernon Ray, aren't you?" I ask.

"Yessuh," he answers automatically. "Yessuh": the stigma of servitude.

We talk. Vernon Ray, a negro porter on the Santa Fe "Scout"—Los Angeles to Chicago—knows the poems of Walt Whitman, Carl Sandburg, and Langston Hughes by heart. He has read Rayford Logan, the negro historian, and Ralph Bunche.[1] This humble, white-jacketed porter studied at the University of Oklahoma, has a Master's degree and has

[1]Dr Ralph Bunche, expert on native problems in the British Empire section of the Library of Congress.

published poems in several literary magazines. It is hard for me to recognize a fellow author disguised as a valet! Yet not for one moment will his quiet manner allow me to forget that he is only a "train porter." His voice retains the accustomed humility and respect as he addresses me.

"I wish I could read your book about my country."

I promise to mail him a free copy as soon as it is published, and I write his name and address in my notebook.

* * *

I do not deliberately dramatize this episode, yet in a manner Ray is a symbol of the mystery, the misery, the problem, and the promise of the negro. I know that there are even now white students in Ray's position. Aboard ships and in restaurants one met university graduates who were unable to capitalize on their education. But the negro is a more extreme case. In 1935, for instance, 29 per cent (3,500,000) of the total negro population of the United States was on relief. More graphically: where unemployment affected 20 to 25 per cent of the white wage earners, it hit 40 to 50 per cent of the negroes![2]

Probably few Americans will be surprised by the glaring injustice of these figures, but will rather marvel that they are not worse. "What better can negroes expect than to have half their population enjoying relief! Why, we are actually working for them!"

I have heard similar explanations, but they miss the point.

Or perhaps they don't miss the point—for that is they are the point. Only in the United States is one racial group so sharply distinguished from all others. Only in the United States does the impersonal hand of economic fate fall so heavily upon a particular people. Only, alas, in the United States do the rest of the races take this misfortune for granted; and in this last distinction lies the root of the North-American negro problem. North Americans take the status of the negro for granted, and manifest only indifference at his lack of employment, education, and opportunity.

The negro is clearly underprivileged. Negroes were 16.3 per cent illiterate in 1930 as compared with a 6 to 8 per cent illiteracy for whites.[3]

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[2]Charles H. Wesley, *The Negro in the Americas,* (Washington: Howard University, 1940), p. 76.

[3]Louis R. Wilson, *Geography of Reading* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1938), pp. 342-350, *passim.*

Unemployment among negroes is always greater than among whites; there is an almost universal prejudice against whites and blacks studying together in the same classroom (though the northern and western states have overcome it to some extent); and even though the federal government has declared the equality of both whites and blacks, state governments and local institutions often vary considerably in their attitude toward the race question. For example, in 1930 the average annual educational outlay for every white child was $44.31, for every negro child, $12.57. In South Carolina, where racialism prevails, the figures for 1931-32 were $52.89 and $5.20, respectively.

Further, in spite of the expressed federal policy, even the federal government cannot avoid the instinctive North-American slighting of the negro. The negro is on relief—but relief is often a mere pittance which does not serve to prevent hunger, and certainly does no justice to the effective worth of the individual. I have known negroes employed by the Library of Congress, possessing personal and intellectual abilities and nevertheless earning meager salaries, because, though official records do not so state, they are negroes.

In short, America, the melting pot of the world, theoretically opening wide her arms to all children, has long starved a foundling in her home. Anachronistic tradition and foolish prejudice prevent this great country from fully utilizing her heterogeneous humanity and from furthering the unity without which a great nation cannot exist.

These slights, this indifference, sadden the South American. The negro has never been an alien amongst us. We are brought up by a negro who sings us her lullabies, and we grow with her children, sharing equally in childish adventures. The negroes shared in the childhood of our countries as well as of our own children. Poetry has been woven around the immortal deeds of the negro "Falucho,"[4] a hero in Argentina's fight for freedom. San Martín recruited negro battalions for his ragged armies of liberation—battalions whose behavior has been highly praised by our white historians. Antonio Maceo's name figures as prominently as those of the other fathers of the Cuban Republic: Marti Gómez, Céspedes. In our history mulattoes play an important part, as well as negroes. Commentaries have grown around the work of Rubén Darío,

[4]Antonio Ruiz' "nom de guerre."

the great Nicaraguan poet, attributing his genius to his mixture of bloods. Some assert that Bolivar had negro blood, and Rivadavia, the first President of Argentina, was indisputably a mulatto.

I mention these facts because I must emphasize the inability of Latin Americans to understand the instinctive race prejudice—embryonic Nazism—of North Americans toward the negro. There is no historical justification for it; the negro was never an intruder in the United States. He preceded the Pilgrim Fathers by almost a century. Saint Augustine was founded in 1565 by Spanish and negro farmers and artisans, followers of the Conquistador Menéndez. In 1528, Lucas Vásquez de Ayllón founded a little town on the Atlantic coast, north of Cape Hatteras. He was accompanied by negroes brought over from Santo Domingo.[5]

The negro participated in almost every event in the conquest of the vast territory of the United States, just as he did in South America, yet historians have slid over his heroisms, just as the North Americans forget his sorry plight. Crispus Attucks, for instance, precipitated the Boston Massacre, and lost his life there in the birth pangs of American Independence. Matt Henson, Admiral Peary, and four Eskimos were the first people to reach the North Pole, and Henson was a negro. Between these two points in history stretches a world of negro and white cooperation. The negro historian, Rayford Logan, states that in D'Estaing's attack upon the English at Savannah in 1779, about 600 Santo Domingan negroes took part.[6] One-hundred-and-seventy-eight-thousand negroes fought in the Civil War, and nearly as many in World War I. In short, the North-American negro's contribution to the development of his country has been as great as that of our negro in South America, yet whereas the Latin-American negro enjoys the full privileges of his country, his northern brother is discriminated against and his achievements are viewed with pallid indifference or stupid curiosity.

Think again of Vernon Ray. Think of his intelligence, his ability, his education, and his literary success. In South America would he be unknown? Would indifferent ears hear his "Yessuh"—Los Angeles to Chicago?

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[5]Wesley, *op. cit.*, p. 73

[6]Rayford Logan, *The Diplomatic Relations of the United States with Haiti* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1941), p. 25.

THE NORTH-AMERICAN NEGRO

The negro in the United States is totally separated from the white races. He is separate in his ways of thinking, his behavior, and his innermost thought. I will show you what I mean. A Latin-American friend and I were seated in the back of a bus. At a stop in Virginia, just outside the District of Columbia, several negroes entered and walked through the crowded bus to the rear, to "their" seats, as I later found out. Two of them addressed us, asking us if we would be so kind as to move toward the front, so they could have a seat. Since then, when I find a vacant seat next to a negro I sit in it—in defiance of this convention. Now this same thing happens in South America, though not very often. In Chile, for example, there are ladies who refuse to sit next to a *roto,*[7] in Peru next to an Indian; yet both belong to their own race, and the prejudice is based upon financial status and cleanliness. We do not hesitate to sit side by side with a negro for racial reasons alone.

Again, the negro is exploited economically in both the United States and South America. Yet if we exploit the negro in our plantations, we also treat the Indian as a slave, and exploit the poor whites (peons) in many South-American countries. Yet Indians, whites, or negroes who acquire culture and economic position in South America automatically acquire social standing (the millionaires Patiño in Bolivia and Femandini in Peru are proof enough), since pure social standing is not based on the concept of race but on a transitory economic status. In spite of any achievements, negroes remain in the United States a race apart.

Evidence for this is not hard to find. Let us logically assume, for instance, that the racial problem in the United States is based upon exact principles and ask ourselves, "What constitutes a negro?"

The answer to this question amazes Latin Americans; although it might seem natural enough to Dr. Rosenberg in Berlin. In North America, a negro is anyone who has negro blood in his veins, no matter how small the amount. Therefore our Latin American *zambos,* mulattoes, *pardos,* and *morenos*[8] are, by Yankee terminology, "niggers," pure and simple. This is certainly a connotative interpretation, rich in significance for a student of race prejudice. Ancestry is all important, just as "Aryans"

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[7]Literally, a broken one"—a member of the lowest class in Chile.

[8]These terms represent different shades of color and mixtures with Indian bloodlines.

are so important to Hitler and Dr. Rosenberg, and "Anglo-Saxon Aryans" to Houston Stewart Chamberlain and Count Gobineau.

Worse, the number of mulattoes in the United States clearly indicates that sexual relations exist between blacks and whites. Nevertheless, marriage between blacks and whites is illegal in most Southern states. Southern mulattoes are therefore bastards, and illegitimacy is consecrated in the name of morals. We Latin Americans cannot grasp such a Puritanical concept, for a child is a child, and our law tends to overlook the legal difference between a legitimate and an illegitimate birth. Our codes give an "illegitimate" child full legal rights, and it is almost impossible for us to conceive of compulsory illegitimacy for racial distinctions. Thus by custom and by law negroes are considered racially separate and distinct from whites in the North-American Democracy.

The negro nevertheless has, according to a judgment handed down by the Supreme Court of the United States,[9] equal rights with whites in all aspects of life. Racially separate though he may be, his legal rights and his opportunities are theoretically the same as those of any other North American. This is both true and false, for while the negro has achieved increasingly equal opportunities in many fields, his progress has been racially separate, and not in combination with whites. In 1865 the negroes had only a few schools, yet today they own about 25,000 elementary schools, 1400 high schools and 500 normal schools, colleges, and universities. Between 1860 and 1870, only 44 negroes graduated from college; between 1900 and 1910, 1,613 graduated; and in 1937-38, 4,965 received Bachelor's degrees. Today in the United States there are more than 150,000 negro teachers, lawyers, doctors, editors, and scientists. Yet they graduated for the most part from negro schools, for in spite of the Supreme Court, educational opportunities are equal only so long as the negroes are separate. In the Northeast and the Northwest, negroes apparently enjoy more comparative equality than elsewhere in the United States, but 19 out of 48 states prohibit joint education of whites and negroes, and many others do not tolerate it in practice even though there is no written law against it. Again, the negro has been given equal voting rights with the white in North America, yet many of the Southern states restrict negro voting, and since it cannot be done legally, resort to every type of legal and political chicanery and intimidation.

[9]December, 1938.

Ask Vernon Ray if this is true, and he will answer you:
"Yessuh."

It is logical but irritating that badly organized oligarchic republics like the majority of those in South America should harbor caste prejudices because of economic interests; but it is absurd for a wealthy nation like the United States to maintain race prejudice and hate the negro as an inferior and disturbing element. The basis of the negro's inferiority is economic, and that basis should be transitory, not perpetual.

> Economic forces gave rise to this condition. Tobacco, then cotton, rice, and sugar determined the economic fate of the negroes brought to the colonies. Then custom, law, and religion gave sanction to this slave status and so it remained until the Civil War.[10]

The slave status ended with the Civil War, but negroes like Vernon Ray and even those more famed, have remained a race apart. Law and custom separate them from their white fellow-citizens; and with more force than law and custom, they themselves seem to live alone and secret as a race. Though they seem sympathetic and approachable, though they willingly communicate their ideas, enthusiasms, and talents to the whites, yet there is always that inviolable barrier between the northern negro and his white brother, that silent reminder that keeps one always subconsciously aware that the negro is the negro.

The negro lives alone, and perhaps from choice. At the fringes of his residential districts the conflict between negro and white often reaches physical proportions. More crimes are committed around 110th and 112th Streets in New York than in any other district of comparable size in the nation. This is in Harlem, New York's negro district—where whites go at night for a good time, courting women in the presence of their husbands, fathers, or brothers.

Yet in Harlem the negroes are themselves—and seem to relish their racial solitude. Here they express their racial pride, and relish their racial progress. The achievement that is denied recognition in the United States here receives praise and adulation.

Let me recall an experience I recently had. We are in the Apollo Theatre, on 125th Street near 8th Avenue in the heart of Harlem. It is a weekday night; nevertheless the theatre is filled with an eager, excited audience. Tap dancers, musicians, singers, and acrobats hold the stage.

[10]Wesley, *op. cit.*, p. 74

The gallery cheers Sammy Wood's tap dancing vociferously. The mulatto Josephine Baker sings sweet blues while Louis Armstrong, trumpet in hand and smiling infectiously, conducts his demon orchestra. Sammy and Louis start a diabolic saraband, drumming with toes and heels. The audience whistles and yells with delight. The musicians occasionally drop their instruments to join in the chorus. But Louis Armstrong is ever the master. Vibrating from head to foot, clapping his hands and croaking joyously, he concentrates in himself the gaiety and enthusiasm of the audience. He is the master. He soothes and cajoles his audience, and when he announces one of his own songs, presaged by the liquid note of his marvelous trumpet, the audience thunders and shivers with anticipation.

But this is not all. Louis Armstrong, the King, pauses. He presents Louise Beavers, the famous "Mammy" of the motion pictures "Imitation of Life" and "Belle Starr," and although she apologizes for not being able to sing because of a cold, the thunderous ovation of her subjects gives ample evidence of the popularity of their Queen.

Both Armstrong and Louise Beavers are on the stage. Armstrong commands silence, and with a huge smile which threatens to swallow the microphone, he says:

"Ladies and gentlemen, we have with us tonight, the great Joe Louis!"

A wave of frenzy seizes the audience. Stolid and impassive, as is his wont, Joe Louis, in Army uniform, jerks a stiff military salute. Afterwards in spite of a prolonged and frenzied applause, Joe Louis maintains his habitual composure, half sullen, half shy.

The final number on the program is "The Star Spangled Banner," a trumpet solo by Louis Armstrong. The audience rises solemnly, and Joe Louis' massive silhouette stands out in his box. When the performance is over, the people mill around the exits looking for their idol. But Joe Louis has dodged artfully and is nowhere to be found.

This incident serves to emphasize a curious fact: Joe Louis, World's Heavyweight Champion; Louis Armstrong, the most famous trumpet player in the world; and Louise Beavers, beloved screen actress, all have to gather in this humble and isolated theatre in Harlem, where they feel at home and are appreciated and idolized by their black brethren. Joe Louis rarely exhibits himself except in Harlem. His glory rests upon his solid shoulders and dwells in the hearts of his people.

And the negro is proud of his inalienable popular idols—proud of his achievements with a racial pride. Denied recognition in the world of whites, he is becoming conscious of himself and achieving a racial solidarity along with racial improvements. Think of Vernon Ray—proud of his reading, his poetry—and always and inviolably a negro. "Yessuh."

Contrast to this racial pride, this growing sense of their collective importance, the spectacle of Harlem. The first day I was in New York Waldo Frank, who knows of my interest in everyday life and my dislike for frivolity, took me on a swift tour of Manhattan. We went from Riverside Drive, where the wealthy Jews live, to East Second Street, the domain of the Jewish poor; from luxurious Rockefeller Center to miserable Harlem—and I shall never forget it, for Harlem is a unique spectacle. Negro and mulatto children play games in the littered streets of Harlem, casting hostile glances at passing automobiles, shouting at pedestrians. Old women sew and knit in their doorways and windows. Wildly dressed adults gather at street corners, shop windows, and bars.

Yet in Harlem the city lives and breathes misery. The human swarms reveal, not hunger, but humiliation, which is worse. Here we deal with no such poverty as we find in our little South-American villages—we deal, not with the poverty and indigence which hurts, but with a poverty and indigence of personal pride which fans the more fiercely the flame of racial pride. In contrast to the general well-being in the United States, the negroes of Harlem are poor, but nowhere as poor as our native poor.

The inner poverty of Harlem becomes evident at night in the wild escapism which flourishes in contrast to the resignation and squalor of the day. Sordid and mean daytime Harlem is transformed at night into a dazzling scene. Whole sections become gambling dives and brothels. White men, thirsting for emotional excitement, loiter around dives in which alcohol and cheap love excite passions and lay the groundwork for tragedies. Lustfully, the whites watch the negroes dance at the Astoria. Brothels pander to perverted desires, and ebony Venuses feign passion and ecstacy for a price. Afterwards, it is easy to accuse the negro of being sensual and cruel; but the fact is that Harlem is the vicious white's paradise.

Meanwhile the negro throws himself into the maelstrom of his acrobatic dances, as in the rumbas of "Las Fritas" in Havana, the *cumbias* of

Panama, the *condombes* of Montevideo, and the *marineras* of Peru. Poor negroes, hard workers who drown their sorrows in work and sweat and alcohol! And Vernon Ray?

Contrast this misery of the spirit again with negro racial pride, and then I shall tell you what they both mean to me. Think, for instance, of the negro's pride in his ring fighters, the pride that has been increasing ever since Jack Johnson knocked out Jim Jeffries in 1910. Jack Johnson was devil-may-care, strong as a bull, a notorious drunkard, and (with a sly wink) quite a Don Juan. He managed to capture a pretty white girl with the fame of his biceps and the added attraction of "Darling Jack's" money. How different he was from taciturn Joe Louis!

"The boxing crown will always be the negro's," a negro enthusiast once told me.

"Remember Kid Chocolate, the Cuban negro?"

"How about Sam McVea?" says an older negro.

"What do you think of Jesse Owens' record in the Olympics?" asks a long-legged student, the whites of whose eyes are like headlights in the dark.

"We've got the best music in the whole United States. The best dancers. The best singers. The best poets. The best clarinetists. The best novelists. Without us there would be no blues. Nor hot jazz. Nor spirituals. Nor Josephine Baker. Nor the banjo. Nor the musical saw. Nor the new virtuosity of the saxophone and the double bass. Nor the new negro Cuban poetry. Nor the social novel. Nor rebel poetry. Nor surrealism."

Hold on, brother negroes: I, too, know something about it and can give you an answer.

There is no doubt that the negro has been constantly on the alert in America. In an atmosphere of Indians, Basques, Castilians, Englishmen, Flemings, Irish, and Dutch, the negro represents a passionate cry, the call of the flesh, a permanent carnival. Among Catholics, Puritans, Quakers, and Anglicans, the negro, pagan and fetishistic, is the colorful note, the cry of rebellion. He is all movement, all rhythm, all song. He discovered the key to contortion, the secret of curvature; as a defense against a hostile universe that cares little for his hopes and sorrows, the negro has found a way to guard his joviality from so much voluntary senility. And thus he discovered many things: the melancholy blues, the

moving sincerity of spirituals, the modernist poetry of Latin America, "hot jazz," and frenzied dancing.

And the negro guards his secrets jealously. He shows off his superiorities with a feeling of racial unity. "To be a negro" is on the way to becoming a source of pride, just as "to be an Indian" is a distinction in Mexico. In the United States very few people yet realize the significance of an oppressed race and people suddenly becoming proud of its position; yet the North-American negro is already beginning to feel what the Mexican Indian has felt since the revolution of 1911. To be sure, the Indian in Mexico constitutes a majority; but in a country made up of as many minorities as the United States, a minority of 13,200,000 is pretty important.

The negro's way of living in special districts is significant of the ease with which he can achieve active racial solidarity as well as symbolic of the spiritual solitude in which he exists in the white world. Harlem, the Black Belt in Chicago, the Northwest Side in Washington, Philadelphia's Seventh Ward, Atlanta's West End, Cleveland's Cedar and Central Avenues, and countless others all over the United States exist as colored nuclei for his political organism. In these common denominators, noisy districts of perpetual clamor and movement, of poverty and endless resentment, the negro holds the key to a destiny. Perhaps he may even learn it from the Latin Americas, for a Latin American cannot talk Spanish in Harlem and talk in secret. Thousands of Puerto Ricans and Cubans have come to swell the numbers of hard, humiliated, and resentful "colored workers." This is why New York is known as the "largest Puerto Rican City."

Let us consider the negro as a political entity. Remember first that the democratic concept of politics depends upon the individuality of the voter—upon his ability and his willingness to be a single personality, to be conscious of himself as himself. This individualism is directly proportional to culture—culture which unequal education and financial opportunity have denied the negro. It is small wonder, then, that the negro has strong communist and fascist proclivities, for in his uneducated state he is either a staunch traditionalist (as evidenced by his faith in the Republican Party) or else, when his ingrained prejudices are ever so lightly shaken, he protests through his new knowledge in the most instinctive, simple, and thoughtless fashion—communism. This is the reason why the

Communist Party has long appealed to a ready audience in postulating a negro as Vice-Presidential candidate, although they know he has no chance of being elected. They are sowing seed for a later harvest—and more than 13,000,000 negroes constitute more than 10 per cent of the population of the United States!

Let history substantiate and explain what I have claimed. Before the Roosevelt administration the majority of the negro vote was Republican. During the Civil War, the Republican Party fought for and won the emancipation of the slaves. The negroes, who venerate the memory of Lincoln as much as their ancestors did, became loyal followers of the successors of "Honest Abe." That the Republican Party had turned reactionary did not matter; tradition carried more weight than reality. (Incidentally, I notice that in my own country the old negro Democrats, followers of the *caudillo* Nicolás de Pierola, are still faithful to the "cause," still loyal to one of his sons, even though graft and comfort have replaced the martial spirit of the old "caliph.") World War I, in which the negro shed his blood "for those who denied him the vote," aroused the negro to a sense of his potentialities. The common danger, the recognition of negro jazz and art that followed the war (especially in the France the negro discovered with the war), the birth of Bolshevism in Europe—all these found an echo in the awakened thoughts of the negro. Langston Hughes symbolized the awakening:

> I, too, sing America.
>
> I am the darker brother.
> They send me to eat in the kitchen
> When company comes,
> But I laugh,
> An' eat well,
> And grow strong.
>
> Tomorrow,
> I'll sit at the table
> When company comes.
> Nobody'll dare
> Say to me,
> "Eat in the kitchen,"
> Then.

Besides,
They'll see how beautiful I am
And be ashamed,—

I, too, am America.[11]

* * *

Then Franklin D. Roosevelt started a new era in political policy. For the first time the government evinced a systematic interest in the negro. It was not merely a political expedient to obtain the negro vote—a new problem had arisen: Hitler. What Hitler represented, among other things, was the triumph of racialism. To oppose Hitler's doctrine of race and state supremacy implied, above all, freeing oneself of all traces of racialism and oppression, for the theories of totalitarianism, taken one way or another, enrolled the negro against democracy. As a counter measure, Roosevelt offered the negroes many opportunities, especially relief and the W.P.A., without which many of them would not have been able to weather the depression, and in 1936, the Republican Party lost two million negro votes—votes which helped to re-elect Roosevelt by a landslide majority.

In 1939, one of those women's societies which are so numerous in the United States and which usually interfere in every affair, The Daughters of the American Revolution, tried to flaunt white hegemony at the expense of Marian Anderson, the most famous negro singer in the United States and one of the greatest contraltos in the world. The D.A.R. prevented Marian Anderson from singing in Constitution Hall. Mrs. Roosevelt protested vehemently against such an attitude, and Marian Anderson sang before an enraptured multitude from the steps of the Lincoln Memorial, the most impressive monument in the United States. Negroes' hearts responded to that beautiful and significant gesture. They voted in a considerable majority for Roosevelt's third term.

In September, 1941, traveling from Valparaiso to New York, I read a radiogram which stated that President Roosevelt had asked all government officials and industrialists to give the negroes employment opportunities under the same conditions as whites. That day I realized that the President was taking the pulse of national unity on the eve of war.

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[11]Langston Hughes, "I, Too," *Anthology of American Negro Literature*. (New York; Modern Library, 1929), p. 210.

To fight racialism, here and in other lands, now and tomorrow, with a race-conscious army is a cruel paradox. That is why, at this critical moment, when negro soldiers crowd New Orleans, or ask to be admitted on equal terms into the Navy,[12] the negro problem has a greater significance and is closer to a solution than ever before. Those who look to the future cannot but be aware that no country can contain a separate minority for long without running the risk of being actively opposed or disorganized by such a minority. This holds true in the United States where, in spite of the tremendous assimilating power of the country, there are nevertheless so many minorities that the majority is rarely more than the sum of several of them. Now, for the first time in a long history, the negroes are willing to lay aside their separateness, and the whites can find the negro useful in the coming struggle. If a common sympathy can grow out of a common necessity the negro may yet find both equality and fruition in "the land of the free." On the other hand, we are not dealing merely with inequality and a simple ideological concept, but with something more fundamental: the certainty that if this rent in the democratic fabric is not repaired, the fabric itself stands in danger. For the dividing process which war earnings and the common cause of combat have halted, will inevitably be strengthened and furthered by the international economic struggle that follows the war.

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We Latin Americans may still lack democracy, and we may not have solved all the problems of comfort, but we are free from the stigma of racial prejudice. With us, race is an economic concept. The skin becomes lighter or darker with the fluctuation of wealth. And the rest—oh shades of Verlaine!—"the rest is nothing but literature."

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[12]"Since June 1, 1942, the Navy has enlisted members of the negro race as apprentice seamen in the United States Naval Reserve. After a period of preliminary training, it is intended that these negro recruits will be assigned to sea duty as well as to shore stations. Prior to June 1, 1942, negroes were enlisted by the Navy in messman ratings."—Randall Jacobs, Chief of Naval Personnel.

A NEW PAN AMERICANISM

By EARLE K. JAMES

RARE PROPHETIC QUALITIES would have been needed in those days of the '20's—when our Marines were in the Caribbean, when war with Mexico was being advocated by many, and when Latin America rang to denunciations of our imperialism—to predict that in 1942 virtually all of the Latin-American republics would be united with us in war. Yet this has come to pass; and for those who knew the gulf separating the peoples in this hemisphere—including disputes among Latin-American states themselves that in one case led to armed conflict—the transformation in the spirit and practice of Pan Americanism is little short of miraculous.

The new era in Pan-American relationships is not entirely of our own making. The American republics, much as some of them would like to think themselves able to fashion their future independent of the rest of the globe, have been moved by great world trends. Military, economic, and political cooperation has been forged in the face of great threats from abroad. Yet such cooperation has also been possible because in the last few decades the peoples of this hemisphere have begun to live as actual neighbors instead of the strangers they were for almost a century of independent existence.

It was another war, the first World War, that in reality laid the bases for the inter-American living of today. We like to think of Pan Americanism starting with the visions of men like Bolivar, or even with the first Pan-American conference of 1889; but these are beginnings only in terms of the historian. For until the opening of the Panama Canal in 1915 great areas of South America were as aloof from us as Australia once was; and in the Caribbean and Mexico, where we were in closer contact with Latin Americans, our policies were those of Theodore Roosevelt's Big Stick and Knox's Dollar Diplomacy, creative of a friction that penetrated all inter-American relationships. It was the opening of the Panama Canal and the great economic and social shifts effected by the war which spurred our interest in Latin America and the vast expansion in our shipping, banking, commercial, and industrial activities southward, and which carried our technological developments to areas which

had seldom seen a citizen of our country. It was the war, too, and the improvements in communications that it brought (before the war South Americans venturing a trip to our shores usually took a steamer to Europe and then crossed the North Atlantic) that turned Latin Americans to us rather than to Europe for their capital and their technical tools. And it was the war which nurtured new ideals of international cooperation externalized in the League and the Briand-Kellogg pact, and which in Pan Americanism—after a period which our new interest in Latin America seemed to accentuate rather than alleviate our dollar diplomacy—eventually culminated in the Good Neighbor policy.

The new trends in Pan Americanism were evident even before the appearance of those definite shifts in Washington outlook which were to lead to the withdrawal of our Marines, the abrogation of the Platt Amendment, and adherence to a policy of nonintervention in the affairs of our sister republics. The manifestations of broader and more fruitful political relationships appeared in the fifth Pan-American conference held in Santiago in 1923, the first to meet since the 1910 Buenos Aires gathering. Much of the Pan-American ideal had long been focused on the establishment of a system for preserving peace in this hemisphere. If the American republics could avoid war, all the economic and cultural cooperation desired would, it was believed, follow more or less automatically; for the nineteenth-century ideal—reinforced now by the League—was still dominant, and international cooperation was still primarily a cooperation of states, regardless of the dynamic change in the structure of societies that might be requisite for the true happiness and association of peoples. The Pan-American conferences, held at four or five year intervals, had attempted hopeful but fragmentary approaches to the problem of peace, drawing up treaties usually unratified by the home governments, a condition reflecting the tenuousness of the Pan-American ties. At this Santiago conference, however, the long sought agreement for the settlement of disputes through peaceful means was at last effectualized through a treaty which for the first time bound the signatories to submit to arbitration all disputes arising "from any cause whatsoever." And that the effort was a continuing one, and not limited to the formal gatherings of diplomats, is shown by the subsequent agreements at Havana in 1928, Washington in 1929, and Montevideo in 1933, which supplemented the Santiago pact with declarations condemning

all war, pacts making arbitration compulsory, and the establishment of permanent commissions of conciliation and inquiry, so that delays in setting up the machinery to mediate disputes might not, as in the past, thwart efforts to maintain peace despite all signed agreements.

Also, new trends were evident in the greatly broadened meaning given to Pan Americanism. With the Santiago conference Pan Americanism began to extend itself outside the field of diplomacy to embrace peoples; for although some of the earlier meetings had encouraged the exchange of views among United States and Latin-American jurists, financiers, or experts in certain fields, it was the Santiago meeting which gave definite impetus to those numerous Pan-American movements bringing together Red Cross workers, educators, journalists, highway engineers, labor, and eventually the women of this hemisphere. Today Pan Americanism is not functioning solely when the formal gatherings are in session every five years, but works also in the recurring meetings of professional and liberal groups.

Movements of still greater significance were to come. It was obvious that peace, or fruitful Pan-American relations in general, could best flourish where there was solidarity of outlook as to the role of the Americas in world affairs. The ominous European and Asiatic scenes were soon to emphasize this need. Fortunately, the new currents in Pan-American cooperation were to prove an excellent base for a broadening view of hemispheric collaboration. A special "peace" conference, meeting in Buenos Aires in 1936, very suddenly shifted the emerging "American system" of international cooperation from one trying to maintain peace among the Western republics to one seeking to make them an entity in world affairs. A Declaration of Principles of Inter-American Solidarity and Cooperation was adopted, which restated many of the objectives underlying the Pan-American movement. Among these were the juridical equality of the American states, the principle of collective concern for the peace of America, the proscription of territorial conquest, the nonrecognition of territory acquired by conquest, the settlement of disputes by conciliation, arbitration, or judicial procedure, the condemnation of intervention, and the "existence of a common democracy throughout America." Secondly, a convention popularly known as the Consultative Pact provided, among other things, for consultation of the Ameri-

can republics in the event that their peace was menaced by war among the nations of the Americas or war outside the Americas.

Through these, the Pan-American ideal was not only embracing world affairs, but it was also concerning itself with the beliefs and principles back of stable peace, endeavoring to forge a common approach to the problems of civilized living, the existence of which might considerably lessen the need for involved machinery to prevent armed conflict. The fruition of this new trend in so far as the role of the Americas in world politics is concerned came with the Lima conference of 1938, aided by the evolving Good Neighbor policy and the now clearly established aggressive intents of the totalitarian powers. The Declaration of Lima reaffirmed the principle of "continual solidarity," not only against war but against "acts of any nature," a phrasing which covered the devious techniques of the totalitarian powers. Furthermore, as a Declaration the agreement, unlike the Consultative Pact, required no ratifications, the absence of which might weaken its effectiveness. And finally, the means of consultation was provided for, it being agreed that the foreign ministers of the American republics or their representatives should meet "when deemed desirable."

The far-reaching meaning of these developments became abundantly evident on the outbreak of war; and the contrast with conditions in 1914 is striking. Whereas twenty-five years ago the Latin-American countries acted almost individually when Europe went to war, the present conflict immediately brought the Panama conference of ministers, where certain courses of action, including the adoption of a neutrality zone, were agreed on; and, after the fall of France, the Havana conference that provided for joint action with regard to European colonies on this hemisphere should occasion arise. Likewise, following our own entry into the war, the Rio de Janeiro conference again saw virtual agreement on measures to meet the new situation; for while two nations—Argentina and Chile—refused to break off relations with the Axis powers, the remaining eighteen Latin-American nations did; and the policy of neutrality that these two countries have adopted is not one designed to hamper the war effort of the Americas, and is in fact much more benign than our 1936 neutrality policy, which, strangely enough, we sought to foist on Latin America at the Buenos Aires conference.

Along with this evolving political structure have gone evolving economic policies in keeping with the tremendously changed conditions in Pan-American economic relationships. Since the outbreak of the war, economic cooperation has been particularly significant, operating not alone through the regular agencies engaged in Pan-American work but also through several of the new war boards; at the same time government departments once chiefly concerned with agricultural and mining activities in our own country have greatly expanded their contacts with Latin America. Furthermore, quite aside from the multiple evidence of a far greater collaboration among governments than existed some decades ago are those significant examples of peoples in collaboration. Through the activities of the Division of Cultural Relations of the Department of State a steady flow of Latin-American students, teachers, scientists, journalists, artists, musicians, and writers has been moving to our shores, while representatives of our own scientific and cultural fields have also been visiting Latin America in increasing numbers. We know, too, that Latin America's moves of collaboration with us since the outbreak of war have represented the prevailing views of public opinion rather than a few leaders. Evidence of the changed atmosphere for Pan Americanism lies in the fact that we have been able to establish military and naval bases in some of the Caribbean countries without the widespread repercussions that once would have met such proposals; as well as in the fact that Mexico, with whom we have suffered such a long period of tense relations, is now our active ally in war, a position adopted not by the interests of any dictator but with the approval of the Mexican people.

The question that arises, of course, is the way in which this new Pan Americanism will meet our postwar world. As a system premised on the equality of states, nonintervention, nonaggression, consultation, the solution of all differences through peaceful means, economic cooperation through outlooks approximating those of free trade, and through encouragement of broad economic progress rather than the older attitude of economic benefits achieved as peoples are held in a semi-colonial status, Pan Americanism offers both principles and practices which appear models for some of the reconstruction to be achieved when victory is won.

One may say that the new Pan Americanism is similar in many ways to the spheres of influence aspired to elsewhere by European powers or Japan. But in our case, both means and objectives are presumably vast-

ly different, for, it is argued, we are seeking such a sphere of influence precisely to combat pernicious alien doctrines that might destroy Latin America. Whatever factors exist that would make our role a more enlightened one than those operative elsewhere, the danger lies in the elements of power politics usually motivating such proposals and depriving cooperation of the freedom and spontaneity it must have. A regional system such as Pan Americanism should be voluntary, not alone as to acts of states but as to the aspirations of free peoples freely participating for benefits achievable through cooperative effort.

Achieving such a regional system is the most serious problem confronting us in the Pan-American field. We have been inclined to assume that we have a political and economic set-up that will be able to move into the era of peace smoothly and with no fundamental changes except those of beneficial expansion and growth. Yet the fact is that the social foundations of the structure are not stable, particularly in this world of transition; and that changes as profound as some of those destined to come in Europe will be emerging in Latin America when the war is over. There are nations where the eradication of the feudal land systems bequeathed by the colonial era has not yet been achieved, and where the story of Mexico's revolution may be repeated if progress toward the democratic society is not encouraged. In many lands there are millions of Indians who have yet to see the hope that they may be citizens contributing to progress instead of a social drag or object of exploitation. Almost everywhere there is the trend toward industrialization and mechanized agriculture, and the need for adjustments in nineteenth-century social structures to encompass these. There is, in general, the widespread desire for reform, for the ending of old ways, for modern progress and enlightenment, for true democracy. A quarter of a century ago war gave tremendous stimulus to such aspirations; and recent history, with its technological change and world-wide movements for social advance, has been steadily feeding new hopes in all peoples whether they are peasants wishing to end the primitiveness of their living or industrialists seeking to transform rural communities into modern manufacturing centers. And the problems for Pan Americanism that these trends may create will not be the making of Latin Americans alone. They will be dependent on us, on our attitude toward social change in the world, and on

the effectiveness of the promises our own democratic system may offer as a hope for the better society.

This superimposition of political unity over a social and economic base in acute transition is in fact the weakness of present-day Pan Americanism, for strains in the foundation cannot fail to be transmitted to the superstructure. The basic difficulty is the need for extensive change and the possibility—as experience in the past has shown—that this change will be thwarted by a concept of Pan Americanism that endeavors to freeze the *status quo*; or else that change, if not foreseen, and so not operating within flexible and dynamic policies, will wreck Pan Americanism.

That this change should not be entirely unprepared for is to be expected in view of the widespread discussion already under way as to the nature of our postwar world. The fundamental problems of large parts of Latin America, like those of many other parts of the world, might be said to involve the termination of feudal economics and the creation of economics we associate with the industrial democracies. Or, in other terms, they involve the freedom of the individual functioning in an environment of ever-growing opportunities for self-advancement.

The Latin-American wars for independence, like our own, were in large measure a movement in this direction, a late phase of that world-wide disintegration of feudal remnants before the emerging market economy. Feudal control of the land and mercantile control of trade were to be shattered, and a system of political and economic liberty in which all men would be free to govern themselves and free to work and trade as they chose, was to replace them. Numerous factors made impossible the establishment in Latin America of conditions achieved here, important among these being the absence of an ample trading base for the various political structures attempted. Also, development was hampered by the remoteness of Latin America from the growing industrial centers of Europe and the United States. Thus it was not until late in the nineteenth century, when European shipping and capital were available to Latin America, that some of the now leading Latin-American countries began emerging from the lingering colonialism which far-seeing individuals had tried to end prematurely through the establishment of republics. Capital, trade, immigration meant the breaking down of isolationism, the erosion of feudal lags, the disintegration of feudal

estates and their serf systems, the creation of cities with their opportunities for work in multiple fields, the transformation of peasants into a middle class engaged in small-scale farming, industry, commerce, or the professions. Liberties and opportunities for individual improvement advanced coordinately as a modern market economy like ours replaced the old semi-feudal base for society. Such developments brought tremendous transformations in many countries, particularly in Argentina, Uruguay, Chile, and Brazil. On the other hand, in other areas many of the old colonial conditions persisted into modern times, often aggravated instead of ameliorated by the requirements of foreign industrialism, the tensions finding relief in places—as in Mexico—only by the explosive force of social revolution.

A Pan Americanism based on effective democracy is thus scarcely a realizable achievement until the economic base for democracy is widely established. In other days we did not always look with favor on reform in this direction, as our attitudes toward the Mexico of Díaz or the Revolution revealed. Presumably with a "peoples' war" now being fought we may in the future be gazing more askance at dictators than at social reform, approving the efforts of Latin-American reformers seeking to bring their countries all the benefits of a technological age full of new social objectives. Yet we seldom fit Latin America into the postwar utopias we conjure up, usually assuming that the Good Neighbor policy has taken care of all problems, and that nothing more is needed aside from the continuation of this policy under our aegis. We like to believe that as good relations among states continue, as trade grows, as communications improve still further, and as more of our investments and our enterprise move into Latin America, those areas will almost automatically achieve the democracy and level of living we have enjoyed.

Unfortunately, this theory of automatic growth in political and social enlightenment as the international economic streams swell has been considerably disturbed by our emerging technological age, at least in so far as movement toward the type of democracy we have known is concerned. We have amazing new tools—product of this technological age—for the achievement of a living rich for all and not just the few, able even to satisfy social aspirations that once seemed capable of satisfaction only in the utopias of dreamers. Yet these new tools at our command have raised

questions as to whether the promise they speak of is achievable through the democracy we have known.

We have in fact held the ideal democracy to be one shaped along the lines of ours. Its economic base in the agrarian sphere has been essentially one of small independent farmers, with a multiplicity of opportunities in the industrial area, both phases providing in turn a wide area of opportunity in professional and cultural activities. We have felt that Latin America could achieve our type of democracy as peasants became independent farmers, and as manufacturing activities grew. Too often we put the cart before the horse by believing that education alone would create the proper economic base and the standards of living we enjoy, without much thought as to what economic system would support that education or how its products would be utilized, an approach which that rare spirit Alberdi decried for his Argentina almost a century ago. But whatever the means, we saw democracy in Latin America premised on the type of small-scale agrarian, commercial, and industrial enterprise which, despite our giant industries, seemed the essential foundation for our civilization.

Yet today not only must such basic elements of democratic living be achieved in many parts of Latin America but progress must move far beyond, fashioning social frameworks able to encompass an age of technology. This latter phase of the problem is not theirs alone but also ours, for we, too, must re-examine many of our traditional concepts of democracy in order to bring what is an essentially agrarian and small-factory view of democracy into harmony with an age of mass production. For Latin America, however, the problem is particularly acute, seeing that Latin America almost skipped the transitional era we experienced in the nineteenth century, and with a lagging colonial heritage has had to face the full impact of economic processes of a technological age. It is large-scale enterprise alone that can effectively open up the continent's resources, build its roads, railways, steamships, and airlines, create hydroelectric plants, make vast tracts of jungle or towering mountain ranges either passable or inhabitable, produce the ores and vegetable products Latin America and the world needs, and even engage in the educational, health, and cultural activities that are requisite if the peoples are to feel they are moving with and not trailing progress. And it is not alone

large-scale enterprise stemming from the peoples themselves, but enterprise backed by foreign resources.

Such a situation, arising without the slow evolutionary growth that has marked our country as we moved from a farming-trading economy into a highly industrialized one, has naturally fostered many outlooks which do not see the paths to progress in Latin America as being those we have known. The desire to end feudal or colonial remnants, to raise standards of living, to industrialize and modernize those countries, has prompted proposals advocating reform through measures implying an end to the republican systems of Latin America and the establishment of some sort of planned or controlled economy. Extensive reform, it is believed, must be achieved rapidly, and with government rather than individual enterprise its instrument. Indeed, the political freedoms and the systems of free economic enterprise that we sponsor as the foundations for democracy are in many parts of Latin America seen as the tools favoring unchecked exploitation of the people by privileged individuals, both native and foreign. Even where the trends have been most strongly against totalitarian ideologies as in Mexico, the patterns of reforms have leaned heavily on the control of the nation's economy by the state, both because previous systems have been held to favor unmitigated exploitation by individuals and because of the obvious fact that private resources—except in the case of foreign enterprise—are too meager for the wide reconstructions envisaged.

For Latin Americans this emphasis on social and economic reform through the state is of course not new. Almost a century ago young nations with a paucity of capital resources were depending on the state for many enterprises—like railroads—built here by private initiative. With change of a scope never before visioned pressing on Latin America, and with technology both inviting and demanding that progress now move not in faltering steps but broadly and boldly, the emphasis on state action, or on the society where the state plans and controls the economic advance of the people, is more acute than ever. And in such outlooks there is a cleavage with our own which might well be disruptive of the Pan-American program.

The problem thus facing Latin Americans—and Pan Americanism—is the harmonizing of social reform and economic progress with the democratic aspirations which, despite the popularity of new approaches

to economics, is so strong in them. Indeed, much of their desire for reform is precisely in order to achieve greater liberty and democracy; and the confusion of ends and means, or the failure to see incompatibilities between economic and political measures, is a failing by no means exclusively theirs in an age when so many of the old pillars of society are crumbling. This problem, however, is a substantially different one in many of the republics; for the aspect of Latin America that can never be overemphasized—a weakness in any over-all or Pan-American view of the hemisphere—is the enormous diversity in the geography, resources, peoples, and achievements of the Americas. In fact, were it not for common heritage and common language the contrasts are often such as to make many of these nations virtual strangers in their approaches to social problems; for certainly a country where the majority of the population is an Indian peasantry but slightly advanced over what it was in colonial times will find little in common with a nation where a large bulk of the peoples lives in the most modern of cities.

In general terms, however, the differences demanding varying approaches to this problem of harmonizing economic progress and democracy may be grouped around three broad sets of factors, all of them essentially geographic in origin.

One such complex of factors is found in the areas of the temperate regions of South America. In Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, and parts of Brazil geography has provided an environment not unlike that found in our own country. The lands are favorable to the agricultural activities dominant in the United States, such as the raising of cereals and breeding of cattle, the growing of fruits and vegetables, the operation of dairy farms, as well as the commercial and industrial activities accompanying these pursuits. At the same time, and as a product of both history and geography, these were not important centers of either Indian civilization or early colonization. They have been populated, again as with our own country, largely by Europeans, with nineteenth-century immigration an important factor in their growth. Their development—at least since European industrial expansion brought them out of their long economic isolation—has closely paralleled ours. Farming, commerce, and manufacturing have developed the typical characteristics of a modern market economy; and this working basis for democratic action has made possible political and social developments along democratic lines,

encouraged, rather than discouraged, by foreign economic influences which have tended to multiply all those economic opportunities on which rests the existence of an advancing middle-class and an industrial labor group. In such areas the future of democracy is dependent, in broad terms, on solutions to problems not so very dissimiliar from ours, the chief difference being the heavy reliance of such areas on foreign economies.

Another set of factors, however, offers considerably different prospects for democracy. They are exemplified in the regions that can be described as supporting mining economies, particularly in the Andean zone. These are generally barren mountainous areas ill fitted for any extensive agricultural pursuits, where the wealth produced is chiefly in minerals. In addition, they are usually the areas where the pre-Columbian empires flourished, where Spain established her centers of control, and where the combination of Indian populations and Spanish power were conducive to the creation of strongly feudal conditions. But quite aside from the attendant circumstances of Indian peoples and feudal lags is the fact that wealth from mining is concentrated wealth. Impressive export values are created by activities which, despite the size of some of the enterprises involved, give direct employment to only a small portion of the population, as against the many more people supported by agricultural activities; and technological developments have been consistently narrowing the ratio of workers to output. Furthermore, if the minerals are precious, very limited subsidiary activities—such as transportation—may be involved in an export item of high value but representing only a few tons of actual commodity. It is true that the earnings of workers in mining activities may be considerably higher than those engaged in agriculture; but these are going to a very small portion of the population. And as with the present industrial development of the mining areas mineral products are virtually exclusively for export, the actual residue of wealth remaining in the country is small.

Such mining economies have presented serious problems since the days of the colonies, as is revealed in the troubled history of liberal movements in Peru and Mexico. To control the political and economic power represented by important concentrations of wealth in the midst of little-advanced communities the current trend of thought favors the nationalization of such enterprises and their operation by the state. The economic problem involved, however, goes beyond that. Nationalization may solve

problems like the exportation of profits or the power exercised by foreign owners. But it is not solving the basic problem of a high-value production which is the creation of a small fraction of the population and which, because the minerals are exported, contributes to building great industrial activity not at home but abroad. Furthermore, nationalization of economic processes is itself a recourse for which democracy as yet has no pattern assuring a strengthening and not a weakening of democracy. The problem is not merely seeking solutions but having these serve a growing democracy; for while many of the reforms proposed might well bring relief in terms of economics, in their advocacy of state planning they may well set up structures that are even less democratic than the present ones.

A third set of factors concerns the tropical lands. Agriculture developed most widely—at least in the forms common to Western civilization—not where vegetation was lush but in the temperate and semi-arid regions; for tropical areas, with their heavy rains, rampant growths, and innumerable pests and parasites offered problems too formidable for man to conquer. It was not until the coming of the machine age that men commanded the tools for the mastery of nature in the tropics. Today some of the world's most important crops—sugar, rubber, bananas, coconuts, pineapples, cotton, cocoa, nuts, fibers—come from the warm lands; and as technology advances, more tropical products will be in demand to meet the needs for new types of fats, oils, drugs, or other products used in synthetics, changes of a revolutionary nature being in the offing and destined perhaps to affect considerably the role the temperate zones have played in farming.

These advances, however, have been not through the spread of the relatively small-scale farming once supplying the bulk of the food products of Western civilization but through the modern plantation system, demanding extensive capital resources and requiring use of all available technological tools. Under such a system, it is possible to clear large areas of land, provide drainage, correct the deficiencies of tropical soils, control pests and diseases, set up processing plants, and provide the often complex transportation and distribution facilities without which some of these products, like bananas, never could enter the foreign market. Here again we have not had conditions conducive to the type of democracy we have known despite the vast advances that such developments

have meant to national progress in the countries concerned. In the temperate lands, foreign capital, despite its encouragement to commercialized farms of enormous size, has also fostered a multiplicity of activities of widely diversified ownership (often competitive), and many of the political and economic patterns familiar in our own country. In tropical zones, on the other hand, conditions have often favored, if not made essential the concentration of many activities—such as the building of railroads, ports, power houses, roads—in the hands of one organization. Thus a very important complex of the country's leading economic activities, including sometimes its shipping and credit systems, may be controlled by one or by several closely allied concerns, all of them foreign. Or, if this extreme has not been attained, the basic problem of large-scale industrial farming, with the agrarian population functioning as employees and not independent farmers, still remains.

It is not to be assumed, of course, that these factors sketched here in brief and therefore highly inadequate fashion have not contributed to the growth of democracy in the areas concerned. On the contrary, powerful blows have been dealt the remnants of feudal-colonial economies lingering in a modern age. They have brought remote areas into the province of technological living. They have created new wealth, new opportunities, new incentives to progress, and opened up aloof lands to broad new currents, stirring new wants and new aspirations. Their discussion here has been for the purpose of noting that many parts of Latin America have economic problems that we have not been facing; and that we cannot assume an expanding democracy in Latin America merely through a Good Neighbor policy or a beneficent Pan Americanism that sees a solution to all problems possible so long as certain broad principles of international living—chiefly those developed by industrialized nations —are adhered to. Our current age is one of profound change, and the postwar era of reconstruction will unleash forces still latent. The benefits of technology have brought widespread dissatisfaction with the old; and the potentialities of technology have expanded hopes and aspirations and the desire to build new societies. The problem is the means through which to achieve this rapid and revolutionary progress, and whether it is to be through democracy and international cooperation or must come through new ideologies and conflict among neighbors. And the former seems possible only as we see this hemisphere as an entity of peoples, not states;

as we see government the servant of peoples and not of special interests or abstractions; and as we see liberties, prosperty, and happiness enriched and not stifled through broad new cooperative efforts, unhampered by the concepts of a simpler age which we strive desperately to hold as immutable truths.

It is a problem that is eminently ours. It concerns us not only as a power that will be a leader in world reconstruction, but as a neighbor vitally interested in a hemisphere advancing through democracy and peaceful cooperation. It concerns us, too, because it is our economic power in Latin America that may be both the main source of the problems involved and the main avenue of solution. But it also concerns us because we ourselves have to meet the task of adjusting our democracy to a new age. We live in an era of vast technological change. We have had as a stubbornly emerging problem the fitting of new economic processes into a democracy patterned for a simpler age. Now we will have to make readjustments in our concepts of government, freedoms, economics, and society as a whole that go far beyond those we once felt necessary; with readjustment, too, in our whole view of our relationships to other peoples on the globe. We do not have the acute problem faced by some parts of Latin America, where technology has struck without any intervening period of slow industrial growth, bringing the airplane and electronic cell to lands where Indians still live much as their pre-Columbian forefathers did and where tremendous and sudden saltations in social progress seem imperative. But we, as champions of democracy and Pan-American cooperation, will have to be able to show others that democracy can meet the technological tools and the new aspirations democracy itself has created, and that programs for future progress stem from these creations here in America, and not from Berlin, Rome, or Tokyo. With such programs, we will have to make effective changes in our attitudes toward the purposes and functions of foreign trade and investments—and the diplomacy they support—returning to the premise we have too often forgotten, that fruitful relations and peaceful and prosperous societies flourish only as democratic neighbors enjoy true democracy, peace, and prosperity. We speak of this as a peoples' war, and the peace to come as a peoples' peace. We have been making Pan Americanism a thing of peoples rather than diplomats. We have to move on to see that the economic and social base on which it rests is also one truly serving peoples, con-

cerned with the welfare and happiness of peoples, and not the symbols that statesmen, financiers, or economists may hold to be the sole indices of progress; for when economics is concerned not with statistics or abstractions or privilege then economic prosperity is soundest; and when politics is concerned with the true welfare of peoples, democracy can never be killed. Pan Americanism as an instrumentality designed to maintain orderly relations among states and inspired by former static concepts of such orderly relations may achieve little more than the Metternich system did in another revolutionary age. Its lasting success must come as it reveals itself an adequate instrument to promote the actual welfare of the peoples of this hemisphere, not through old-time symbols but along the broad new ways that a new world is calling for.

THE SENSE OF THE PRESENT IN THOMAS MANN

By EDWIN BERRY BURGUM

IN POPULAR OPINION Thomas Mann is the greatest of modern novelists. Like an established deity of letters, he towers above his age, comprehending and not rejecting it. His feet seem as surely planted upon the solid ground of experience as his gaze has remained tranquil and dominant above it. Other novelists may have fled from so resolute a stance in so disorderly an era, and preferred to hiss at the world from their private corners. Mann has stayed at the center of the disturbance, sure of his insight, and able to detach himself by the irony of his comment from whatever he can neither approve nor ignore. An extraordinary consciousness of what he is doing and determination to control his material distinguish him from the typical novelists of our time whose writing often appears the dictation of neurotic impulse. The fruit of his determination has been an array of novels, of unusual variety of flavor and theme, in a period when many novelists of quality have exhausted themselves over the details of some single gigantic and abstruse act of creation.

Mann, it is true, has come ultimately to this latter attempt. His recent concern with the Joseph legend marks his belated acceptance of the type of novel for which Proust and Joyce have been notable, in which a systematic philosophy emerges from the intricate weaving of an immense amount of detailed observation. But, unlike these other novelists, Mann's synthesis is the empirical conclusion of a lifework of separate novels, each of which has been stimulated by some special problem. It would therefore seem to have a more objective basis than that of the other writers. It would seem to have been reached, like a scientific statement, as a result of the solution of these different special problems. Upon examination the final attitude appears to have been made possible by the use of some dialectic method, which has disclosed relationships among what otherwise must have remained quite separate studies.

Mann's novels may be divided into two groups. In the one group are the objective or sociological works, with elaborate plots and many

characters; in the other, though retaining the objective method, he limits his attention to a simple situation and a single problem, which is often the aesthetic or the personal aspect of the larger social theme of the longer works. But the longer novels themselves divide according to the periods of social history they specifically cover, and change their tone and structure with change in tone and structure of objective events. Such range of variation is unusual in a novelist, and would seem at first sight to make any synthesis impossible. The philosophical interest of the Joseph stories is that Mann has in them utilized the only feasible solution by adopting a kind of dialectic resolution of opposites.

The final gesture of the Joseph stories, however, cannot be properly understood unless the earlier novels have been first examined. Though, taken together, these early works form a series of contradictions, each one of them, taken by itself, is comparatively free from inner contradictions. Each is rigidly designed to secure a particular accumulative uniformity. In his early years, Mann writes under the general influence of that aesthetic formalism which abhors the inconsistent as much as the irrelevant. To secure uniformity of tone, harmony of detail, simple consistency of theme is his aim during the greater part of his life. It is as though, like a prudent youth, he was unwilling to introduce complications he might not be able to control; as though, like the social reformer, he sought to clear up some specific area of aesthetic inquiry before proceeding to another. And yet take even this earliest group of novels together, and they are seen to represent a resolution of conflicts in social attitudes that is quite unique in the history of fiction. Mann's early orientation becomes perceptible, not in any single early novel, but in the relationship among three, *His Royal Highness, Buddenbrooks,* and *Tonio Kröger.*

In what is logically the first of these novels, *His Royal Highness,* Mann gives the *coup de grâce* to the old feudal Germany. This Germany of small principalities, rigid in class distinctions, pretentious in culture, as archaic intellectually as economically, survives in the novel only through the paradox of a personal embrace of the new order that is killing it. The prince falls in love with the naively wilful personality of an American heiress who impulsively breaks down the aristocratic principle her capitalistic fortune is intended to buttress. That the theme, though valid enough, belonged to the past, Mann stated by the *opéra*

comique style he adopted. He could afford to be gracious to the dying foe, and he was not sufficiently able to identify himself with the old feudal culture to elaborate any possibility it might afford of the tragic theme. Inferentially, nevertheless, the book is a devastating attack upon the whole school of international novelists in America. Henry James, who did take the aristocratic principle seriously, could only reach the note of pathos when he sought one of tragedy. Mann's firm bourgeois perspective forced him to view the decline of the aristocracy from the outside, and, the predominant direction of history being on his side, he could not fail to translate James's pathos into the whimsical burlesque, which was all it deserved if one thought in terms of history at all. Obvously such a theme, by the very insight Mann brought to it, could offer little of intrinsic worth. The wonder is that Mann should have chosen it in the first place. The belated tug of the past in Germany doubtless brought it to his attention, and by the process of composition he rid himself of any vestiges of sentimental attachment. His sense of history, evoking a specific consciousness of what he was doing, by determining this attitude toward his theme, also enabled him to escape the cumbersome seriousness of the German tradition in satire. Recognizing that he was dealing with what the progress of history must regard as fantasy, he was able to achieve something approximating grace of style, although the key remained subdued and the tempo less callously sprightly than a disciple of Voltaire would have brought to the theme.

In *Buddenbrooks,* by contrast, where Mann turns to a bourgeois theme, his personal relationship to the new material is defined, as one might expect after reading *His Royal Highness,* by a style of objective realism from which every trace of fantasy has been removed. If the tone of *His Royal Highness* was that of the quaint but benevolent distortion of late twilight in summer, that of *Buddenbrooks* is full afternoon in autumn when the bright clear air gives no more than a hint to come and the particularity of a few dying leaves is lost in the rich general sense of fruition. When cool objective statement gives way, it is to humor and not to irony, and only intermittently as the sun's warmth strikes the back in crisp health-bringing weather. The humor only intensifies Mann's identification with his theme, as we reveal the security of our love for some one by loving also what we recognize to be the merely human blemishes upon his personality. To be sure, the tone becomes troubled

before the end because this is the story of the decline of a family. There is the foretaste of storm, but not of winter, because *Buddenbrooks* is not intended to narrate the decline of a social system.

This freedom from satire or any kind of essential criticism permits us to conclude that *Buddenbrooks* gives the true conviction of Mann, at least at the time that it was written, and records his belief in the old bourgeois way of life. The unruffled composure of style, only a little less matter of fact than Defoe, fosters the reception of the novel as a valid social history by its very reluctance to wear its love upon the sleeve. If the style thus defines the certainty of Mann's belief, the substance of the novel leaves no doubt as to the content of it. It concerns three generations of a family of wealthy merchants, like Mann's, in a German town, such as Lübeck, beginning in 1838 and coming down toward the end of the century, the period of his own boyhood and maturing. In terms of economic history this is the period that begins with the flourishing of free trade and the open market in Germany and ends with the rise of consolidation and state aid. But the novel does not intentionally reflect this change from competition to monopoly. It assumes to the full the validity of the attitudes of the earlier period when the precepts of Adam Smith were being actually followed. It assumes, in other words, that competition is the law of trade. Any changes the novel mentions are not presumed to be fundamental changes in the economic structure, but only manifestations of the unending discovery of new mechanisms to keep competition alive by tossing the ball of prosperity to that firm which gets hold of the new idea. We may be able to see that the failure of the Buddenbrooks' firm to join the customs' union was its failure to recognize the first historic step toward consolidation. But Mann treats the customs' union in the old bourgeois manner, as only a new tool to force profits, on a par with a better system of bookkeeping or the discovery of a new product to sell, and not for what it really was, a change in the nature of the system. If, therefore, Mann truly records an historic situation, he records it through its own eyes, and gives it a consistency within itself which turns out to be misleading if examined from the larger perspective of later history.

Within this fixed framework, the novel presents the only distinguished, thoroughly faithful, thoroughly sympathetic picture of a society that once existed, with its happy assurance that an eternal com-

petition guaranteed an everexpanding prosperity. It is a picture that once was typical, but now survives with increased tensions and completely on the defensive, only in the minority of small businessmen not yet crushed by finance capital. *Buddenbrooks* is probably the best of that surprisingly small group of literary works which take this old bourgeois world seriously. For the bourgeois period is unique in literary history for having bred chiefly critics and satirists of itself, in sharp contrast to the tendency of literature traditionally to defend the world it writes about. It is noteworthy that Mann was capable of this rare accomplishment. At this period in his career he was able completely to identify with the dominant social system. That the "weaknesses" of the system are displayed need not cause hesitation. Every system has its weaknesses and makes allowance for them. In *Buddenbrooks,* just as the head of the family lays up capital against a period of depression or a bad investment, so he accepts vicissitudes in family life as a law of nature. The family takes in its stride, though of course not with rejoicing, the daughter who makes a bad marriage from which she has to be bailed out from time to time, and it counts the son who has no head for business on a par with a poor investment to be covered from other sources. These weaknesses only keep men alert. The system was stable, so men reasoned, precisely because no single part of it could be. Prosperity, in Napoleon's phrase, followed the talent, and for the individual the only stabilizing element was the possibility of training him to be shrewd and aggressive by use of the family.

Naturally, therefore, when the family produced an individual aesthetically inclined, this old bourgeois system found digestion difficult. For this was an attack upon its essential narrow-mindedness. An occasional case of sheer depravity, a plain and frank roué, might be handled. Culture was more insidious. If not taken seriously, if treated like a commodity, it might be harmless enough, like a good dinner. It was safe to collect cultural objects, indeed to clutter one's rooms with them. The harm began when one passed from absent-minded comfort in their mere quantity to trying to understand their values in their own right. Unfortunately from the family point of view, art had a way ultimately of arrogating attention from business. It was still the period when the adage, three generations from shirtsleeves to shirtsleeves, was not absurd if loosely interpreted. Competition was kept healthy by the fact that no ascendancy was assured and by the belief that the command of wealth was a greater

handicap to success than the need to command it. Art was a demoralizing distraction from these demands, especially since, unlike drinking or gaming, it could not be proved fundamentally bad and clearly put in its place.

Such was the code of living in the middle class during the greater part of the nineteenth century, of which the story of the decline of the Buddenbrooks is a candid illustration. The first generation makes the money by tending strictly to business. Necessity for hard work diminishes with the second generation, and this Buddenbrooks marries a wife for her beauty rather than for her frugality and common sense. The new interest in having a *salon* and being concerned with public affairs not only distracts attention from business which is no longer talked through three square meals a day, but produces a son in the third generation who is not satisfied with a fringe of artists about him, but is no better than an artist himself, incapable of managing to say nothing of increasing, the family business. This theme concerns the most important dilemma of the old bourgeois family; for it cannot be called a tragedy, since the particular decline of the Buddenbrooks does not land them in poverty or disrepute, but only paves the way for the emergence of a new family of another name whose lack of ascendancy has kept fresh in them the old Buddenbrooks virtues.

But the easiest way to isolate the aesthetic merit of *Buddenbrooks* (whatever one may think of its mores) is to contrast it with *The Forsyte Saga*. Galsworthy refuses to take sides. With his charitable liberalism, he states the case for art as well, and tries to resolve the dilemma while remaining fair to both parties. Mann confines himself to putting the case for business, and by thus limiting his attempt, he avoids the aesthetic blunder of finding himself unable to resolve his plot. To put it bluntly, there could be no case for art, recognizable by an artist, in the old bourgeois society, and Mann in this novel does not pretend that there can be. When the entrepreneur became the *rentier* as competition gave way to the less strenuous exertion of clipping dividends, the change in the system allowed at least a temporary adjustment, of which the strange history of art in the twentieth century is in large part the consequence. Now Galsworthy's novel deals chiefly with this later period, and one would think that a more adequate handling, if not a resolution, of the dilemma might have been possible. Instead, he repeated its statement in a voice that grew more and more faint until death intervened. The reason for

his failure lay in his retention of the old bourgeois code of morals when the new *bourgeoise* was, for the time being, flourishing under the equivocal use of some form of art for art's sake which severed art completely from relationship to morals. Galsworthy's interest in Soames Forsyte shows that he recognized this to be not the right solution. When the businessman was no longer willing to remain the specialist, the dilemma had only been transferred to the subjective sphere where it became personally distressing. Yet enough of Old Jolyon survived in both Soames and his creater for them to believe that it could be solved without compromise of either art or bourgeois mores; when, as Proust proved so admirably through the Verdurins, the only possible resolution is the mutual degeneration of both. Galsworthy's solution should have been Proust's; instead, he attempted the one that Mann avoided.

What Galsworthy sought to do, Mann, however, realized had to be tried. But the needs of his personality, quite as much as his superior aesthetic sensitivity, dictated a more satisfactory approach. It was as though Mann had said to himself: I must be fair to my family before I reject their aspirations for me, and become an artist. Psychologically he rid himself of guilt by writing *Buddenbrooks* essentially as his family would have written it, and thereby became free to declare himself an artist and seek to justify his profession in another novel. His personal difficulty permitted him to handle the theme in terms of its aesthetic structure, not as a plot involving the objective relationships of individuals, but as the biography of a critical stage in an artist's development. Under such circumstances a philosophical conclusion that may be untenable may nevertheless be aesthetically satisfactory if it is true to character. In *Tonio Kröger* Mann, by utilizing the suitable aesthetic vehicle, at least achieved an explicit statement of Galsworthy's attempted solution. For the nature of Mann's defense of art shows that he was even less willing than the English writer to compromise the old bourgeois mores. When the general tendency among artists of every sort was either toward the esoteric which denied the existence of the problem or toward Galsworthy's befuddling of the issue, Mann retains the old Puritan ideal (for it does not matter that he was technically a Catholic) quite as much as any clergyman or literary humanist. As an artist speaking of business, he confines his objection to the limited conception of the good life among men of affairs. But when he turns to art, he no longer accepts the attitude so sym-

pathetically presented in *Buddenbrooks*. Art is no longer regarded as *ipso facto* degenerative. Art and business he now holds to be two complementary aspects of a duality, whose relationship must no longer be neglected. If the values of both are thus admitted on both sides, he believes they will both be purged of their present inadequacies. If art is frivolous or self-indulgent, if business breeds the crude and rigid man, an art that is rooted in the reality of everyday life as the bourgeois lives it, but without submitting to its superficial interests, will succeed in ennobling both. The dilemma, according to this private statement of Mann's, is temporary and not at all a consequence of the inherent character of the bourgeois mores, which he seems to believe capable of transforming the profit motive into a superficial interest. "For surely," he says in his own italics, "it is my *bourgeois* conscience that makes me see in the artist life, in all irregularity and all genius, something profoundly suspect, profoundly disreputable; that fills me with this lovelorn *faiblesse* for the simple and good, the comfortably normal, the average unendowed respectable human being. . . . If anything is capable of making a poet out of a literary man, it is my *bourgeois* love of the *human,* the living and usual." The artist ceases to be decadent, to be an ordinary artist, when he becomes aware of the neglected ethical basis of the ordinary bourgeois qualities within himself. It is true that Mann's hero makes these assertions in a mood of self-pity, as though beseeching his readers to protect him against his weaker side corrupted by the prevalent trend in art. But verbally, at least, his conviction is explicit.

As far as Tonio represents Mann, the pessimism gained the immediate ascendancy. The tide proved overwhelming, and *The Magic Mountain* is the monument to the defeat of Tonio's ideal. Indeed, as Mann took this second, later, and more comprehensive view of the social scene, it seemed to him that Tonio had come too late; the old bourgeois ideal seemed to have disappeared from the objective world, degenerated into a sinister anarchy. *The Magic Mountain* is the negation of *Buddenbrooks*. What had earlier been taken as a particular failure set within the social frame of glorious robust success, is now observed to be the symptom of at least the temporary decay of the system itself. In the same way, the hero of the later novel is the young Buddenbrooks of the third generation generalized; that is, no longer drifting toward art, but possessing the same qualities of personality. If young Buddenbrooks was Mann

pretty much as he had been, Hans Castorp is the same Mann as he would have been deprived of his artist's insight. Hence the transformation of style from the judiciously sympathetic, back to the ironic of *His Royal Highness,* only now the seriousness of its use deepens. There must be a check upon the levity with which Mann patronizes that nonartistic three quarters of himself which walks the streets. In fact an ironic style today is generally a device of rhetoric by means of which an author separates himself from a world in which he is indubitably though not at all gloriously involved but which he will not be held responsible for making. Whether it veer toward the bitterness of Hardy's pessimism or toward frivolity in Meredith's comic spirit, our ironic style has the same psychological origin. It is the conscious creative aspect of the personality registering through recognition of defect its superiority to the world it lives in. Frequently, and notably in Mann, this world also includes the noncreative aspects of the author's own personality, and there is therefore often a latent self-depreciation involved. There, Mann might say of Castorp, but for the grace of being a writer, go I. Sometimes the irony is also deceptive since it sets up only the appearance of superiority; as when a writer, though the reader can discover no coherent conclusions of any sort from his writing, seems to have reached them solely because he has so devastatingly bared the inconsistencies of other people. Mann never stoops to this low use of irony, nor requires this desperation of personal defense. But he sometimes, as is shocklingly illustrated in his essay on spiritualism, tries to elevate this type of confusion into a tentative broadmindedness, an honest agnosticism which is doubtless only temporary. Though philosophically regrettable, such a use of irony is aesthetically profitable since it forces narrative enrichment by presenting all sides of the picture, while leaving the author in the safe position (should the future play him a nasty trick) of not having taken the wrong side. But irony, as Mann uses it, is also a device for escaping the melancholy induced by a conscientious observation of the facts. The significance of the style of *The Magic Mountain* is that it is typical of the intellectual of the '20's.

Mann's indecisions make the narrative fairly glitter as ideas are spun to show their facets. One cannot decide whether he considers psychoanalysis fraudulent or truly therapeutic; for the evidence for both interpretations is insidiously presented. In regard to the practice of medicine

which is surely on a scientific basis, one cannot be quite certain whether the profit motive does not paralyze its good intention. The age, it is true, enjoyed such ambivalencies since there seemed no way of resolving them; and Mann cooperates ironically with the pretense that discussion is directed to this end. At the same time, since the difficulties are real and other first-rate novelists are with obvious persistence striving to clear them up philosophically, Mann's ironic style in *The Magic Mountain* tends to break under the strain of being forced to be at once serious and frivolous about them. His talent will not permit him to compete with Proust as a philosopher in fiction. His style becomes ponderous under the attempt, and discloses the strain the intricate process is putting upon his faculties. The simplification of reaching some general conclusion was necessary, and he sought to try for a decision on the age-old problem of the nature of evil. (As for his discussion of time, I put that aside since, in comparison with Proust's really magnificent though not always satisfactory insights, his is only the common-sense observation that time sometimes seems longer or shorter than it really is by the clock.) But the problem of evil, baffling enough to the Puritan conscience, had become even more vexing since Baudelaire had said that evil is good and Nietzsche had dismissed it as a concept not applying to the superman. Here again Mann's discussion boiled down to a simple statement which only records the unavailing pull of the social degeneration upon the core of Puritanism within him. He now sees that we may learn through suffering. Evil may become the mechanism for deeper understanding of its opposite, the good. What remains a little doubtful is how far it should be indulged by the individual to extend his perceptions beyond the commonplace (which is not extoled in Hans Castrop as it had been in Tonio Kröger) and thus facilitate a more distinguished ultimate perception of the good.

The problem, however, becomes academic when one turns from these speculations in *The Magic Mountain* to the plot itself. For the plot (in distinction to these philosophical passages) reaches indubitable conclusions in its representation of European society before the first World War. In the realm of actuality evil dominates the modern world. It is temporarily irresistible and scarcely needs to be cultivated. If plots are of significance, all the theorizing, one must conclude, is unimportant in the face of this fact. This is the conclusion that Mann finally reaches, but

he cannot forego the pleasure of first discussing what a fact is. This, in philosophical terminology, means discussing the nature of reality, and Mann raises it in relation to the question whether Hans really has tuberculosis or merely thinks he has; whether he was tubercular before he came to the sanitarium or became so under the influence of its environment; whether, in short, the body materialistically influences the consciousness or an imaginary As-If can affect our physical condition. It is characteristic that after all the insinuation, Mann's final answer is essentially that of old-fashioned humanistic Protestantism. The problem is dismissed as pragmatically not worth discussing since Hans (however he got that way) is sick enough of something (whether mentally or physically) to incapacitate his normal functioning, which the necessity of going to war automatically restores to him. Inferentially, one concludes from the action of the book, Mann does not really care about the causes over which he has spent so many teasing pages. It is the objective activity, what Hans does or does not do, measured in old bourgeois terms, that counts. By this test, the book concludes, society is in a state of degeneration, and the education of experience (all this glitter of ideas to which we have been treated) implies a loss of standards.

So one reads with his own irony the remarks of those critics of Mann who consider him our great philosophical novelist. A certain professor, for instance, has extravagantly declared that *The Magic Mountain* is a "pedagogical, autobiographical, psychological, mystical, above all a symbolic novel." He proceeds to state that the only ism not represented is the economic or sociological. But the truth would seem to be that all these other isms are ambiguous and often irrelevant in the novel; only concealing a practical interest which is to Mann's credit, I believe, but to express which quite frankly in the '20's might have made comparisons with Proust and other stellar figures less spontaneous. Of all the isms in the novel, that which is developed most coherently is the sociological, which Professor Weygand says is not there at all.

Mann's absorption in the practical-historical, though elevated by a mystical superstition about numbers, is shown by his putting the start of *The Magic Mountain* as definitely seven years before the outbreak of the first World War as *Buddenbrooks* began in 1838. It is a history, therefore, of the breakdown, after the rise of monopoly capitalism, of a system that *Buddenbrooks* showed had once been stable. By making one

further change in the character of his hero Mann defines the change; Hans has trained neither for art nor entrepreneurship, but to become a specialist in engineering, a cog in the new business machine. None too strong, he falls ill and takes the cure at a tubercular sanitarium in Switzerland. The relation between the sanitarium and the world below is of symbolic importance. Most of the inmates lose touch with it completely and fester in their segregated private world. Either they have enough money or do not worry about its sources. They are Veblen's leisure class. The fact that they are of various nationalities, though it adds piquant detail, only emphasizes the dispersion of the malady. In contrast to the world below, which is that of practical affairs, they are the vanguard of decadence; they represent in the present what the rest of the world is coming to. It is noteworthy that persons of any surviving strength of character unwillingly submit to the domination of the mountain. Though they know that they are diseased, they refuse to revel in their malady; they refuse to follow a regimen that is supposedly curative but is actually an orgy of licentiousness of speech and action, of frivolity and callousness, of narcissism become exhibitionistic, worthy of a Soho drawing room or a *café* on Monmartre. Hans, the weak average bourgeois of the new decadence, falls prey to this atmosphere. Although it awakens his dormant interests in culture and knowledge, at the same time it gives him a culture and knowledge that eventually prove not worth having. Hans's cousin, whose rank as officer in the army makes him symbolize the old aristocracy, rejects the sanitarium, returns impulsively to the practical world, where he dies almost like a hero since he has felt the necessity to act. The intellectuals, Settembrini and Naphta, hover about the flame but will get no closer than the inn on the mountainside, whither Hans comes to hear them talk. The great Java plantation owner, Mynheer Peeperkorn, comes to the inn occasionally to be near his mistress, whose occasional visits he is willing to indulge.

In the relations among these characters is indubitably to be found a basically authentic materialistic history of society under monopoly capitalism. The philosophers, knowing something is wrong with society, have their cures typical of the dominant panaceas of the period. Naphta, whom Mann presents with callous objectivity, is a Jew who has become a Jesuit, and would reintroduce what he calls medieval communism. His scheme is systematic and logically foolproof. Settembrini, Mann treats

more sympathetically though with a trace of disdain since he represents the weaknesses in Mann's own liberal position. Mann shows him paradoxically defeating his avowed purposes. The grandson of a Mazzini patriot, he is wasting his time and distracting the energies of his associates by compiling not some textbook of hopeful action, but a compendious history of human suffering, which he pretends will pave the way for later progress. Actually he is so selfish and indifferent that he does not even attend the congress of the international society of which he is secretary and which is a parody of the Second International. These two men may be figuratively said to hover in midair, escaping the world of the practical, but their rationalizations prevent them from admitting that they are sick enough to enter the sanitarium which draws them like a magnet. Finally, after pages of discussion, to which Hans listens with open mouth, they get so angry with each other that they fight a duel. Settembrini refuses to fire at Naphta; whereupon the Jesuit, infuriated that his adversary has not even tried to kill him, kills himself. Obviously he has not really believed in his perfect system at all. But Settembrini's psychology is equally interesting. Though he claims that his abstention from firing is a magnificent gesture of humanitarian impulse, it actually represents his inability to take any kind of action. All his pretensions curiously manage to keep him alive and somehow fed in an atmosphere of instability which he really enjoys and which is quite in keeping with his restless pragmatic pleasure in juggling ideas so that his opponent at least is driven to suicide. But he conceals from his consciousness this use of the Socratic method by constantly mouthing all the empty abstractions of the old liberal movement.

As though to drive his meaning home, Mann does not stop here. These men have won Hans's puzzled admiration. For him they are significant, and the world should stop to listen. When Mynheer Peeperkorn appears on the scene, an opposite reaction takes place. The two philosophers have been talking as volubly and heatedly as usual. Peeperkorn, who must dominate every environment he enters, shuts them up with a single savage command and takes the center of the stage. Wealthy as this international capitalist is, he knows he is dying; his kidneys have given way under Rabelaisian self-indulgence. But in place of heeding any doctor, he only spends his excessive profits the more recklessly, and, we are told, later dies in a kind of suicide of magnificent drunken brawling.

It can hardly be doubted that Mann is here personifying not only the future of finance capitalism but its relationship in the present to free speech and the high life of the mind. Beneath the superficial geniality, the willingness to play the host, Peeperkorn is a wilful man who must do what he pleases with his power. The possibility that Hans might have become interested in his mistress, the dissolute Frau Clavdia of the green eyes, never occurs to him. Hans, in the feverishly erotic atmosphere of the sanitarium, has fallen into a desperate verbalization of love with this woman, who resembles a youth he once knew, though he puts his sensuality into French and doubtless would never have acquired the courage for a sustained affair. Nevertheless, when Peeperkorn returns, all his interest vanishes as though Peeperkorn had commanded. He has been saved for the time being from the growing tyranny of his baser nature by submitting automatically to an equally abject tyranny imposed from without. Writing during the years of the Weimar Republic, Mann is not only depicting the degeneration of the German character which deepened after the World War. He is also in an uncanny way foreshadowing the birth of fascism. The anarchy is awaiting the dictator's command.

The symbolic interpretation of *The Magic Mountain* that is least open to the charge of ambiguity is, then, its accumulation of evidence of social decadence. Characterization and action unite to this clear interpretation. Always ambiguous where abstract ideas are concerned, Mann shares the degeneration sufficiently not to recognize its full extent. His sympathy for Settembrini and his acceptance of almost any mental stimulus as good is proof. But he can never free himself from scientific respect for the facts of observation, whatever his theoretical indulgence for the insidious philosophy of As-If. As though to close any doubt one might have about the validity of this interpretation of *The Magic Mountain,* Mann, as usual, furnished the pendant work in which the problems of the longer novel are presented in terms of his own aesthetic attitudes. Perhaps the very fact that *Death in Venice* is the peak of his accomplishment as a writer, written with a disingenuous simplicity that facilitates the transfer of its psychological subtlety, shows the congeniality and importance of its theme for Mann. For *Death in Venice* depicts the sort of writer who was beginning to abound, and who Mann himself might have become if certain Puritan elements in his character had not enabled him to write *Tonio Kröger.* He can therefore write with indulgent pathos of what he

recognizes must be condemned: so indulgently that he sets up a mood of delicate hesitation between the contradictory impulses to resist and to submit. But here again, if one separates the verbalized meaning of the action from the emotional response, there is no confusion. It is again a story of the impossibility of separating life from art. The superficial writer, who has always pursued the beauty of abstract design in his work, finds himself inviting death in the end. On the beach at Venice, he falls in love with the abstract beauty of a homosexual youth. Unable to bring himself to speak to the boy, he is equally unable to take his eyes from him. When a pestilence drives virtually everybody away save the youth, who seems held by the same spell, despite warnings the writer stays also and falls victim to the plague. If he had not been a believer in art for art's sake, he would not have been deceived as to the nature of his interest in the boy; he would have followed the advice of common sense and escaped the plague. But the plague offered him a further view of the Grecian urn at the risk of death. And he was willing to die because he could not stop indulging in imagination what he had neither the courage nor quite the folly to indulge in reality.

The real problem for the most consciously intellectualistic writer of our time was thus to look for a valid escape which did not deny the incontrovertible facts of social degeneration. The intervention of the war gave him a new set of facts upon which he could build. If art had not yet exercised its leavening authority, the very life process itself could not be relied upon to do so. The war, however horrible on the surface, could be interpreted as regeneration. He had only to avail himself of the most popular prevalent theory of history. The belief that history proceeds in cycles could easily be brought into harmony with his bourgeois habit of arranging ideas and events into separate categories. The cyclic theory gave him the necessary law of contradiction to bring his social categories into relationship. If the sanitarium of *The Magic Mountain* represented a new low in human depravity, it could not last. The good must arise, like the phoenix, out of its own burning ruins. And so he appended to his diabolically depressing account of actuality a prophecy (in a more ecstatic style than he ever elsewhere allowed himself, so desperate was the situation): that the first World War must prove a purification of mankind by death and suffering. It would burn away the old sin in man, and educate him into obedience to his higher nature once more. Whether this

creditable result would come automatically did not need to be raised in *The Magic Mountain*. But the unexpected return and deepening of the same depravity during the Republic and the ultimate emergence of fascism as the sort of false purgation that seemed to come of itself, forced the question upon Mann's attention.

Mann gave his answer in two works, as usual, one short and one long, one a negative and one a positive approach. In *Mario and the Magician* he stated with unmistakable symbolism that the people, hypnotized by fear of their dictators, would find the leader who would break the spell by killing the dictator. It is worth noting that the leader in the story is the waiter from Mann's hotel; for this is the only instance in Mann's writings where he has paid any attention to the working class, and one should treat this symbol perhaps a little gently as the accident of this particular narrative. All of Mann's tracts against fascism have otherwise assumed that the intellectuals of the *bourgeoisie* would effect the cure. The positive prototype of the true leader who later emerged from his pen was that representative of the eternal entrepreneur, Joseph of the Old Testament.

The sequence of Joseph stories has not been completed, and one would have to proceed cautiously were it not for the fact that Mann has already bound himself by the Biblical account. Nor is it necessary to go into the refinements of interpretation Mann has given the general outline. He has repeatedly stated his underlying philosophy in the book, of which this passage is only a single example:

> We are justified in drawing a parallel between his sin against Potiphar's wife and his earlier sin against his brothers. Once more he had gone too far, in his craving to make people "sit up"; once more the working of his charm. . . had been allowed to get beyond control, to degenerate into an actual danger. In his first life these workings had taken the negative form of hate; this time the immoderately positive and equally destructive form of passion. He had in his blindness given fuel to the flames of both; in the second case, misled by his own response to a woman's uncontrollable passion, he who stood in such need of instruction himself had tried to play the pedagogue. His conduct cried out for retribution, there is no doubt of that; but we cannot help smiling to see how the punishment which so justly overtook him was directed to the furtherance of a good fortune much greater and more brilliant than that which had been destroyed . . . . [God makes] misfortune a fruitful soil whence renewed good fortune should spring.

Here, I take it, Mann is stating a universal philosophy. The career of Joseph is symbolically that of Mann himself. But it is more than this. It symbolizes the fate of all who suffer and are exiled, not merely Jews, but all antifascists who have been forced into exile from their native lands, like young Joseph. The blame is not put either on Joseph's cruel brothers or upon Potiphar's unscrupulous wife. If there is any general meaning here, we should not so much blame Hitler as ourselves, and in either case, no blame at all should be attached to the particular organization of society, system of economy, of which for many of us Hitler himself is only the tool. Instead Mann prefers to have recourse to the old Hebraic and Greek ethic that makes *hubris* the most dangerous of sins and the humility that follows suffering a salutary process of rebuilding the ethical life upon a sounder basis. If applied to modern politics, this theory is a dangerous form of appeasement. But in the broader sense, by neglecting the importance of the practical machinery of life (since Joseph falls twice, once under the old tribal form of society among the Jews and later under the different system of the Egyptians), Mann is accepting a philosophy of pure idealism.

What happens to the life of the individual also happens to the collective life of men. Nations will always require the therapy of suffering, whether in the specific form of war or not, and through it will be restored to dignity and prosperity. The humiliation of individual exile parallels the temporary loss of national integrity; and both, as the negative aspects of the cyclic oscillation of history, will periodically recur. If fascism and other forms of social degeneration result from the human tendency to indulge base material interests under the domination of either national or individual pride, this indulgence sets up its opposite. The men of stronger moral character are called to their senses and begin consciously to work for the ascendancy of man's better nature once more; and their exile will end in a victorious return. Despite his unusual fidelity to sociological change, Mann philosophically sees all this as subordinate to and governed by the spiritual nature of man himself. Change is important only as a clue as to whether in the inner spiritual nature of man good or evil is getting the ascendancy. Of course, the good will win, generally speaking, but it will win only when the need for its winning has been brought by sad external events into men's consciousness and has focussed their energies once more upon the recovery of the ideal. The need for the good,

like the desire for wealth (which was taken for a good) in *Buddenbrooks,* awakens the energy to attain it. The Joseph stories only spin thin the idealistic philosophy of the concluding chapter of *The Magic Mountain.*

Such a philosophy is dialectic, to be sure, but it is not the dynamic progressive dialectic of either Marx or Hegel. It is specifically the static dialectic of the Manichaenism in the Protestant or the Augustinian tradition of the Renaissance humanism. Early Protestantism, emphasizing the practical value of its new moral code, neglected these abstract implications. When modern society was observed to be headlong in its plunge into decadence, the re-examination of fundamentals became essential. Protestantism revived its latent dualism, and put it on a new philosophical basis of Romantic institutionalism which excused its ideational ambiguity. A thousand voices are now raised, declaring that fascism is the force of evil let loose in the world and that antifascism is the rallying of the dormant forces for good which must in the nature of things win. These voices come from the preacher and the educator; they turn the New Humanism in literary criticism from its authoritarian direction into more democratic channels. They are of commendable and indispensable aid. But it remains to be seen what risks of ultimate defeat lurk in their indifference to material mechanisms and their careless rejection of the ideal of human progress.

But if the aesthetic test has any validity, this dualistic idealism is an unsatisfactory substitute for that use of history as an evolving process of events which was the conspicuous but involuntary concern of Mann in his earlier novels. Readers, both philosophically naive and trained alike, find the Joseph stories dull, and this dullness is a consequence of Mann's rejection of his earlier method. It is certainly not the result of any loss of fastidiousness as a craftsman on Mann's part. He has been keenly aware of the difficulty of writing historical fiction. He has sought to escape the failure of much historical fiction in which human nature disappears in incident and description of setting. Not only has he studied the history, the religion, the anthropology, the various cultural interests of both Hebrews and Egyptians. He has rigidly limited himself to reproducing only so much of this detail and will not overwhelm his characters and make them the puppets of this information. Even in dealing with his characters, he has been equally careful to proportion the relation of sub-

jective and objective, the amount of inner mood and outward action. He has escaped all the faults of the Scott tradition.

The opposite risk, however, he has invited by his shift of emphasis from his earlier method. Then he succeeded in isolating the idiosyncratic features of the period of his novel. Now, when he passes into a remote past most difficult to make come alive, he prefers the opposite course of stressing the eternal sameness of human nature and human struggles. This is to violate the particularity which must distinguish the novel as a literary form from the poem. The great historical novels, *War and Peace, Salammbo,* Sholem Asch's *Nazarene* agree in their recognition that the past can be fictively revived only when delineation of human differences make it seem historical while those aspects of human nature closest to certain contemporary traits are emphasized to make it seem validly alive. Thus *Salammbo* is both historical and alive because it stresses the undisciplined emotions of the Carthaginians and their subject peoples at a time when Frenchmen had escaped the discipline of classicism, the primitive superstitions at a time when decadence was stimulating interest in the perverse and diabolical, the callousness of the ancient world toward suffering and the welfare of the masses when the modern world had become sensitive to the good of the greatest number. Thus Asch in his picture of Jerusalem at the time of Christ emphasizes the vested interests, the class rivalries, in which the modern reader is interested while he shows the particularities of difference in their operation. Indeed, to do otherwise and write fiction is impossible. Despite his attempt to stress only the enduring traits of man in his portrait of Joseph, Mann has introduced unawares his own particularity of interpretation. This is, in contrast to both Flaubert and Asch, to ignore altogether the existence of the masses of men. In this respect Mann is "historical" with a vengeance, but it is to be hoped that Joseph's sole interest in his own welfare, or at best, that of his family, is not a universal trait of human nature. But Mann is not content to generalize the personality of Joseph in this fashion. He rubs his generalizations home through interpolated passages of mystical philosophizing. These sections of the book read like paragraphs from some Protestant *Imitatio Hominis,* whose repetition holds up the narrative and whose vagueness succeeds in giving a sense of unreality to the most specific situations. The dullness of the book is the effect of its philosophy upon the characterization of its hero.

This shift in Mann's recent work has given it an air of pretentiousness. He now stands above his age somewhat as Dryden did above his; and yet both writers were concerned with immediate and political affairs. If they have been taken for leaders in their eras, it is that, in spite of their most conscientious and honest effort, they succeeded only in becoming representative of typical and prevalent ambiguities. They failed because they sought to become the comprehensive expressions of periods of disunity, when to be comprehensive at all may well be impossible, and certainly must be, when outmoded attitudes alone are employed. In his earlier periods, Mann's pragmatic interest in the facts of a changing world led him close to a recognition of history as an irreversible process of development. But when the process seemed to have become one solely of degeneration, he felt himself forced to discard a vague notion of progress for a still more vaguely comprehensive one which Protestantism has never lost: the notion that our physical life reflects an eternal spiritual struggle for domination between good and evil. He has become indifferent to the world of actuality which once intrigued him as thematic material for a novelist as he fixes his attention upon the nostalgic hope that this everlasting spirit of the good will in time once more assert itself to restore the equilibrium of free trade in both goods and ideas. The pallid austere dignity he now wears testifies to the unreality of this interpretation of the disorders of modern life in what are essentially the terms of the old bourgeois beliefs of his grandfather.

Indeed the publication of *The Beloved Returns* almost abjectly turns the circle. In this novel, in which a woman vainly seeks to revive the thrill of Goethe's smile upon her as a girl, Mann has become spokesman for the sentimental feminine weakness for lavender and old lace, the belated romanticism of the *Buddenbrooks* period, with which the masculine dominance of *Buddenbrooks* has disdained to concern itself. But now the atmosphere of fantasy of *His Royal Highness* revives, though its gay irony has faded into a falsetto of garrulity; as the sharp shrewd insight of *Buddenbrooks* too has deliquesced into archaic platitudes of style and meaning. Leaving all modern attitudes and themes behind, Mann has virtually become a popular novelist his grandmother would have admired.

THE ROOSEVELT-HITLER BATTLE OF SYMBOLS

By JAMES MacGREGOR BURNS

A SHORT TIME AGO the President asked the country to think up a name for the war. The people found this even more interesting than name contests for new soap brands or cake recipes, and they sent scores of suggestions to the White House. Some seemed to be satisfied with the prosaic "Second World War." But others suggested "War of Freedom," "War for Peace," "War against Oppression." The isolationists took advantage of this opportunity too, and offered such names as "The Meddler's War" and "Franklin's Folly."

This concern with a name for the war brings to an end a curious cycle in our thinking. Not long ago we were being told to stop labeling ideas and programs with glib and easy names. We were told that our group relations were dominated and distorted by big words that were essentially meaningless—like Democracy, Freedom, Fascism, Individualism. Since these words had no concrete meaning, they meant all things to all men. People could not act intelligently because they could not communicate intelligibly. The result was misunderstanding between individuals and between nations. This was the tyranny of words.

At the time we meekly accepted this advice, because what we were told was startlingly true. Yet today we know that it was only half the truth. Despite the good advice, man persists in using word-symbols and in letting them tyrannize him. And what is worse, the danger today has become immeasurably more acute. Man not only continues to think in terms of symbols, but he is engaged in a struggle which is explained to him in terms of symbols—a war for Freedom, for Democracy, or a fight against Encirclement, against the Pluto-Democracies. Abstract words are not only confusing words. Now they are fighting words.

This puts the problem in a different light. No longer may we ask, "How can we stop people from being misled and dominated by symbols?" Experience has shown that we cannot. Instead we must ask, "How can we prevent mankind from being dominated by symbols that our

enemies use for their purposes—purposes we consider bad? How can we strengthen the democratic symbols?"

What has happened is that we have made the painful discovery that symbols are not only obstacles to clear communication. They are also means by which their users can mobilize support for or against certain courses of action. Symbols are weapons—weapons at the disposal of anyone with the wit and will to use them. In a world at war they have become effective weapons in fortifying public feeling at home, weakening the will to resist in the enemy countries, shaping future action in neutral lands. And the symbol-manipulator—whether he is a Goebbels or an Archibald MacLeish—is a man of power.

What was proposed amounted to another kind of disarmament. We were told to beware of the weaknesses of trying to communicate by symbols, and we were urged to be more careful how we used high-sounding words. But our moral disdain came at the wrong time. While we talked of limiting armies and ships, our enemies were building them. And while we talked of clarifying abstractions, the enemy was finding the uses to which symbols could be put. Today, with the battle lines drawn, we must master the use of symbols as an aid to survival, just as we are building tanks and planes and mastering their use.

We are not ill equipped in this phase of the struggle. In President Roosevelt we have had for almost a decade an acknowledged master of the spoken word. Much has been written about his superb speaking voice and his radio presence, as though these explained his success. If this were the test, our national leaders would be Bing Crosby and John Charles Thomas. Actually, the President's great gift lies in his use of words, above all, in his skill in the use of symbols. This involves more than apt phrasing, or clear wording, or jargon that the "average man" understands. That is elementary equipment for the successful public speaker. As spokesman for the nation President Roosevelt has known how to use those symbols that are rich in meaning for his listeners—and to use them at the right time. He has known which symbols lead to action, and which to inaction. And in this, I think, lies a major reason for his success in public affairs.

II

Every candidate for office seeks to identify himself and his cause with the virtues that are holiest in the community. He seeks to universalize

his goals. In doing so he invokes the very highest deities and attempts to identify his cause with them. This is often called "flag-waving." It may be the Flag, or more likely God, the People, Americanism, George Washington, or some other spread-eagle concept. At the same time the symbol-manipulator must identify the opposition with unpleasant symbols like Fascism, Tyranny, Class Hatred, Bureaucracy. The basic technique is to link your opponent and everything he represents with "hate words" or negative symbols, to line up your own program and personality with the "good" ones. If this is done well, you will have your reward on election day.

Of all the symbols in the vast array at the disposal of the politician, the most important are those that attract the nation as a whole rather than those that make a special appeal to a single group. These might be called the "universal symbols." The crucial battle is fought for the possession of these symbols, because they bring to a focus that attitude of the great majority. These universal symbols have both an element of power and an element of weakness. They are powerful in mobilizing public opinion because they are accepted by all. But in their very breadth of appeal they have a weakness, in the sense that anyone can claim their blessing for any program.

An appeal to the universal symbols can usually be found at the beginning and at the conclusion of a political speech. At the beginning we are given to understand that this speech and the cause espoused are aimed not only at the Democrats (or at the Republicans). The appeal, we are told, is to all parties, to all the people. Toward the end of the speech there is usually an implied claim that God will look with special favor on this speaker and his party. For example, each of the three main speeches at the Republican presidential convention of 1936 began with a plea of nonpartisanship and ended with a claim to special support from the Lord. Mr. Frederick Steiwer, the keynoter, began with the assertion, "We do not meet as partisans but as patriotic Americans." Mr. Hoover concluded with the statement that by enlisting in the campaign against the New Deal the delegates would "win the gratitude of posterity and the blessings of Almighty God."

If the Republicans in 1936 had been successful or only partly successful in identifying their program with the universal symbols, the fight would have been over. No matter how popular the New Deal, it could

never have survived in a situation where the majority of the people equated the Republicans with God, Justice, and Americanism. The elections returns showed among other things that the Republican attempt had failed. The identification between the G.O.P. and the universal symbols had not been achieved.

By and large, the Republicans forgot that the very potency of these universal symbols requires that they be used with shrewdness and with caution. The American people have listened to politicians for over a century and a half now, and they are politically wise. They are in general too sophisticated to surrender to any group which claims special partnership with God. They expect proof rather than oratory—and proof has not yet been forthcoming from the Lord.

President Roosevelt's use of these symbols has been much shrewder. He realized, consciously or unconsciously, that there must be some connection between the symbol and the objective set of policies that the symbol describes. A symbol must be charged with meaning, no matter how general and vague that meaning may be. A set of policies must exist somewhere to which the symbols can be connected. The connection may be shadowy and obscure, but it must exist. While the symbol and the program it denotes may not be close, they cannot part company.

Let us watch Mr. Roosevelt in action in 1936. The President centered his campaign in one key symbol—Security. He talked of many things, but this concept constantly emerged in almost all his spoken and written words. It gave unity and direction to his whole campaign. The symbol itself gained concrete meaning in the course of the campaign speeches. It was effective because Mr. Roosevelt used it intelligently. Obviously, Security represents a major goal of the average man. It is a universal symbol of peculiar appeal in an age of chaos and insecurity. Mr. Roosevelt may have been guilty of all the sins that the Republicans charged, but the average man without question had a far greater sense of security in 1936 than in the last years of Mr. Hoover's administration. It was a perfect symbol for the Democratic candidate, because it coincided roughly with the objective program of the New Deal, and at the same time had meaning for the mass of voters.

In speech after speech the President asserted that under the New Deal the average man had achieved greater security in an insecure world. This applied, he said, to all groups, not merely to workers under the

Social Security Act. "Your Administration has as its great objectives for all our citizens," he said, "in the cities and on the farms, in the West, in the South and in the East—greater permanence for employment, safety for earnings, protection for the home, and a better security for the average man and his family." Sometimes his variations on this theme were eloquent, as at a "green pastures rally" in North Carolina when he used the Twenty-Third Psalm as his text, and concluded: "better conditions on the farms. . . in the factories. . . in the homes of America are leading us to that beautiful spiritual figure of the old psalmist—green pastures and still waters."

The significant aspect of Mr. Roosevelt's use of this symbol is that he gave it affirmative meaning. Essentially security, like peace, has negative implications—protection *from* personal or national dangers. It is the absence of something bad rather than the attainment of something good. It involves huddling down in the boat and preventing anyone from rocking it. Mr. Roosevelt was never content, however, to give this symbol a purely negative meaning. He never allowed his statement of his program to take the form of merely protecting the security already gained. Over and over again he stressed that he wanted four more years to extend security, to finish the job. Security for the American people could not be simply protecting what they already had, he said, but pressing on toward better conditions of work and recreation.

His efforts here were greatly strengthened by the aggressive nature of his whole campaign. The Republican drive lost its impact by indiscriminate pot shots at all phases of the New Deal, without setting up other symbols that had some significance for the workers. The G.O.P. failed to put the President on the defensive. He took the offensive from the start. "I am not here to defend the New Deal," he said, "I am here to proclaim it." He gained in power and directness during the course of his speeches. The climax was reached in his famous speech in Madison Square Garden when he gave his answer to those who had challenged him to state his future plans. Mr. Landon had put the question in negative symbols. "I have asked him and asked repeatedly," the Republican candidate said; "does he intend, if re-elected to revive the N.R.A. and the A.A.A., which the Supreme Court has declared to be contrary to our American form of government? So far his reply has been a long, loud silence."

The President's reply accepted the gage of battle, but he carefully avoided the negative symbols and set up those of his own.

> Of course we will continue to seek to improve working conditions for the workers of America. . . . Of course we will continue every effort to end monopoly in business. . . . Of course we will continue our efforts on behalf of the farmers of America. . . the needy unemployed. . . for young men and women . . . for the mothers . . . for the aged. . . . For all these things we have only just begun to fight.

This use of a great universal symbol in an aggressive campaign explains Mr. Roosevelt's victory in 1936 in so far as the battle was one of words. Mr. Landon could not compete with this master of the use of symbols because he could not put the President on the defensive. Whenever the Republican candidate tried to corner Mr. Roosevelt with a barrage of "hate words" Mr. Roosevelt evaded these words and emerged elsewhere with glowing symbols of his own.

Far more important even than this, however, was the choice by the President of a symbol that had greater impact because it had greater meaning. And it had greater meaning because underneath the smoke screen of words there were the tangible results of a program that had given most Americans a sense of security far greater than they had previously enjoyed. This tells us something of the technique of choosing symbols. It tells us much more about the need for backing up one's symbols with policies or acts that have some relation to the symbols. Max Lerner has called this the "propaganda of the deed." In the long run the symbol is ineffective without the actual deed to back it up. It is this situation that gives some degree of order and stability to symbol manipulation, which otherwise might become a fertile field of operation for unprincipled demagogues who could never deliver the goods.

III

Today a discussion of the campaign of 1936 has a curiously antique flavor of "old, unhappy, far-off things and battles long ago." But this domestic encounter is important, because it shows Mr. Roosevelt's mastery of a phase of ideological warfare. Today the battle of symbols is taking place in a large and more crucial arena. The squabbles of '36 now seem petty and remote in the face of real perils. As we move from the field of domestic politics to that of world war, the overtones change. The mood becomes more urgent, the appeals sharper, and the calls to action

more inflammatory. The stakes are far more immense, involving both elementary survival and mastery over world empires. But the techniques of using symbols remain essentially the same whether we study the Roosevelt-Landon encounter of 1936 or the Roosevelt-Hitler struggle of 1942 *et seq.*

Indeed, the nature of war propaganda enables symbols to play an even more important part in our ideological struggles today than in those of domestic politics. This is a result of technical limitations in the use of propaganda that crosses military and geographical boundaries. Appeals to the subjugated peoples of Europe and to the neutral peoples of the Near East and Africa cannot be put in elaborate and reasoned documents. They often cannot be put even in the form of speeches such as Americans could hear as often as they wished in 1936. These appeals must be put in capsule form aimed at the most primitive emotional responses of the people. The leaflets from the R.A.F. that flutter down on Berlin and Paris are framed in simple words to produce the quickest response. The short-wave broadcasts to Germany and Austria speak in symbols which seek to mobilize resentment against the Nazis and the kind of world Hitler hopes to build. These symbols seek to explain the reasons why the United Nations are fighting Hitler, and the kind of postwar system that the democracies propose for all peoples. These are the "word bombs" against which no ships, no tanks, no planes can defend a nation.

This propaganda campaign, however, is not a one-way affiar. For years the Nazis have been bombarding neutral and enemy populations with propaganda via the short-wave radio. This has been implemented by the motion picture, the news article, and the leaflet. Behind the propaganda machines stands Goebbels, a veteran of a decade of political warfare within Germany. And behind Goebbels stands Hitler.

Hitler knows propaganda, and he knows the uses to which the symbol may be put. His knowledge is the product of bitter experience. As a vagrant in Munich, he was forced to associate with workers. They were a miscellaneous lot. Many of them were Marxists. Hitler was soon drawn into violent arguments with them. Some time afterward he related in *Mein Kampf*:

> In the short time I learned something important, viz., to knock the weapon of the opponent's retort from his hand myself at the outset. It was soon noticed that our adversaries . . . had a very definite "repertoire" in which

> constantly recurring objections were made to our assertions, so that the uniformity of the process indicated a purposeful and regular training. And so it was. Here we encountered the incredible discipline of our adversaries' propaganda and it is still my chief pride that I found the means not simply to make that propaganda ineffectual, but with it eventually to smite its own creators. Within two years I was a maser in the art.

By the "incredible discipline of our adversaries' propaganda" and the "very definite repertoire" Hitler means the Marxist philosophy and its symbols of the Class Struggle, Brotherhood, the Proletariat, International Solidarity, World Revolution. He hated these symbols and the democratic symbols that he associated with them. And, as he relates, he mastered the art not only of divesting the Marxist symbol of its strength but of using it to "smite its own creators."

Indeed, under Hitler symbols came to occupy a more significant role in German propaganda than ever before. To study a Hitler speech is to marvel at the absence of reasoning or substantiation and at the endless repetition of a few key symbols. In speech after speech Hitler denounced Pacifism, Democracy, Internationalism, Bolshevism, Freemasonry, Versailles, Plutocracy, and above all, the Jews. He exhalted the Fatherland, Lebensraum, the People's State, Kultur, the German Race, Discipline, Authority, and asked for "pride and will power, defiance, hate, hate, and once again hate" to "purify the great sty of democracy." These have been the chief symbols in Hitler's repertoire from the beginning. Although some have been played down at times, there has been surprisingly little change in the group as a whole.

A glance at Hitler's symbols shows how utterly repugnant most of them are to our own universal symbols. It will be recalled that both candidates in the election of 1936 in this country praised Democracy, Tolerance, Business, Private Enterprise, Labor, and many others. They both denounced Regimentation, War, Speculation, and Class Hatred. But as between Hitler's array of symbols and our own there has been no agreement on even the most basic and universal symbols. This of course is a measure of the utter incompatibility of the two systems. As Hitler has said, "Two worlds are face to face with one another," and we know this to be true of the world of ideas and symbols as well as the world of peoples and nations.

There is one crucial exception here, however, which holds out both a promise and a threat to our efforts to win on the propaganda front. The

Nazis, like us, proclaim that they are fighting for Freedom. Not for Democracy, nor for Tolerance, nor for Individual Rights, but for Freedom. This is the only major symbol which has some intrinsic meaning of its own and which is being fought over by both sides. It is the only symbol that has universal affirmative meaning for both Nazis and anti-Nazis. As such, it occupies the strategic terrain where the battle of symbols will be fought out. And it exhibits on a grand scale the same techniques of divesting one's opponent of his claim to a symbol, and of building up one's own claim to it, that we witnessed in 1936. The fact that the battle has been narrowed down to the possession of this one symbol simply means that the stakes are higher here and the struggle more crucial.

Hitler seems to have had some trouble with this word in his early speeches. He sought to make of Freedom a hate word. It meant, he said, the possibility of an unchecked plundering of the masses. But in later addresses there is a change in mood—or in strategy. It develops that the German people now want Freedom. "The National Government," Hitler warned, "will educate the German people in this spirit of a desire for freedom. . . . The ideal of freedom must once more become sacred to the German people." He pointed out that this meant freedom for the Fatherland, not for the individual. Indeed, he admitted that "it is thus essential that a number of individuals must sacrifice a part of their individual freedom and must subject themselves to a single will."

From the time of the Beer Hall Putsch to the outbreak of the war, this "freedom for the Fatherland" was stressed far more than any other single concept. But Hitler never allowed it to take on purely negative connotations. Freedom for the Fatherland meant Lebensraum—Germany's right to expand, to regain her old boundaries and her former colonies, to exercise a dominant role in the affairs of Europe. The symbol was never used as only Freedom *from* some peril. It was invariably used as Freedom *for* something—*for* unity, *for* equality with other nations, *for* Germany's place in the sun. This infused Freedom with an affirmative meaning for the German people.

When Hitler became supreme in continental Europe, the "lebensraum" motif was dropped. With so much territory at its disposal Germany could hardly complain of lack of living space. Besides, demands for new territory would merely alienate remaining neutral states and those

elements in belligerent nations that were potential allies of the Axis. A new rallying cry was needed that would both reassure the Germans at home and encourage the pro-Nazis abroad.

For Hitler this was a minor problem in intellectual acrobatics which he could easily solve. The emphasis on Freedom as a "good" symbol remained. Lebensraum was soft-pedalled (Hitler rarely mentioned it after April, 1940, in any important speech). To give Freedom the affirmative meaning that it had enjoyed, a new interpretation was sent over the air waves. Freedom now became the freedom of the masses to enjoy security and the good things of life. British and American Freedom became the freedom of the democracies to exploit the world, and the freedom of the "plutocrats" within the democratic nations to exploit the masses. This became the dominant theme in Hitler's speeches. It was the stick with which Hitler proceeded to beat the democracies.

He used this symbol shrewdly in both its political and economic implications. Watching India and the Middle East out of the corner of his eye, he would say sarcastically: "If the British declare that they are fighting for freedom, then the British might have given a wonderful example by granting their own Empire full liberty."

He reserved the full effect of this strategy, however, for the "legions of capitalism and plutocracy" and the "great international Jewish financial interests" which, he said, formed the real power behind the façade of democracy.

> They say . . . "You jeopardize liberty." Yes, we certainly jeopardize liberty to profiteer at the expense of the community.
>
> They say: "Here we have liberty." By this they mean, above all, an uncontrolled economy, and by an uncontrolled economy, the freedom not only to acquire capital but to make absolutely free use of it . . . . It is precisely in these countries that the distress of the masses is greater than anywhere else.
>
> There is povery—incredible poverty—on the one side, and equally incredible wealth on the other. They have not solved a single problem.
>
> They hate the Germany of Social Welfare . . . . they hate it because they feel that their own people might be infected by it.

This is the challenge—endlessly repeated—that is broadcast to the four corners of the world.

IV

On July 5, 1940, President Roosevelt held a press conference at Hyde Park. The reporters, away from the rush of official business in Washing-

ton, were in a philosophical mood. They wanted to know about the President's "long-range peace objectives."

Mr. Roosevelt was willing. For several minutes he proceeded to sketch out his conception of those objectives. "You might say there are certain freedoms," he said. "The first I would call 'freedom of information,' which is terribly important. . . . The second, of course, is freedom of religion. . . . A third freedom is the freedom to express one's self as long as you don't advocate the overthrow of Government. . . . Fourth, freedom from fear, so that people won't be afraid of being bombed from the air, or attacked, one way or the other, by some other nation. . . .

"Does that cover it pretty well?" he asked finally.

There was a pause, and Mr. Harkness, one of the reporters, spoke up.

"Well, I had a fifth in mind which you might describe as 'freedom from want. . . .'"

"Yes," said the President, "that is true. I had that in mind but forgot it. . . . That is the fifth, very definitely."

It was in this easy, informal way, speaking without rhetoric and off the record, that the President first advanced the set of symbols that was to form the lietmotif of his subsequent speeches. The process of development was slow. Different interpretations of freedom were advanced. It was not until six months later that the President set forth clearly what he ment by the Four Freedoms, as they had come to be called. Addressing Congress in January, 1941, he said that the future world must be founded upon four essential human freedoms—freedom of speech and expression, freedom of worship, freedom from want, and freedom from fear. "That is no vision of a distant millenium. It is a definite basis for a kind of world attainable in our own time and generation."

This situation set the stage for the inevitable clash between Hitler and the President over what they meant by this symbol. Since they both laid claim to Freedom, the battle would be fought for possession of this symbol. And the one that established his claim to Freedom most persuasively would have the support of the millions who idolized Freedom. It was, in a word, Hitler's Freedom versus Roosevelt's Freedom, in so far as the latter spoke for the democratic world.

President Roosevelt has not been unaware of Hitler's affectation of Freedom as the Nazi goal. Repeatedly he has assailed Hitler's freedom as not "freedom to live" but simply as freedom for the Nazis to "dominate

and enslave the human race." He has described the naked drive to power, the ruthless suppression of minorities and individuals, and the worship of brute force that characterizes the Nazi system. "Today the whole world is divided between human slavery and human freedom. . . . We choose human freedom. . . ."

President Roosevelt's attack on the Nazi conception of freedom has been eloquent and outspoken. The question remains, however, whether this is enough. Can we be content only with assailing our enemy's symbols? Can we hope to evoke the full strength of our present and potential support simply by weakening the impact of the Nazi ideological attack? Experience and reason indicate that we cannot.

Freedom from what? The President has answered the question in his Four Freedoms. Freedom from suppression of speech and worship. Freedom from efforts at world conquest. But the Nazis also have given their answer to this question. Freedom from capitalist world control that has enslaved millions of little people both at home and in the colonies. Freedom from political domination by a few Tories over great lands like India. Freedom from control of the press by a few "Judo-plutocrats." These are seductive words for millions of people who have felt—rightly or wrongly—that they had legitimate grievances against the victors in the first World War and the ruling groups within those nations.

Freedom *for* what? Now we approach the nub of the matter. Hitler in a crude sort of way has pictured a Nazi postwar world. "This world will be set free," he has said. "The possibility of one nation blockading a continent whenever it feels like it must be done away with." There will be a new world order with peace insured forever. A world unit will replace the present chaos of sovereign states. Within each country there will be a national socialist system that would offer some security and some freedom for all. A Greater Germany would enforce the new arrangement.

A pretty bleak outlook. But so far we have been offered no specific alternative by a responsible leader that holds out a promise of something much better. We want a world rid of Hitlerism. But that is only a condition, a prerequisite, for something positive to work for. The men and women of the United Nations want a Freedom that means more than freedom from the things they hate. They are not likely to deliver much support to a fight for a vacuum. They will give wholehearted support to an affirmative program.

Evidently President Roosevelt is not unaware of the threat offered by Hitler's ideological warfare. He has developed his counter strategy since the day he had to be reminded by a reporter that his long-range objectives included "freedom from want" as well as the other freedoms. A year after the press conference he acknowledged that "the Hitlers of the world are waging war by exploiting social unrest. . . ." And only a month before Pearl Harbor he said, "The essence of our struggle today is that man shall be free. There can be no freedom for the common man without enlightened social policies. In the last analysis, they are the stakes for which democracies are today fighting."

Mr. Roosevelt's procedure here is comparable with his strategy in the campaign of 1936. There he took a symbol with essentially negative meanings—Security—and gave it affirmative connotations by his promise to extend security into new fields, and by the vigorous nature of his whole campaign. And now he is in the position to take the key symbol of the day—one which also has had negative implications—and make of Freedom a symbol and a goal that will capture the imagination of all peoples.

This seems to be the President's strategy. The question remains: Has it been carried out with the vigor and imagination that are so imperative in an ideological struggle as crucial as this?

We have just observed "Charter Day"—the first anniversary of the signing of the Atlantic Charter by Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill. The Charter has been formally signed by the twenty-eight United Nations during the past year. It is probably the most important single document setting forth the principles for which we fight. But the great majority of Americans have been hardly stirred by this document. And we are told that in Germany Goebbels had the Charter reprinted verbatim in the newspapers, in some cases with no editorial comment. The hollow phrases spoke for themselves, and vindicated the Nazi propaganda which seeks to show that a victory of the United Nations would mean a new Versailles and another era of economic and political insecurity.

The solution to this ideological impasse is implicit in the hopes we have for the future. If we want the Four Freedoms to have meaning and impact, they must be fortified by the "propaganda of the deed" on a vaster scale than ever before. If Hitler points with scorn at our unemployment, our slum areas, our idle factories, our only answer can be

specific plans for postwar freedom from want, and the willingness during the war to improve the lot of the underprivileged as a token of our intentions. Nor is this simply a domestic charge. The Four Freedoms need bolstering elsewhere. A correspondent of the *New York Times* has a significant observation on the Indian situation. "There is a large part of India that is not much interested in the Congress Party or Britain either," he cables. "They probably have no pronounced views, either, on the outcome of the struggle between the Axis powers and the United Nations. . . . They are interested in getting more money for their labor and more food for themselves and their families." How much easier would be the solution of the Indian problem if these millions had a glimpse of a democratic world in which freedom from want and fear were guaranteed?

Such an effort to vitalize the Four Freedoms is all the more necessary because Freedom is today more than ever the key symbol of the United Nations. Mr. Roosevelt uses this symbol in every important address. Mr. Churchill addresses us as "fellow workers in the cause of freedom." Stalin in a recent Order of the Day to his soldiers stressed again and again that this was a war for freedom and for "all freedom-loving peoples." It is no coincidence that well over half the American people think of this as a war for freedom, according to a Gallup poll; that our French allies are the Free French; that a recently established magazine is called the *Free World*. Freedom is unchallenged as the symbolic justification of our stand. The urgent task is thus not the elevation of Freedom as a symbol, but its definition as a goal.

Who will win the battle of symbols? Obviously, the cause that wins the war as a whole. But victory in the battle of symbols will help decide the outcome of the war. Victory in both war and peace requires that if we really mean freedom from fear, we must plan for postwar world relationships that will be equitable. If we really mean freedom from want, we must not shrink from the job of setting up a stable and productive economic system. And in doing this we must be eager to champion a set of symbols that will stir to action millions of people who are waiting to be aroused. With these symbols we can block the Nazi symbols and turn them back on Hitler's own *ersatz* freedom.

"Men live by symbols," Justice Holmes once said. Today men die for them. "Upon the outcome of this war depends the freedom of your

lives: the freedom of the lives of those you love," President Roosevelt has written to each American soldier leaving for a foreign battlefield. The President has promised that some day these soldiers will advance against the enemy. But these military operations must be coupled with an ideological campaign. Our symbols, like our armies, must take the offensive.

MARGARET FULLER: TRANSCENDENTAL REBEL

By CHARLES A. MADISON

To us, nearly a century after her death, Margaret Fuller's enduring eminence seems inexplicable when considered in the light of her published work; while much of it is still vigorous and readable, even the most finished of her essays lacks the depth and directness of distinguished writing. We soon discover, however, that her fame derives from her remarkable personality rather than from her books. Only the husks of her brilliant mind went into cold print. This she knew better than anyone else, for the pen never excited her. "I feel within myself an immense power," she remarked with her usual candor concerning her imperfect style, "but I cannot bring it out." It was this torrential power, which became quick and magnetic in the heat of conversation, that made her the sibylline voice of her idealistic generation and gained her lasting renown. But this leading role in the Transcendental ferment was not the sum of her achievement. Moved by an unquenchable unrest, stirred by an irresistible passion for freedom, she forsook the philosophical tranquillity of her native New England for the barricades of a Europe in revolt. And although the French invaders defeated Garibaldi's Legion and gave Rome back to the Pope, her heroic efforts in behalf of the short-lived Roman Republic capped the glorious adventure of her tragic life.

I

In Cambridge, where Margaret was born in 1810, her father Timothy Fuller was known as a stubborn nonconformist. He had definite ideas on politics and education, and decided to test his pedagogical theories on his first-born, even though she was not the son he had expected. As soon as Margaret was able to quit the nursery he took complete charge of her. He bought her clothes, and supervised her every activity. Having early become aware of her precocity, he proceeded to force her mental development to the utmost. He taught her English grammar and Latin in her sixth year; in her seventh he had her read Virgil, Ovid, and Horace for

their Roman virtues. At the same time he gave her the freedom of his compact library closet, and she took joyous advantage of it during the hours she was not preparing her arduous lessons. He insisted on accuracy and preciseness in her daily recitations, and often kept her until long past her bedtime before he was satisfied with her progress. As a consequence she sometimes left him feeling so excited and unstrung that she dreaded closing her eyes and finally would fall asleep only to experience terrifying nightmares. Yet she accepted her solitude and her intensive training as a matter of course, and later wrote of this period of her life without rancor and with little regret.

Margaret matured like a forced plant. Without regular playmates, with little opportunity to vent her normal animal zest, she devoted most of her childhood to study and reading. In the realm of classical and modern literature she roamed from peak to peak with exceptional ease. The heroes from mythology and the great characters of Shakespeare, Fielding, Cervantes, and Molière engrossed her imagination. Her father, however, who treated her as "a living mind" and precious instrument, was closest to her heart and she yearned to have him all to herself. She sometimes dreamt "of following to the grave the body of her mother," and "of horses trampling over her"—evidences of her sexual precocity. Indeed, at the age of thirteen she appeared physically and mentally full grown and was accepted as such by her elders. When her father sent her to a finishing school in her fourteenth year, she had great difficulty in adjusting herself to the less mature ways and views of her classmates and was greatly relieved to quit it after two years for the comforting solitude of her father's library closet.

Throughout her teens ambition coursed through her consciousness like a burning fever. In her eagerness to acquire the knowledge and understanding of the intellectually superior person, she read at the rate of Gibbon: history, metaphysics, and foreign languages and literatures became her steady diet. For a time she went to a boys' school to study Greek; what man could do she would do. When the more serious Harvard freshmen of the class of 1829 began to take note of her, she enjoyed matching wits with them and made lifelong friends of several of them. She also began to make her appearance in society, and assisted her father in entertaining a large and distinguished gathering at a reception in honor of President John Quincy Adams. But her arrogant impatience with polite small talk

and her uncouth manners alienated many a Cambridge matron, and she was glad to place herself under the kind tutelage of Mrs. Eliza Farrar, author of *A Manual for Young Ladies.*

II

The tragedy of Margaret's life now began to cut into her sensitive heart. Of an intensive nature, her need for emotional fulfilment was strong and irrepressible. She craved not only admiration but affection. Yet no young man appeared to pay court to her. Harvard students were eager to converse with her, to enjoy the sparkling brilliance of her wit, to open their secret thoughts to her—but it never occurred to them to make love to her. For Margaret lacked physical charm: her bony face and blinking eyes failed to invite amorous glances. Not that she was actually homely. Emerson, who was at first disagreeably conscious of her appearance, soon found that "when she was intellectually excited, or in high animal spirits, as often happened, all deformity of features was dissolved in the power of expression." Yet the knowledge that she was not attractive was wormwood to her colossal ego. "I hate not to be beautiful," she confessed years later.

She would have gladly exchanged all her intellectual attainments for the normal joys of the wife and mother. If she "was not born to the common womanly lot," however, she was determined to be admired as a sibyl. To this end she intensified her cultural regimen during the next few years and adopted the maxim, "Make the emotions the servant, not the master of the soul." Because the *weltschmerz* of the German Romantics fitted her mood, she studied their writings with assiduous zeal and later became the "Germanico" of the Transcendental circle. Goethe's genius impressed her most deeply. She become one of his early American disciples, and for years prepared herself to write his biography.

For a long time her compensating conceit strove with her Goethean "extraordinary generous-seeking" for mastery. "There is no modesty or moderation in me," she admitted to Higginson. Fully aware of her great gifts, yet always conscious of her plain face, she was all the more eager to assert her intellectual superiority at all times. Her natural queenly bearing and her romantic predilections helped her to idealize herself as a sovereign of the mind. "I now know all the people worth knowing in America," she once asserted, "and I find no intellect comparable to my

own." Nor was this an idle boast, as Emerson and other eminent thinkers were soon to discover.

Her eagerness to lift human beings to her own high level caused her to castigate them for their shortcomings and to spur them with the stinging shafts of her caustic wit. This forthrightness, softened by an outgoing generosity of spirit, drew to her the discerning youth of Cambridge. Her magnetic personality encouraged them to jump the hurdle of her obtrusive conceit and her sharp tongue in order that they might bask before the blaze of her exciting intellect. Regarding her more as a disembodied intelligence than a girl of flesh and blood, they shared with her the woes of the world and communicated to her their innermost thoughts and feelings. And she helped them to unfold their powers and solve their personal problems with rare unselfishness. Those she cared for particularly she cultivated with a tender solicitude that bound them to her for life. "The friends whom her strength of mind drew to her," Emerson declared, "her good heart held fast; and few persons were ever the objects of more persevering kindness."

Margaret was twenty-three when her father, disappointed politically and professionally, decided to move with his family to a farm near Groton. The change was repugnant to her, but she knew better than to oppose it. For the next two years she led a secluded and unrewarding existence: she helped her mother with the housework, tutored her younger brothers and sisters, and assisted her father in his study of American history. Hard work and inner fretting made her an easy victim of an attack of brain fever, and for nine days she was in mortal danger. She had hardly regained her health when her father succumbed to Asiatic cholera and died within twenty hours. The blow was as severe as it was sudden, but she bore up under it with remarkable courage. With her mother self-effacing and unfitted to deal with the outside world, she accepted her new duties as head of the family and reconciled herself to the deep disappointment of having to give up a trip to Europe with Harriet Martineau, who had recently befriended her.

Grief and discontent had shaken her to the roots; her journal of that period gives evidence of severe soul-searching. But by the following summer she had regained her emotional stability and decided to seek a teaching position in order to improve the family income. In September, 1836, she was engaged by Bronson Alcott to teach in his Temple School

in Boston and was delighted to quit the farm where she had "to give up all which my heart had for years desired."

III

Margaret Fuller's coming to Boston was both a resurrection and a flowering. She was so happy once again to live in a center of culture that she did not mind the loneliness of the first weeks or the hard work that was sapping her strength throughout that winter. For she was not only teaching Latin and French at the school but also giving private lessons in German and Italian and reading German aloud to Dr. Channing one evening a week; in addition, of course, she continued her omniverous reading and study. Yet she rejoiced in this "incessant toil," since it brought her in contact with the choicest spirits of the land. Although her brusque manner and caustic tongue discouraged the more tender minds, enough persons of prominence had befriended her to give her the satisfaction of having become an integral part of intellectual Boston.

Her greatest conquest was Ralph Waldo Emerson, to whom Harriet Martineau had introduced her and whom she had visited in Concord during the previous summer. The young philosopher was at first on the defensive: her plain face and blinking eyes only accentuated her "rather mountainous ME." After their initial meeting he recorded, "We shall not get far. . . . I am a little afraid of her, she has such an overpowering personality." But she was not easily discouraged. She knew his worth, was certain their friendship would stimulate both of them, and made no secret of her wish to gain his intimacy. Before her visit was ended she thawed his inhospitable prudery and persuaded him of the complementary nature of their minds. Repeated meetings only strengthened their bond of sympathetic understanding. Margaret opened his eyes to a vision of truth and universality which added to his own; Emerson instilled in her a sense of serenity and assurance which she had not known before befriending him and which helped her fully to unfold her idealistic self.

Happy as she was in Boston, she was too much in need of a larger income not to accept the offer from the Greene Street School in Providence at the unprecedented annual salary of a thousand dollars. During the two years that she held the post she continued to regard Boston as her spiritual home and kept up a large correspondence with the friends she had left behind. She also kept up her studies in European literature and philosophy

and translated Eckermann's *Conversations With Goethe* for George Ripley's new series of standard foreign works. Her holidays were of course spent in the Massachusetts capital, where she either attended art exhibits and classical concerts or exchanged views with a growing circle of intellectuals who were searching their souls for the key that would unlock the secret of philosophical certainty. In 1839 she decided that teaching children was not her final vocation—that it was time to strike out for her appointed place in the wider adult world.

The Boston to which Margaret returned was in the full career of a seething cultural upsurge. The Puritanic lid which had confined the life of New Englanders for two centuries was thrust aside by an impatient new generation which knew not the Calvinistic Mathers and which found Dr. Channing's Unitarianism pale and ineffectual. Not religion but philosophy, not salvation but social reform, became the goals of the young men and women who had tasted of European Romanticism and found it good. Perfectibility appeared to them a feasible reality; education a talisman with which to acquire all that the imagination conceived. Everyone was engaged in study: mill hands and chambermaids were as preoccupied with self-improvement as their bookish betters. Lecture-going had become a passion, and the lyceums were crowded with eager audiences. Those who had become aware of the businessman's crass materialism began to hatch utopian schemes to rid the world of greed and inequality; others preferred to dwell in the clouds of soulful talk and educational whimsy.

Margaret, culturally in full flower and with a mind that probed deeper and ranged further than those of her contemporaries, was quick to assert her superior gifts upon those with whom she came in contact. Her eloquence and passionate vitality made her the pivotal center of every discussion in which she participated. Emerson, with whom she frequently shared honors at these gatherings, admitted that she "always appeared to unexpected advantage in conversation with a circle of persons, with more common sense and sanity than any other—though her habitual vision was through colored lenses." This notable success as a moderator led her, logically enough, to decide upon the career of a "paid Corinne."

She had long been fretting at the restrictions laid on women. Brought up by her father as the equal of any man, conscious of her worth and yet vexed by her lack of pulchritude, she chafed at the thought of being de-

prived of certain rights and privileges simply because she was a woman. "I have often had reason to regret being of the softer sex and never more than now," she wrote at the time when her dour uncle took charge of her father's estate as the nearest male kin. It was therefore natural for her, in capitalizing upon her speaking ability, to wish to further the cause of equal rights. She decided upon a feminine audience and upon topics of special benefit to it. But she did not want to lecture to it: she wished rather to discuss with it such questions as, "What were we born to do? and how shall we do it?"; to bring these women out of their stuffy parlors and help them acquire the knowledge and self-reliance that would compel men to accept them as their equals. Her first course of ten Conversations began on November 6, 1839. Twenty-five women came, among them the most intelligent in Boston. The respect which the most eminent men of the city had for Margaret's great gifts made it possible for their wives and daughters proudly to venture into a public activity previously open to them only at their peril. The topic was Greek mythology, and the praise of heathen Greeks at a Christian meeting so disturbed her inexperienced audience that she had to do most of the talking at first. But she soon made everyone alive with the intensity of her volcanic personality; her penetrating analysis of myths hitherto accepted uncritically opened the minds of her hearers to new and exhilarating vistas. Before the course was far along they were actively participating in the discussions, probing their thoughts for hidden and unexplored depths, and gaining the firmness of intellect which speeded the organization of the feminist movement.

The notable success of these Conversations led immediately to a second course, this time on the fine arts. Again these novel two-hour discussions attracted a maximum audience, and once more Margaret's regal manner and brilliant talk made the women her grateful debtors. At their strong urging she prepared new courses of Conversations and gave them regularly until she left for New York in 1844. In March, 1841, she opened the Conversations to men as well, and a number of the intellectual leaders paid two dollars an evening for the privilege of discussing literary and philosophical problems with the queen of conversationalists.

Margaret Fuller's determination to achieve fame was now realized. Alcott, himself a fountain of eloquence, extolled her as "the most commanding talker of her day." After attending one of her discussions, Dr. Channing wrote that "she blended feminine receptiveness with mas-

culine energy. By the intensity of her conceptions, she brought out in those around her, *their own consciousness.*" Emerson likewise averred that her conversation was "in elegance, in range, in flexibility, and adroit transition, in depth, in cordiality, and in moral aim, altogether admirable, surprising and cheerful as a poem, and communicating its own civility and elevation like a charm to all hearers." No wonder that she preened herself as the most celebrated woman in Boston!

All this applause and admiration yielded her nothing of the emotional fulfilment which she continued to crave. To her journal she confided her anguished heart: "With the intellect I always have, always shall, overcome; but that is not half the work. The life, the life! O, my God! shall the life never be sweet?" Nor did she know that her very self-consciousness before the men who came to pay homage to the sibyl and might have remained to court the woman tended to drive them from her. Even Samuel Gray Ward, who had come closest in his admiration of her, was in the end discouraged by her equivocal and neurotic behavior. All she could do was to express this sense of failure in one of her frequent prayers: "I am weary of thinking. Oh God, take me! take me wholly! . . . No fellow being will receive me. I cannot pause; they will not detain me by their love. . . ."

IV

Margaret's next venture was the editing of the *Dial,* the organ of the Transcendentalists. The latter were a small group of thinkers and reformers who met irregularly and infrequently after 1836 to discuss the ideas and problems uppermost in their minds. Emerson, Alcott, Theodore Parker, and George Ripley were among the leaders; Margaret and about a dozen others joined the Conversations at one time or another. These idealists had no common basic philosophy and no definite program. They all believed, however, in "the inalienable integrity of man" and in his "birthright to a universal good." Many of them were ministers reacting against Puritan orthodoxy; others showed the influence of Greek philosophy and German metaphysics; all were humanitarians recoiling from the materialism about them. Margaret's mind was enthusiastic rather than reflective; but she made up for this deficiency by her powers of analysis and expression and by her extensive knowledge of modern writing. These qualifications made her the logical choice as editor when

the group decided to issue a quarterly that would reflect the latest trends in philosophy and literature.

The first issue appeared in July, 1840, and she herself had to fill space reserved for less obliging contributors. But the immediate success of the periodical enabled her thereafter to publish the best contemporary writing without paying for it. Especially noteworthy was her ability to seek out the timid neophytes and nurse their talents to rapid fruition. Yet her policy of letting everyone have his say, even to the magazine's hurt, soon met with the inevitable disapproval. The conservatives, of course, condemned the quarterly for its very existence. But even its friends found fault: the radicals did not like its conventional part; the social reformers complained it was impractical; and the literary critics were annoyed by the uneven style. Most of them, moreover, could not accept the idea of a woman editor and insisted that what the periodical needed most of all was a masculine emphasis. The circulation, small at best, had dwindled to less than one hundred copies at the end of the second year. Margaret saw no advantage in continuing her thankless task and gave over the editorship to Emerson, who accepted it reluctantly in order not to let it fall into the hands of the "Humanity and Reform men." With young Thoreau's help the number of subscribers rose to about 250, but after two years more the *Dial* was suspended. It had served its purpose well as a vehicle for the rising generation and the new philosophy, and Emerson had other work to do.

About the time the *Dial* was launched George Ripley began to plan for a utopian farm community, based on the Transcendental principle of plain living and high thinking. Numerous similar phalanxes were then being operated by foreigners who had come to this country in the hope of bringing heaven upon earth. Ripley's Brook Farm was the first venture into utopia by native Americans. When the idea was broached to the group of Transcendentalists, Emerson was cool, Alcott thought the plan not severe enough, while Margaret, though sympathetic, remembered too well the dreary years on the Groton farm to chance another similar experience. Moreover, as an advocate of self-reliance she objected to "doing things in crowds." "Why bind oneself to a central or any other doctrine?" she asked rhetorically. "How much nobler stands a man entirely unpledged, unbound! Association may be the great experiment of the age, still it is only an experiment."

Nevertheless she was too much the utopian idealist not to favor the attempt at human amelioration. It was only her aesthetic recoil from the "rabid and exaggerated" behavior of the Abolitionist leaders that had kept her from joining the reform which was then most in the limelight; later, from the vantage point of the Roman Revolution, she came to appreciate the high motive of the Garrisonians—"it was really something worth living and dying for to free a great nation from such a terrible blot"—and to regret her prejudiced inactivity. Likewise, while she frowned upon the mechanical disciplines of Fourierism, she sympathized with its humanitarian aspirations. It was her belief that "every noble scheme, every poetic manifestation, prophesies to man his eventual destiny." She was therefore glad to visit Brook Farm when she could and held several Conversations there. The grateful community honored her as one of its distinguished guests. Only Hawthorne, whom she had met there and who had seemed eager enough to befriend her, wrote disparagingly of her as "the stump-oratress" in *The Blithesdale Romance,* which he published after her death. This novel of the utopian experiment is probably most responsible for the much closer association of her name with Brook Farm than is warranted by the facts.

V

An unexpected but welcome invitation in the spring of 1843 made it possible for her to visit the Great Lakes country and to observe life on the frontier at first hand. She recorded her impressions in *Summer on the Lakes,* her first work, which in form is reminiscent of Heine's *Reisebilder* and which reveals clearly her interests and sympathies. She deplored the tendency of farmers to send their children to schools in the East and thus to unfit them for life on the prairie. She also deprecated the "comfortless and laborious life" of most of the women; by comparison she found the Indian squaw commanding a higher social status within the tribe. The raw injustice toward the Indians invoked her strongest condemnation—"The white man as yet is a half-tamed pirate, and avails himself as much as ever of the maxim, 'Might makes right.' "

Horace Greeley, a West enthusiast and reformer, was so favorably impressed with the little book that he offered Margaret the position of literary critic on the *Tribune.* She was delighted with this opportunity to make her way in the American metropolis, as the trip west had

wrenched her center of orientation and made her aware of Boston's parochial limitations. First, however, she wished to complete the expansion of an essay on equal rights into a volume, and did not begin her journalistic career until December, 1844.

Woman in the Ninteenth Century, published early in 1845, was the first book on feminism in this country and was both praised and denounced with equal heat. Essentially Margaret urged for the right of women to develop their talents and predilections in accord with their inherent natures. Mary Wollstonecraft and George Sand, at that time scorned as immoral freaks, she defended as persons worthy of honor and not disdain. Drawing upon her enormous reading and citing examples from history and literature, she demonstrated that her sex always had been stultified and conditioned against "originality of thought and character." She urged women to stand firmly on their feet, to develop "self-subsistence in its two forms of self-reliance and self-impulse." So far as she was concerned, women were capable of filling any office—even that of "sea-captains"—and had in fact already "taken possession of so many provinces for which men had pronounced them unfit, that although these still declare there are some inaccessible to them, it is difficult to say just *where* they must stop."

Yet she was too much the reformer and Transcendentalist to advocate mere equality. Perfection was to her the ultimate goal. Denying that love encompassed woman's whole existence, she exhorted her sex to clear their "souls from the taint of vanity" and to cultivate their potent moral power in order to achieve nobility in themselves and to lift men to their own level. "You see the men," she counseled,

> how they are willing to sell shamelessly the happiness of countless generations of fellow-creatures, the honor of their country, and their immortal souls for a money market and political power. . . . Tell these men that you will not accept the glittering baubles, spacious dwellings, and plentiful service they mean to offer you through these means. Tell them that the heart of Woman demands nobleness and honor in man, and that if they have not purity, have not mercy, they are no longer fathers, lovers, husbands, sons of yours.

VI

Horace Greeley soon had reason to congratulate himself on his choice of Margaret Fuller as his literary critic. The obvious high quality of her reviews made them one of the *Tribune's* special features. With the pos-

sible exception of Poe, she was the first American to write of books with objectivity and deep critical acumen. Her thorough study of European literature and of Goethe in particular enabled her to expose the provincialism, the imitativeness, and the general mediocrity of a good share of American writing. Her sharp pen dissected the books under scrutiny without fear or favor, and she shocked many of her readers with devastating criticisms of such popular poets as Lowell and Longfellow. Only Emerson's verse and Hawthorne's fiction appeared to her to measure up favorably to the best European literature. Her evaluation of the leading English and Continental authors was equally penetrating. In all her reviews she adhered to the aesthetic principle that "a great work of Art demands a great thought, or a thought of beauty adequately expressed." She tried her utmost to develop the literary taste of her readers and to wean them from the prevailing pedantry and prudery. When her representative reviews were collected and published in 1846 under the title of *Papers on Literature and Art,* they constituted a volume of the most distinguished criticism to appear in this country up to that time.

The realities of a newspaper office and the broader associations of the metropolis soon rubbed off a good deal of the mystic sentimentalism—"cant and nonsense" to Greeley—which she had cultivated in Boston. She became keenly interested in the improvement of the city's charitable and reformatory institutions. The women prisoners at Sing Sing and Blackwell's Island attracted her particularly, and she spent days with them in intimate interrogation and discussion. Convinced of their inherent goodness, she espoused their cause at a time when the social taboo excluded these unfortunates from the ken of women of respectability and wrote about them with a compassion which brought a new note in the incipient agitation for penal reform.

Margaret was soon as popular in New York as she had been in Boston. But no amount of adulation could fill the void in her yearning heart. "I am alone, as usual," was her reply when asked why she had sighed so deeply at the end of a Valentine Day party. That same month, however, she met James Nathan, a German-Jewish merchant of cultural predilections, and fell in love with him. Flattered by her partiality, he encouraged her interest in him. Soon she contrived in her usual impetuous manner to see him often, to write to him almost daily, and to make no secret of her affection for him. For the first time in her life she was

being wooed for herself and felt too grateful and too happy to bother with formalities and reticences. Nathan was not quite equal to this torrent of mystical ardor, but for a time did his best to keep up his end of the affair. They had many ups and downs, yet went deeper right along. Nathan was becoming frightened; he could think only of flight, and sailed for Europe in June.

Margaret now knew "how wounds can burn and ache." She would have been disconsolate in her humiliation and misery had not her friends exerted themselves to soothe her bruised ego with the balm of forgetfulness. On her return in October from a short vacation in Massachusetts she busied herself with her work and did her best to forget the unhappy experience. Thus the winter passed and the spring, and in the summer came the opportunity she had sought for so many years—a grand tour of Europe with dear friends—plus a correspondent's assignment from her country's most exciting daily.

VII

Margaret's reputation as a feminist and critic had preceded her to Great Britain, and she was everywhere received with marked cordiality. Her visits to the centers of manufacture and commerce—"burning focuses of grief and vice"—made it easy for her to join the cause of Reform and to befriend the liberals and Continental exiles who came her way. Mazzini, whom she met at the Carlyles, became one of her closest friends. The Carlyles received her many times, and although she found her Scottish host arrogant and overbearing—he was her match as a talker and shouted her down at will—she admired his great talents and powerful personality.

In November she went to Paris and made the rounds of the galleries, theatres, and celebrities, and was greatly stimulated by her interview with George Sand. Here, too, she studied the life of the workers and was keenly affected by their wretched poverty. The sight of this misery made her overcome her earlier distaste for Fourier's doctrines. "I should pity the person," she wrote, "who, after the briefest sojourn in Manchester and Lyons, the most superficial acquaintance with the population of London and Paris, could seek to hinder a study of his thoughts, or to be wanting in reverence for his purposes."

The Italians quickly impressed her with their "capacity for pure, exalting passion." In Rome, which she reached the following April, she

absorbed the imposing richness and dignity of its antiquities and churches with the zeal of a pious pilgrim. Here again, however, she was not satisfied to remain merely the disinterested tourist. She was quick to note the incipient restiveness of the people and soon became an active participant in their agitation for national independence. Her frequent letters to the *Tribune* and to friends reveal a deepened awareness of the world, and eagerness to bring about the rebirth of a new society. "I see the future dawning," she wrote to William Channing in May, 1847; "it is in important aspects Fourier's future."

Shortly after coming to Rome, while visiting St. Peter's, Margaret met Giovanni Angelo Ossoli and was immediately attracted to him. He was of a noble family, but of little education and less means; moreover, he was only twenty-six years old and she was nearing her thirty-seventh birthday. But he made himself very useful to her as a guide and gazed upon her with a yearning that made her quick with happiness. What mattered age or station, she wondered, so long as there was understanding and affinity? "Woman is born for love," she asserted about that time, "and it is impossible to turn her from seeking it." With George Sand as her model and with the long-repressed woman in her crying for affection, it was easy for her to welcome Ossoli as her destined lover. When she returned to Rome in October, after a tour of other parts of Italy, her erstwhile guide was waiting for her and made himself her almost inseparable companion.

VIII

The movement for Italian liberation was gaining momentum and Margaret surged on the crest of the revolutionary wave. More than any other English-speaking resident in Rome she knew and sympathized with the unhappy history of the divided country and was only too eager to work for its national unity. But she expected more than political freedom; she wanted to see social betterment as well. Indeed, the socialistic agitation for a more equitable society appealed to her as just and commendable. "Our age is one where all things tend to a great crisis," she wrote in October, 1847; "not merely to revolution, but to radical reform." So preoccupied had she become with the thought of a better world that on the first day of what she knew would be a momentous year she could not help reflecting on the pitiful state of Europe after eighteen centuries of

Christian culture. "Where is the genuine democracy to which the rights of all men are holy. . . . If we consider the amount of truth that has really been spoken out in the world, and the love that has beat in private hearts . . . the public failure seems amazing, seems monstrous." Nor did she exclude the United States from this indictment, and excoriated it as "the darkest offender because with the least excuse." It was in this connection that she expressed her admiration for the Abolitionists, whose rabid behavior she could not endure while at home but whose moral motive now appealed to her as noble and heroic.

The flame and revolution which spread so rapidly through western Europe during the early months of 1848 warmed her responsive heart. "It is a time such as I always dreamed of," she wrote Channing in April. And a month later she excused herself to Emerson for not accepting his invitation to take ship with him from London: "I should like to return with you, but I have much to do and learn in Europe yet. I am deeply interested in the public drama, and wish to see it *played out.* Methinks I have *my part* therein, either as actor or historian." It was her intention to be both. Her letters to the *Tribune,* giving a clear and acute analysis of the prevailing political and social conditions in Europe, served well as material for her history. At the same time she participated actively in the increasing agitation in Rome, and when Mazzini returned to it after seventeen years of exile she became his associate and confidante.

But in addition to the "public drama" she had become involved in a personal drama which tore at the roots of her existence. Intimacy with Ossoli soon led to pregnancy. Her first reaction was one of despair. "This incubus of the future" caused her to write to Caroline Sturgis, "I have no reason to hope that I shall not reap what I have sown, and do not. Yet how I shall endure it I cannot guess." But her good sense kept her buoyant and balanced. She married Ossoli privately, and shortly thereafter left for Rieti to await the worst. The baby came early in September and Margaret had a difficult and anxious time with the doctor and wet-nurse. Two months later, badly in need of money and eager to resume her part in the social drama, she arranged for the care of her infant son and returned to Rome. To her mother she wrote cryptically, "In earlier days I dreamed of doing and being much, but now am content with the Magdalen to rest my plea hereon, *'She has loved much.'* "

Her return to the city almost coincided with the Pope's flight from it. The subsequent establishment of the Roman Republic gave her great joy. "I pass whole days abroad," wrote the erstwhile bluestocking and bookworm; "sometimes I take a book, but seldom read it:—why should I, when every stone talks?" But the forces of revolt were still too weak to oppose the French army which the tricky Napoleon had ordered to restore the Pope to his throne. When General Oudinot began the attack on Rome in April, Margaret took charge of a hospital and worked day and night to minister to the wounded. The tragedy of the siege drained her vitality even more than the physical strain. "O Rome, *my* country," she cried to Emerson that June. "Could I imagine that the triumph of what I held dear was to heap such desolation on my head!" And a month later, after the defeat of the Garibaldi Legion, she confessed to Channing, "Private hopes of mine have fallen with the hopes of Italy. I have played for a new stake and lost it. Life looks too difficult." She was "*tired out*—tired of thinking and hoping—tired of seeing men err and bleed."

Friends helped her and Ossoli to reach Rieti, where they found their son half-starved and ill. He reacted very quickly to their tender nursing, however, and the little family settled in Florence for the winter. Margaret now had to appear before her friends as a wife and mother and was greatly relieved to find them accepting her new role as a matter of course. For the next few months she worked on her history of the Roman Revolution. In the spring the lack of means and a reluctance to remain in an Italy no longer congenial to her speeded her decision to return to the United States. Numerous difficulties, real and fancied, confronted her—the most immediate being the high cost of travel for the three of them. But with the help of solicitous friends she succeeded in arranging for their passage on the *Elizabeth,* a small and slow ship, and sailed from Gibralter on June 19. As the vessel approached Fire Island exactly a month later, a storm smashed it against a sandbar within a few hundred yards from shore. No help came during the gale, and in the confusion Margaret and her husband and child were washed into the sea and drowned. Most of her belongings, including the manuscript on the Roman Revolution, were lost with her.

IX

It was a striking tribute to Margaret's remarkable personality that her tragic death should have caused such genuine grief among so many

persons on both sides of the Atlantic. The Brownings, whom she had befriended in Florence, were deeply shocked; Landor wrote a long poem to her memory; Lowell and Longfellow, forgetting the hurt of her criticism, were quick to extol her genius; Mazzini, again in London, was disconsolate. Even the dour Carlyle was moved to praise her in his characteristic fashion: "Such a predetermination to *eat* this big universe as her oyster or her egg, and to be absolute empress of all height and glory in it that her heart could conceive, I have not before seen in any human soul." Emerson, with whom she had been most intimate, recorded the sad tidings in his Journal: "To the last her country proves inhospitable to her; brave, eloquent, subtle, accomplished, devoted, constant soul! . . . I have lost in her my audience." With several of her other lifelong friends he proceeded at once "to build her a cairn"—which materialized early in 1852 in the two-volume *Memoirs of Margaret Fuller Ossoli,* a somewhat bowdlerized but deeply moving account of her life and character.

Time has made secure her prominent position in the cultural history of the United States. Although her tragic death cut off her productivity before it reached its maturest fruition, her electric personality had impressed itself indelibly upon her generation. Her great intellectual vigor, her extraordinary generosity of spirit, and above all her passionately eloquent criticism of the prim parochialism and narrow materialism about her, made her the effective leader of those who resented the restraints of their Calvinistic environment and sought to enthrone the precious freedoms of civilized man. It was this championing of human rights, this abhorrence of oppression and inequality of any kind, that still endears her name to all lovers of liberty and democracy.

THE JEWISH PROBLEM—GREATEST BUBBLE OF THE AGE

By WILLIAM ZUKERMAN

ONE OF THE MOST SIGNIFICANT effects of Nazism has been to raise the Jewish problem even in non-Nazi countries to a height and an importance which it never reached before in its history and which is entirely out of proportion to its significance as a social manifestation. Anti-Semitism is not a new phenomenon in the world; it is probably one of the oldest and most troublesome minor ills of Western civilization. But at no other time in the last two thousand years has this problem, always an incidental reflection of the greater social disorders of a country, ever been made to loom so high as a major independent social problem by itself, as an international issue of world importance. In Nazi countries the Jewish problem has become the pivot upon which all other problems—social, political, economic, psychological, and religious—revolve; it is supposed to be the source of all the evils of mankind and of all the troubles of society; its solution is made the principal condition for the millennium. Even in countries outside Nazi influence, the Jewish problem has assumed aspects and proportions which transcend all reality and cannot be described otherwise than as fantastic. It is now definitely the greatest bubble of our age.

That this is no accident is too obvious and needs no elaborate explanation now, after nine years of Nazi rule in Germany and another decade of Nazi propaganda. In this time, the world has learned enough of the real nature of Nazi anti-Semitism and of its place in the Nazi scheme of things. It knows that the Nazis are using the Jewish problem not as an aim in itself, but as a means for achieving other, larger, non-Jewish aims, as an instrument for the attainment of purposes which go far beyond the Jews and their interests. In Europe, especially, where the knowledge of Nazism is at least five years ahead of that in the United States, Nazi anti-Semitism is now generally recognized for what it is: one of the greatest political frauds of the century, the cleverest piece of psychological

camouflage ever concocted by ruthless men in search of power. The Nazis, who more than any other politicians have made deliberate use of psychology, early in their career realized the advantages which they could derive from the peculiar position of the Jews scattered as a small minority in most countries of the world, and they have exploited it to the full. They have used the Jews as a wedge for penetration into foreign countries, as a backdoor entrance into the consciousness of foreign peoples. They have used the Jewish problem psychologically as the Kaiser used Belgium in the last war physically—as a stepping stone to their larger aims of world domination. But in order to do that effectively they had to raise this question from its comparatively unimportant local position to a crucial place in international politics and make of it a world issue. The modern Trojan Horse, built of prejudice, had to be made more imposing than the one built of wood in order to deceive the more sophisticated modern man. Thus the biggest psychological inflation of the age began; the blowing up of the anti-Semitic bubble of the Nazis was started on its fantastic career.

It was probably natural that the Jews should be among the first psychological victims of this campaign. For it must not be forgotten that for the Jews the present Nazi war is not nearly three, but more than ten years old, and that a war of such duration and cruelty was bound to tell on the nerves of a people. Emotionally Jews have been affected by certain aspects of Nazi propaganda more easily than a good many other people. They are more susceptible than other people to apprehensions about the growth of anti-Semitism; they are more easily swayed by the alarm which fascism has spread the world over, and they quite naturally yield with greater ease to that feeling of despair and pessimism with which fascism has succeeded in surrounding the Jewish problem above all others. A feeling prevails among many Jews now that their problem is one of the most difficult and complicated issues of mankind; that anti-Semitism is an inevitable and unavoidable evil which cannot be eradicated and that no people in the world can escape it. Even the democratic countries are believed to be not immune from it and it is assumed that a victory over Hitlerism on the battlefield will not do away with its dangers. A popular opinion held now by an important group of Jews is that all Gentiles are potential, if not real anti-Semites; that the entire Christian world is consumed by a "great hatred" of the Jews deeply rooted in the uncon-

scious of all non-Jewish people. Most of the Jewish plans for the postwar period are based on the assumption that Europe and the world will, as far as the Jews are concerned, remain approximately the same even if Hitlerism is completely defeated. Nazism may come and Nazism may go, but anti-Semitism will go on forever, is a dominant mood among a great many Jews today.

Curiously, a somewhat similar pessimism about the Jewish problem prevails also among non-Jews and even among liberals and progressives. Somehow they too have become imbued with the sense of fatalism and defeatism which Nazism has spread about the future of the Jews. It has become fashionable even in advanced liberal circles to speak of anti-Semitism as of a mystical force which cannot be comprehended by ordinary reason and of the Jews as a group as a mysterious people who are not subject to the same social and psychological laws as are other national groups. Well known American liberals who expect a new heaven and new earth after the defeat of Hitlerism nevertheless subscribe to theories that the seeds of Jew-hatred sown by Nazism can, even must, sprout and grow in the United States and in other democratic countries. The most dangerous piece of Nazi propaganda—the distinction between Nazism and anti-Semitism—has found a wide acceptance among Jews and Gentiles alike in America, and an opinion prevails that the world will not escape a strong dose of anti-Semitism after the war, even if fascism be defeated.

An observer of Jewish life for many years cannot help detecting in all of these gloomy predictions and expectations signs of conscious or of unconscious Nazi influence—at best, a note of hysteria fostered by Nazi propaganda. That the Jewish position in Europe, and even in the world at large, is now more tragic than it has ever been in its history, is readily admitted. But the fundamental fact about this position is that most of its calamities—the terrible persecution, discrimination, mass murder, and extermination—are imposed upon it from above by an external force which does not flow from the depths of non-Jewish people but from their rulers and oppressors who tyrannize over them not less than over the Jews. An impartial review of the Jewish scene in Europe in the light of the latest events will show that in spite of Hitler, and probably because of him, anti-Semitism has never been less popular among the peoples of Europe than it now is. The plain facts as they are seen by those who

have no theories to advance is that Europe now seems to be in the midst of the greatest pro-Jewish movement that that continent has seen in a century. The Christian people of all nationalities, classes, and sections of society, their true leaders, their institutions, and particularly the Christian churches have never before revealed more friendship for, and profound interest in, the Jews than now. If the last two and a half years of anguish and suffering have done nothing else, they have advanced the Jewish problem nearer to a solution than it has ever been in its history. The Jewish question has never before been seen in a truer perspective than now—as an integral part of the social problem of the world. One of the effects of the war has been to lift the vapors of Nazi propaganda surrounding the Jewish problem and to show to the millions in Europe the close connection existing between it and their own problem. Because of this the Jewish problem has never been less of a mystery than it now is; in any event, a survey of the Jewish scene the world over in the light of the latest changes brought about by the war will show that the pessimism and despair hanging about that problem are greatly exaggerated and that it certainly is not without some hope.

II

The first two and a half years of the second World War have wrought greater and profounder changes in Europe than did the whole of the first World War and many decades of normal life. As yet some of these changes are not clearly seen because they are obscured by the heavy pall of the war. But in the darkness of the worst military occupation in history, behind the heavy walls of Nazi concentration camps, forced labor camps, ghettos and other means of Nazi tyranny, more than one silent revolution is now growing into maturity and helping to create that new world which is bound to arise when the fighting is over. Perhaps the most dramatic and symbolic of all the changes brought about in this war is the new attitude toward the Jews which has now sprung up among the peoples of Europe as distinct from their rulers. The Nazi censorship is doing everything in its power to obscure this interesting manifestation, but the Nazi press itself is daily obliged to reveal its existence and influence. It is chiefly through the complaints and threats of this press, through the bravery of the small neutral press still existing in Europe (particularly the Swedish newspapers) and through the heroism

of the hundreds of the anti-Nazi newspapers and radio stations which now flourish illegally in Europe that this remarkable manifestation emerges from the dusk of Nazi military occupation.

European observers agree that in all Nazi-occupied countries in Europe a new sympathy with and friendship for the Jews has now made its appearance among the people and is probably one of the strongest and most widespread sentiments in Europe; it baffles the Nazis and amazes even the enemies of the regime; nothing like it has been known in Europe for decades and even generations; it would have sounded unbelievable a few years before the outbreak of this war. Never before in this and even in the previous century has there been so much good will shown to the Jews in every country under Nazi occupation as is being shown now; never has there been so much active aid given to them. From the Low Countries to Poland and from Scandinavia to the Balkans, the people are everywhere openly and secretly sabotaging primarily the anti-Jewish laws of the Nazis; they are refusing to boycott the Jews, to be segregated from them, to cooperate with the Nazis in harassing, insulting, and starving them out. Everywhere the people help the Jews obtain food, clothing, and all other articles which they are forbidden by the Nazis to buy. In some countries, like Norway and Holland, organized social movements exist for the sole purpose of helpng the Jews to contravene the Nazi anti-Jewish laws; societies are specially formed to help Jews leave the country, to pay the collective fines which the Nazis are imposing on them, and generally to be of aid and comfort to them. Where there is no organized movement, individuals act upon their own initiative and there is the testimony of the Nazi press that the number of Gentiles who have lost their jobs, their freedom, and even their lives in efforts to help the Jews, reaches into the thousands. The movement is spontaneous, embraces all classes of people, and is permeated with a strong religious feeling. In most of the Protestant countries it is also inspired and directed by the churches. In the opinion of the best European observers there is now less anti-Jewish feeling among the peoples of Europe than has been known in three generations. Anti-Semitism as a theory is everywhere discredited, hated, and actively opposed.

In Holland the leading universities struck when the Nazis attempted to introduce separate benches for the Jewish students and courses in racialism. The professors and student bodies combined in defying the

Nazis and preferred the suspension of their studies, and many of them even long terms in concentration camps to the introduction of Nazi anti-Semitism into the schools. In Amsterdam the first open revolt against the Nazi invaders took place when the Dutch workers came out in a force to defend the Jews from a Nazi pogrom. In Belgium the first attempt to introduce yellow insignia for the Jews was frustrated by the non-Jews voluntarily putting on the same insignia as a mark of sympathy. A second attempt is now being fought off with the same stubborness. In Norway the remarkable revolt of the Protestant and Lutheran clergy against the Nazi invaders began as an open protest in all the churches against the introduction of the anti-Jewish laws into the country. The signal for the revolt was the pastoral letter by Bishop Eivand Berggrav, the head of the Protestant and Lutheran Churches of Norway, which is probably the strongest document against anti-Semitism ever produced in Nazi Europe. In that country too, the first illegal organization of leading citizens was formed with the sole purpose of counteracting the special Nazi persecution of the Jews. Otto Nansen, the son of the famous explorer and humanitarian, is now serving a sentence in a Norwegian concentration camp for starting that movement. In Denmark, King Christian threatened to abdicate the throne if the Nazis introduced the anti-Jewish laws into the country against the will of Parliament, and the entire country supported the King. In former Czechoslovakia, the struggle of the people against the anti-Jewish laws of the Nazis has been so persistent and so effective that after three years of threats and appeals for cooperation, the Nazi "Protectorate" has come to the conclusion that the entire Jewish population of Czechoslovakia—90,000 men, women and children —must be interned in a concentration camp. In no other way could the non-Jewish population be prevented from helping and showing friendship to the Jews.

Incidentally, this is admitted by the Nazis to be the chief reason for the introduction of Jewish ghettos in all Nazi-occupied countries. These have become necessary in order to keep the non-Jews from fraternizing with the Jews and from breaking the anti-Jewish laws. The ghettos are a result of the Gentile opposition to the Nazi fight against the Jews; it is a move in the silent struggle which is now raging against Nazism in every country in Europe. The most remarkable manifestation of that struggle is taking place in Poland. That country which, before the war,

was the hotbed of anti-Semitism in Europe, is now leading the movement for friendship with the Jews. More Poles have been executed by the Nazis for helping Jews obtain food and to escape from the ghettos than the people of any other nationality. Acute Polish observers claim that not in a hundred years has there been a greater friendship between Jews and Poles than there is now. Even in the Third Reich itself, the tide of friendship for the Jews is rising to higher levels than it has ever reached before. There is the almost daily testimony of the Nazi press to acts of kindness, courtesy, and direct help to Jews on the part of Germans. In the opinion of the people who know Germany well, there would not have been a single Jew left alive in the Third Reich now, if not for the persistent and secret aid which they get systematically from non-Nazi Germans.

This remarkable change which the war has brought in Europe is partly due to the psychological reaction to the savage propaganda by word and deed which the Nazis have been conducting against the Jews for more than fifteen years and which has reached its culmination in the present war. There is a limit to the amount of propaganda which human nerves, if not the heart, can stand. After a decade of hysterical reiterations, vulgarities and brutalities, people in Germany and in other countries in Europe became tired and weary of the Nazi hue and cry about the Jews and became ripe for a revulsion against the anti-Semitism even before the outbreak of this war. The war has introduced a new and stronger force to hasten the process. Ever since their beginnings the Nazis have so closely identified their theory and action with hatred and persecution of the Jews that in the minds of the average people in Europe the Nazi regime and anti-Semitism have become one and the same thing, a single and indivisible entity which cannot be separated. The Nazis themselves have made it so by always putting the Jews in the first line of their attack, by raising Jew-hatred as the banner, emblem and symbol of their regime, and by creating an almost unbreakable association of ideas between their rule and anti-Semitism. Thus when the time came for the subjugated people to rise against this hated regime, it was inevitable that their opposition and attack should be directed against that part of it which Nazism itself has best publicized and made known to the world. For nearly two decades Nazism has challenged the world to battle on anti-Semitic grounds. Now the world has accepted the

challenge and the battle royal is being fought out on the same ground which the Nazis have chosen. To the many other reasons, psychological, moral, and religious, which the people of Europe had for their reaction against Nazi anti-Semitism, has now been added another one, the most powerful reason of all, a political conviction that the destruction of Nazism necessitates the destruction of anti-Semitism, and that one cannot be destroyed without the other. This is why the revolt against Nazism in Europe is everywhere taking the form of a fight against anti-Semitism. This is why anti-Semitism is now more discredited and hated on the European continent than it has been in generations and why Jew-hatred as a movement will in all probability remain the deadest issue for decades after the war. If nothing else, its long association with Nazism will make it so. The democratic world is now more unified in thought and in action than it has ever been before, and an important change in one part of it must affect also the other. It is therefore safe to assume that the state of mind in Europe will extend to the rest of the world, particularly to the United States which has reasons of its own for waging war on racial prejudice and hatred and for wanting to banish nationalist separatism from social life.

III

Normally the United States does not offer a fertile soil for racial theories of the type of Nazi anti-Semitism and the like. The fundamental concept of the American government that people of different nationalities, cultures, and races can live on terms of equality in spite of their differences and the very existence of the American nation as an amalgam of different people are in themselves powerful dams against the basic ideas of Nazism. To the average American and particularly to the immigrant who came to the United States since the beginning of this century, America is not only a land of political equality, religious freedom, and economic opportunity, but also a land free from the racial and national strife of the Old World. This was the chief attraction of America to the immigrant of the last two generations. That period was one of growing European nationalism, of internal strife between national groups, cultures, and languages, even as the previous century was one of political strife, and the century before that, one of religious struggle. The rumbling of the nationalistic thunder which was about to throw Europe into the convulsions of 1914 and later again of 1939, was already

distinctly heard and people instinctively sought refuge from it in America as from a threatening earthquake. America in the early years of this century, up to the outbreak of the first World War, was to the immigrants of that day an asylum from national and racial persecution even more than a religious, political, and economic sanctuary.

It was in those days that the well known concept of the American melting pot was born, swept the imagination of the American immigrants of that period, and took the place of a religious ideal with most of them. It was a simple, almost crude concept, but it expressed the yearning of people of that period who were tired of national hatreds of the Old World and were looking forward to a new world free from internal strife. This America seemed to offer. Here was a country made up of all nations and therefore one that did not belong exclusively to any; here one could sink with dignity all one's native group differences, because all others did the same, because all were contributing to the formation of a new and better type. Here was a new continent, united instead of divided against itself, where the likenesses of men were considered more important than their differences and where differences could be composed in a common union. It was only natural that this idea should have been born in the mind of a great Jew, Israel Zangwill, and that Jewish immigrants should have accepted it with greater ardor than others. The Jews had suffered most from the latest and greatest aberration of Europe, nationalism, and they had most to gain from an experiment which tried to do away with its evils. But all other immigrant groups in America responded hardly less ardently to the idea than the Jews, and even the native Americans accepted it as a profound expression of the ideals of Americanism. In an atmosphere such as this, the principles and ideas of racialism and Nazism could not possibly strike root. They were the exact negation of what America stood for. To accept them would have meant a betrayal of America and of the great new hope which it offered to a distracted world.

The disillusionment which followed the first World War had brought with it the first signs of a change in the American scene. On the part of the native Americans, the period was one of great debunking and profound self-criticism which, although healthy in itself, nevertheless tended to undermine faith in the ideals of Americanism. On the part of the new immigrants who were coming to America after the war,

the effect was more serious. These people were already mostly affected by the forces of nationalism which had been stirring in Europe then and were later to give rise to Nazism. They no longer looked upon nationalism as upon the curse of the Old World, as did their predecessors, nor did the idea of the American melting pot fit into their scheme of thought. It became the vogue to believe that the melting pot no longer melted; that Americanization as it was understood in the early part of this century was out of date. Newer and more fashionable theories direct from the nationalistic hotbeds of Europe were advanced in place of the old American faith; America was no longer a new world where humanity turned over a new leaf, but it was an extension of Europe, a sort of new-world edition of the Austro-Hungarian empire with its variety of nationalities and cultures; hyphenated Americanism became the cultural fashion advanced by immigrant intellectuals; dual allegiance to America was not only possible but even preferable to straightforward Americanism.

These tendencies of an age of disillusionment formed the first soil for Nazi propaganda in the United States; on these as a basis, the first organized anti-Jewish campaign on a Nazi pattern was launched, with some signs of success. On these too, Hitler had built his larger hopes for the demoralization and disintegration of American society which were to keep the United States out of the war and away from aid to the democracies in their hour of crisis. History has already recorded that Hitler made a greater mistake in America than he did in Russia. In the manner of all propagandists he saw the surface of things not the heart. He mistook the froth for the waves, a passing mood of hollow debunking for the stable character of a great people. The true facts are that the United States has never been more soundly American at heart than it is at present. Far from slowing down in its melting process, the American melting pot has never worked more rapidly and efficiently than it now does. The children of those very immigrants who had lost faith in the melting pot are being Americanized with a greater rapidity and thoroughness than any previous second generation of Americans. The radio, the film, the increased means of transportation, and other forces of socialization are working with a greater force than ever before to break down barriers between various national groups in America and are bringing people closer together than they ever were before in the history of America.

This applies to the Jews no less than to other immigrant groups, although according to the new theories the melting pot ceases to melt when it reaches the Jews. Any one who has seen American-born Jewish children and youths in the grade schools, high schools, colleges, offices, shops, and factories, at work or at play, knows that the nationalistic claim that the Jews do not assimilate in America is at bottom a Nazi lie no matter how it is disguised. Jews are now Americanizing even more rapidly than a good many other immigrant groups. For this there are several reasons. One is the fact that the generation or more of the first Jewish immigrants from eastern Europe who came to America in the early part of this century and at first formed the most difficult single bloc for assimilation, is now mostly Americanized itself and is helping, instead of retarding, the Americanization process among the Jews. Another reason is that Americanization itself is no longer the mechanical, one-sided assimilation that it largely was in the early years of Jewish immigration. It is more creative and reciprocal. The new generation of Jews born in America contributes to American life almost as much as it takes from it, and this makes the process more effective than it was two generations ago. A third reason is the new type of Jewish immigrant (known as the refugee) whom Nazism has brought over to the United States. These people are probably contributing more to the Americanization of the Jews in America than any other immigrant group since immigration started to the American shores. They have behind them several generations of the best liberal culture of western Europe which is nearest in spirit to America. Their terrible experience with Nazism has inflamed them with a hatred of nationalism in all its manifestations even as the older Jewish immigrants of the last generation were imbued with hatred of political tyranny, and it makes them even more suitable for Americanization than those first lovers of America who gave birth to the idea of the melting pot. If ever a people came to the American shores ready in mind and in spirit to accept the American way of life and American ideals, it is this group of Jewish refugees from Nazi oppression. They are accelerating the melting process among American Jews to a speed which the country has never seen before. They themeslves become perfect American products within an amazingly short period of time. They are destined to become a great force in Americanization in general and in Jewish assimilation with America in particular.

To these internal forces which work now for a greater Americanization among all immigrants, Jewish and non-Jewish alike, must be added also the greater international forces which work against nationalism all over the world and which have brought America into the war and raised her to a position of leadership among all democratic peoples. If this war means anything at all to America, it means a reaffirmation of Americanism of the days before the great disillusionment and a return to the old spirit of America which is the antithesis to Hitlerism. It is no accident that America is in this war and in a position of leadership. It could not be otherwise, for this is a war between Americanism and Nazism, between the principle that a nation may consist of different nationalities and yet be unified, great, and happy, and the theory that a state must consist of a single group of *Herrenvolk* and that all other groups are to be either exterminated or subjugated as inferiors. These two theories of the state could not coexist; America could no more avoid this struggle than she did the Civil War or the War for Independence, and like those others, the present war too, is bound to end in a strengthening of the American principle, in its rise to greater heights than it has ever reached before.

To assume that America will fight this war, will win it on the battlefield, and then will come home to lose it; that the United States will defeat Hitler in Europe, Asia, Africa, and Australia, and then will turn over the keys of America to the little Hitlerites and anti-Semites at home, is not to know America and not to have any faith at all in its destiny. It is as likely for America to develop a strong Nazi, or anti-Semitic movement after this war, as it was likely for the United States to reintroduce slavery after the Civil War. Common sense says that this is not the way democratic America will act. Its history, tradition, and destiny as a nation are opposed to Nazism in peace time, as well as in war time. All the signs of history point to the logical assumption that after a victorious war, the Jewish problem will cease to be, in the United States as well as in Europe, the morbid and inflated issue that Nazism has sought to make of it for its own purposes, and that it will disappear from the horizon as an international problem all over the world.

IV

Of all other countries in the world Soviet Russia occupies the most important place as far as the Jews are concerned. That country not only

has now the largest Jewish population in the world (between five and six million), but long before this war it had solved its Jewish problem more effectively and thoroughly than any other country, including the United States. It so happened that the first great leaders and theoreticians of the Russian Revolution—Lenin, Stalin, Kalinin, Smidovitch, Larin, and others—were all experts in the problem of national minorities and that most of them had also an intimate acquaintanceship with the Jewish problem. It is thanks to them and to the social radicalism of the Soviet Revolution that the solution which Soviet Russia has given to the Jewish problem has proved probably one of the most successful experiments of our century. Unfortunately it is also the least known in the outside world; otherwise Hitler could not have achieved the success that he did with his anti-Semitic drive.

Before the Revolution, Czarist Russia was the country of the crudest type of anti-Semitism. Its Jew-hatred, it is true, was not as aggressive and sadistic as that of the Nazis; but it was older, more primitive, and essentially of the same brand. The fact is that the Nazis are anything but original in their present campaign against the Jews. Most of their measures are patterned after those of Czarist Russia and many of them are taken bodily from the old Czarist code. In old Russia, as in Nazi Germany now, Jews were deprived of most civil and human rights; they lived practically in what amounted to ghettos and huge reservations; they were not allowed to engage in agriculture and in heavy industry; they were strictly limited in the professions and in educational institutions. The Czarist government also conducted an official anti-Semitic propaganda and often organized and conducted pogroms of the Jews. Its policy, like that of the Nazis, was partly to exterminate and partly to force the Jews to leave the country. The future historian will establish without difficulty that the present Nazi drive against the Jews is but a more brutal and efficient effort to materialize the aims and purposes which Czarism tried less successfully to introduce.

The Russian Revolution swept away the whole of that elaborate structure of anti-Semitism as it swept away all the other institutions of Czarism. All the restrictions and discrimination against the Jews were abolished. Within a few years Jew-baiting had become practically unknown in Soviet Russia. It was suppressed not only politically, but also economically and psychologically. Jews now live in all parts of Russia

and mingle freely with the rest of the population; they work without hindrance on farms, in factories, mines, and railways; they attend all schools and educational institutions without the slightest restrictions; they participate freely in the professions, in the army, navy, and air force, and in the artistic and cultural life of the country. They enjoy not only all the political and cultural rights with the rest of the population, but what is more unique, also economic and social equality such as the Jews do not enjoy even in some democratic countries. Anti-Semitism has been literally wiped out. A country which throughout the nineteenth century was the bulwark of Jew-hatred and gave birth to the Jewish pogrom, now does not know the meaning of anti-Semitism. The new generation of Russia looks upon it as upon one of the legends of a dark past.

It is now generally admitted that this remarkable success has been achieved primarily by the fact that Soviet Russia tackled the Jewish problem economically, not merely through propaganda. The economic position of the Jews in Czarist Russia had been for generations not only a source of great poverty for the mass of the Jews, but also a fertile soil for anti-Semitism. In consequence of generations of persecution and discrimination, the Russian Jews had been forced primarily into petty trading, small shopkeeping, and business occupations of all kinds. They had been deliberately kept from agriculture, from work in the factories, from the professions and all of the more useful labor of society, and were forced mostly into buying and selling and acting as middlemen between the producer and consumer. The result was that in the mind of the impoverished and oppressed population, the Jews figured chiefly not as productive workers but as petty representatives of the ruling class, and they shared the hatred which was felt for that class. The Russian Revolution which swept away the middle class with its trading, buying and selling, and all the occupations of commerce, swept away a potent source of anti-Semitism in Russia. But the new regime has also done something more positive for the Jews. As far back as 1923, as soon as the civil wars were over and the Soviet regime was safe, it started a special campaign to introduce the old Jewish traders and business people into agriculture and industry. Thousands were settled on the land in the Ukraine, in the Crimea and Biro-Bidjan; hundreds of thousands more were drawn into heavy industry, factories, mines, and railways. The doors of the educational institutions were flung open to train Jewish youth in all kinds of techni-

cal fields and in the professions—with the result that in less than a generation, a people which literally was a nation of shopkeepers, peddlers, and small traders was transformed into one of productive workers engaged in the most useful and essential occupations in the country. This was the Revolution's reward to the Jews for the centuries of persecution under Czarism; it also proved to be the chief blow to anti-Semitism in Russia, for at the bottom, nineteenth-century anti-Semitism in Europe was economic in its origin. With that source of the poison plugged, a vigorous educational and political campaign which outlawed anti-Semitism and declared Jew-baiting a crime easily eliminated within one generation that scourge which many believed would take centuries to wipe out from Russian memory.

The Nazi invasion of Russia has added new proof of the success of the Soviet dealing with the Jewish problem. The Soviet press now daily acknowledges the important contribution which Jewish workers, mechanics, soldiers, sailors, airmen, and civilian guerillas are now making to the defense of Russian soil. The devotion and heroism with which the Jewish population of Russia is now fighting to defend its fatherland is the best proof that Russia's method of dealing with the Jewish problem is not only more humane and constructive than Germany's but in the long run also one that pays better. There can be little doubt in the mind of the impartial observer that the defeat of Nazi Germany, when it comes, will be due in a very large measure to Hitler's mad anti-Semitism, and that Russia's final victory will be greatly furthered by the Jews of Russia and of the rest of the world.

The war is contributing also something else of vital importance to the Jewish problem. For the first time since the first World War, the doors of Soviet Russia have now been opened to hundreds of thousands of Jews from other countries in Europe. Over a million Jewish refugees from Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Rumania, Slovakia, Hungary, and other Nazi-controlled countries have now found refuge in Soviet Russia. Even before Russia was a belligerent, hundreds of thousands of Jews had sought and found sanctuary there. With the Nazi attack on Russia, the number of Jewish refugees has increased tenfold. These people see and enjoy the benefits of the Soviet treatment of the Jews; most of them owe their very lives to the Soviet regime. They see for themselves what that regime has done for the Jews in Russia, and this is bound to have a

tremendous effect on them after the war. The old prejudice against Soviet Russia which the Jewish middle class shared with other people is disappearing in this war, and consequently that vast country with its unlimited spaces and resources will once again come to play the important part in Jewish life which it played for generations before the first World War.

V

Soviet Russia, the United States, and a democratically awakening Europe take in together the bulk of the Jewish people (approximately fifteen out of seventeen millions). Another million and a half Jews are scattered in such countries as the South American Republics, the British Dominions, Great Britain itself, and Palestine. In these countries the same conditions—economic, political, and psychological—prevail as in the United States. These are all, as far as the Jews are concerned, countries of immigration in which the future of the Jews depends on a thorough adjustment to new environments—an adjustment which is being accomplished there with the same speed as in the United States.

The Jewish experiment in Palestine is in many respects as radical as the one in Soviet Russia. Behind the façade of nationalism a change which is in the first place economic and then social and psychological is being effected. As in Soviet Russia, Jews in Palestine have begun by settling on the land and by performing all the industrial, agricultural, and other productive tasks of the country instead of following trade and commerce. In Palestine, as in Soviet Russia, the experiment is being conducted chiefly by collective enterprise under the leadership of labor, and as in Soviet Russia, the experiment has proved an unqualified success. In less than twenty-five years the Jewish settlement in Palestine has risen from 50,000 to half a million, from a desert to one of the most constructive social and economic communities in the world. Jews have during this period definitely proved not only their desire to change the economic status that has been forced upon them by persecution but also their ability to do it. In this, not in the nationalistic slogans and appeals to history, lies the strength of the Palestine experiment and of the Jewish claim to large immigration from Europe after the war in that part of the world.

That claim is so valid and the suffering of the Jews in and before the war was so great that there can be no doubt now that the democratic world after the war will have to recognize the just grievances of the Jews more than it did after the last war. Those Jews who see in Zionism an important aid in the solution of the Jewish problem certainly have no reason for despair. Zionism is now much stronger than it was twenty-five years ago when the nebulous Balfour Declaration was issued; its strength, like all true strength, is not entirely political. No other social movement has made such rapid economic and social progress as has the Zionist in the last twenty-five years. In fact, so rapid has been its progress that a danger now exists on the other side—a danger that Zionism, which has now become a ruling force in Jewry, should forget that its province is Palestine and aid to the National Home and that it should seek to extend its nationalistic activity to the rest of the Jewish world. For the peculiar position of the Jews in most other countries outside Palestine is such that nationalistic aspirations and separatistic sentiments, no matter how lofty, can only complicate the process of adjustment to and impede the relationship between the Jews and the people among whom they live. But this danger also seems remote now. With the example of the havoc which nationalism has wrought in the world, there seems to be little likelihood that any people, and particularly the Jews, will fall a prey to any nationalistic movement after this war. One of the most important lessons of the last bloody decade for Jews and non-Jews alike is that Hitler's nationalistic interpretation of the Jewish problem is a myth and a lie. There is no universal Jewish problem which is the same the world over and for which there is a single panacea. There are many local Jewish problems and they differ from country to country. Much of what is good for the Jews in Palestine would be calamitous for the Jews in the United States and much that is admirable for the Jews in Soviet Russia would not suit Jews in other countries. It was Hitler who tried to treat the Jews as a distinct and universal problem of mankind; his failure in this is as apparent as in all his other efforts.

VI

Thus, in spite of all the sound and fury of Nazism, the position of the Jews, viewed in its totality all over the world, is not more hopeless and despairing than that of the rest of democratic humanity, which is now

going through one of the greatest crises in its history. It is only when the Jews are singled out by themselves apart from the people among whom they live that they become a big complicated problem which seems almost insoluble. Seen as a part of the world in which they live, their position does not appear insufferable or hopeless. If in certain parts of the world the Jews are now obliged to stand the brunt of the enemy's attack, they are not alone in their ordeal. The Poles, the Greeks, the Czechs, the French, the Belgians, the Dutch, the Russians, all share with the Jews the common tragedy of mankind. There are also certain compensations for the Jews in this suffering. One of these is that the world is now realizing the close connection between the Jewish problem and its own larger social problem. A conviction is growing in the world now that there can be no isolationism in the case of the Jews, any more than in that of other people. Jews are so intimately connected with most other peoples that an acute Jewish problem can easily lead to a world tragedy, as Hitlerism has so conclusively demonstrated.

As a result of this realization, the Jewish problem is now, at the moment of its seeming greatest darkness and tragedy, nearer to a real solution than it has been in a long time. In vast stretches of the world the problem has already been solved; in others it is rapidly approaching a solution; in still others the prospects and hopes of the Jews for a final, just settlement of their grievances have never been better than they are now. And the irony of fate is that all this has been brought about by the excesses and brutalities which were begun to destroy the Jews. In their eagerness to accomplish their larger aims of world conquest, the Nazis have blown up the bubble of Jew-hatred out of all proportion to its significance. The little bubble could not stand the inflation and is now bursting and coming down to earth a small, sorry, discredited, and despised article, a symbol of the larger failure of Nazism and of its blasted hopes of world domination.

AN EXPERIMENTAL DEMOCRACY

By ROBERT E. FITCH

WHILE WE ARE ENGAGED once more in a war to make the world safe for democracies, it becomes pertinent to inquire just what we mean by democracy, and what kind of democracy we want. For it does not appear that our minds are yet clear as to the respects in which democratic procedure differs from other procedures in its theories of freedom and control, in its treatment of class conflicts, in its program for the effective use of personnel, in its doctrine of the state, and in its assumptions with regard to the significant focus of the democratic way of life.

In the recent past of political theory, we find ourselves confronted with two extreme positions. On the one hand, there is the doctrine of the state as a passive policeman, attempting to reduce the functions of the government to an absolute minimum. This is the tradition which we inherit from Adam Smith and the classical economists, from John Locke and the Constitutionalists, and from a major portion of American social history. It is from this tradition that we get our great liberties —both the economic liberty of *laissez faire,* and the civil and religious liberties of freedom of speech, of the press, of association, and of conscience. The fitting name for this tradition is individualism.

On the other hand, there is the tradition which seeks to extend the authority of the state, so that, ideally, the government may regulate every aspect of life. This teaching has its roots in Plato's *Republic,* and blossoms, curiously, in the modern political philosophies of Hobbes and of Hegel. Its emphasis is not upon liberties, but upon order, discipline, regimentation, and control. The fitting name for this tradition is socialism. And it is important to remember that socialism, in its generic meaning, covers a wide variety of specific doctrines; for there have been Tory socialists, Christian socialists, proletarian socialists (communism), National Socialists (fascism), and even capitalistic socialists.

These two extremes of doctrine—individualism and socialism—stand in radical opposition to one another in certain respects. The ideal tendency of the one is toward anarchy: laissez-faire capitalism and philosophical anarchism have that much in common. The ideal tendency of the other is toward stagnation—a state of complete regimentation, from which all individuality, all initiative, and all possibility of progress have been eliminated. The one theory, with its faith in unlimited liberty, rests on the assumption of the natural goodness of man. The other theory, with its insistence upon control, takes for granted the natural depravity of man—whether stated in traditional theological terms or in the secular versions of Machiavelli and of Hobbes. But individualism and socialism have at least two points in common. Implicit in either one is the doctrine of a chosen and favored class—capitalistic, proletarian, military and feudal, priestly, political, bureaucratic, or technocratic. And both theories are dogmatic and absolutistic in character—acknowledging growth only so far as it may be an unfolding of the already given, a making explicit of what is already implicit; but repudiating the possibility of the emergence of new social patterns and of newly arranged schemes of freedom and of control.

The problem of a democracy is to locate an experimental mean between these two extremes. Since neither anarchy nor stagnation allows for progress, a democracy must forever consider anew the areas in which it wants freedom and the areas in which it wants control. Since both the belief in the natural goodness of man and the belief in the natural depravity of man decree the impossibility of remolding human nature, a democracy will assume that men are born morally neutral, and that what gives moral character to a people are its institutions, political, religious, educational, and economic. Since the ascription of final authority to a chosen class must lead to rigidity, and eventually to stagnation and to decay, a democracy has the problem of exploiting, in alternation and as need may be, the talents of all classes. And above all a democracy must recognize the fact of growth and of change, and provide orderly techniques for change that shall preserve the best of the old while allowing for what is promising in the new.

A democracy that fulfils these conditions may be called an experimental democracy. The precise details of such a pattern of government

cannot be elucidated here; but the ensuing discussion may help to clarify the principles on which it rests.

II

It will help us in developing the attitude of an experimental social philosophy if we begin by noting the distribution of the areas of freedom and of control in a civilization that was radically different from our own—namely, the Middle Ages. For medieval feudalism regimented just those areas where we most cherish our liberties, and it allowed freedom in just that area where we seek to abolish it entirely. It regimented the life of the intellect, the realm of religious conviction, the pursuits of commerce, and the organizations of labor. But it allowed freedom for fighting.

Indeed, it is a mistaken notion that "freedom of enterprise" is exclusively a capitalistic shibboleth. For freedom of enterprise existed in military matters long before it existed in business matters. The medieval knight might cherish the virtues of loyalty, valor, largesse, and honor, rather than honesty, industry, thrift, and foresight; but he cared for individuality, initiative, and independence just as much as did ever his capitalistic successor. When the Church laid down the Truce of God in an effort to limit free-for-all fighting to certain days of the week, the knight protested this action as an illegitimate ecclesiastical interference with business—the business of fighting. And, when the state forbade duelling and set up king's courts to administer justice, this was regarded as a further encroachment upon the free enterprise of the fighting man. Undoubtedly, as the authority of the church and as the authority of the state backed by the rising middle classes restricted more severely the military activities of the feudal barons, there was many an old-timer who wailed that this meant an end to all human liberties, and that henceforth we should have a spineless generation dependent for all good things upon the bounty of ecclesiastical and political organization.

Of course, the feudal knight could not be expected to perceive that freedom might spring up still more significantly in new areas unnoted by himself. For the rise of capitalism was, in effect, nothing other than the transfer of free enterprise from the area of fighting to the area of business activity. Along with this shift in the relative prestige of certain social classes, there occurred a complete redistribution of the areas of

freedom and of control. Men now sought liberty in science, in philosophy, and in religion, where formerly they had shunned it; and they began to set up political and legal systems of order which, up till then, had seemed both unnecessary and harmful.

We may note, moreover, that the historical logic of the evolution of *laissez faire* was the same for fighting as it has proved to be for business. In its initial phase, it meant anarchy; in its concluding phase, it meant monopoly. Out of the military struggle for existence, there emerged the survival and dominance of the militarily most fit. At first there arose small monopolies of fighting power under the aegis of local feudal barons. Then there came the duchy, the principality, and finally the kingdom and the empire. In certain respects, indeed, the modern national state was simply a gigantic monopoly of an activity which heretofore had been cherished as the inalienable right of the individual free man. The state decreed that henceforth there should be no more fighting within its borders, but only beyond its borders; and that the initiative in fighting must rest, not with the lawless individual, but with the duly constituted authorities.

We should remember, however, that the redistribution of the areas of freedom and of control which took place in middle-class countries like Great Britain and the United States was not the only possible pattern of redistribution. In the Germany of the Hohenzollerns, they ordered it differently. As John Dewey has pointed out, they provided for a sort of Kantian dualism between the body and the mind. They put order and regimentation into the realm of political, economic, and military activity; but they left free the realm of the spirit to bloom and to blow as it listed. The arrangement was one which capitalistic countries find it hard to understand. It meant, on the one hand, a disregard for political democracy, a preference for some form of state socialism over *laissez faire,* and a highly disciplined organization of the military profession. And on the other hand, it meant an extraordinary development in philosophy, theology, science, music, letters, and art, the like of which the world had not seen for some time. Hitler's crime against the genius of the German people was that he closed off this realm of the spirit, and subjected it to the same severe controls which had been extended over the body politic and economic.

To be sure, the noting of these various historical patterns of freedom and of control hardly yields specific answers to the specific problems we face now. But it does help to suggest and to reinforce certain principles of procedure. An experimental democracy cannot allow complete *laissez faire* or complete regimentation, because it cannot allow either anarchy or stagnation. Its problem is always one of determining anew the *areas* of freedom and control, and the *degrees* and *kind* of freedom and of control that should exist in any one area. And when it finds that freedom has run its course in some one field and must now give way to order, it must look for other areas where freedom may spring anew and more significantly for the life of man.

III

It is important also that in an experimental democracy we should have a clear idea regarding the role of the various social classes. Historically, there have been two dominant traditions—the tradition of a favored, chosen class, and the tradition of a classless society.

The doctrine of a favored class rests on the assumption that there is such a thing as absolute truth; that the favored class is in possession of that truth; and that, therefore, this class should administer the organization of society in the light of its special insight. Of course, political philosophers differ as to which class occupies this enviable position: it may consist of Hindu Brahmins, the feudal lords, the philosopher-kings of Plato, the Calvinistic clergy, the capitalists, the proletariat, the technocrats, the bureaucrats, the party members, the managers, the brain-trusters. In any case, this class constitutes the politically elect, while the rest of society makes up the relatively damned, whose only hope of salvation is through the grace obtained by the sacramental administrations of the chosen few.

The difficulties in such a doctrine are obvious. There probably is no absolute truth; and, if there is, it is unlikely that any one class is in exclusive possession of it. There probably is no one talent which alone is sufficient for the administration of society and which is possessed by one class only. Historically, moreover, it is to be noted that the favored class usually becomes drunk with pride and power and soon loses the ability not only to administer the affairs of society as a whole, but even to administer its own affairs with profit.

The doctrine of a classless society turns out, in practice, to be simply a way in which a new alignment of classes is effected, without at all abolishing the fact of class distinctions. Communism in Russia illustrates the functional logic of this position. In order to bring about the classless society, it is necessary to elevate some one class—the proletariat—to the messianic role in revolution. But in the reconstructed society, not even the proletariat is the favored class. What we get is a new elite of bureaucrats and party members, who reorganize social and economic distinctions in terms of their own interests and ideology. Thus the doctrine of a classless society is in effect nothing but a variant form of the doctrine of a favored class.

An experimental democracy cannot believe either in a favored class, or in a classless society. It must begin by accepting frankly the fact of a diversity of classes having diverse contributions to make to social welfare. It must provide means whereby each class may make its special contribution. And in particular it must provide means whereby the leadership of society, at any one moment, shall rest with that class or set of classes whose interests and aptitudes are peculiarly relevant to the problems of the time. Actually, this is pretty much what has occurred in the history of American democracy. In an early period, we followed the lead of the landed gentry. Later on under Jefferson, certain agrarian interests of humbler character came to the fore. Under Andrew Jackson, more prestige lay with the pioneers of the developing West and with the rising class of industrial labor in the East. From the end of the Civil War to about 1932, when our problems were largely those of an expanding economy, we accepted the leadership of big business and of the Republican Party. Under the New Deal, with an approach to our problems that has been broadly social rather than narrowly economic, class leadership has rested with organized labor, with the farms, with the brain-trusters, and with the *petite bourgeoisie*. We can only speculate as to what new alignments may develop in the future. But that such flexibility should exist is a token of vitality in our political system and a promise of the possibility of future progress.

Dogmatic theories of class are especially pernicious, moreover, when it comes to assessing the abiding values that we wish to incorporate into the social structure. The Communists, in their rebellion against the obvious evils of too much economic liberty, also rejected the great civil and

religious liberties because these, too, were part of the heritage of the middle classes. Reactionary capitalists, in their consciousness of the obvious dangers of bolshevism, are apt to throw out also the humanitarian elements and the sense of social solidarity that come from the proletarian movement. But an experimental democracy must always discriminate among the values of any one class. It may seek to curtail economic liberty at the same time that it seeks to extend the reality of civil and religious liberties. It may desire to appropriate from the disinherited classes the passion for social justice, at the same time that it rejects the menace of a new and more fearsome tyranny. This is the method of intelligence rather than of absolutism, the method of orderly growth rather than of violent change.

Finally, an experimental democracy cannot accept as immutable the nature of class distinctions as they now exist. Doubtless there will be different classes in society as long as there is any sort of division of labor. But there is no one pattern of stratification—no caste system—that is absolute and abiding. New classes and new arrangements of classes are forever emerging as old classes pass away. And in particular we need not accept as final the present arrangement whereby the differences between classes are largely marked by great inequalities in economic advantage and opportunity. It is possible considerably to reduce these economic inequalities at the same time that we retain for each class its distinctive functions in the social order, and retain in our political system sufficient flexibility so that now one class, and now another, may form the spearhead of progressive leadership as need and as occasion may require.

IV

Another problem for an experimental democracy is that of the effective use of personnel. A socialist order fails in this respect through an excess of regimentation and by discouraging initiative and enterprise. But an individualistic society fails equally at this point, because, while it ostensibly observes the principle of *la carrière ouverte aux talents,* it nevertheless favors one particular kind of talent to the exclusion of others. Feudal individualism favored the talents of the fighting man, just as capitalistic individualism favors the talents of the business entrepreneur or of the financial manipulator.

The standard which ideally meets this condition of a growing society is the standard of equality of opportunity. To be sure, the social imple-

mentation of this ideal is a complex and difficult affair. It means that in any situation the individual shall be assessed on his merits alone, regardless of family ties, political connections, inherited wealth, or inherited prestige. It means, certainly, equality of educational opportunity. This calls for a system which shall pay less attention than we do at present to the financial resources of candidates for advanced and special studies, and more attention to their abilities. It calls, again, for an educational system that shall recognize all kinds of talent and provide for their full development, no matter whether they come under the rubric of the "practical" or of the "liberal." And, finally, it means that we make provision in our social institutions for the recognition, placing, and encouragement of those who have proved their abilities in the educational system. Already, it may be said, the American people have made great advances in this direction; but there is room for still closer approximation to the ideal.

We need also to strike an experimental mean between the extreme of too much order and of too much caprice in the advancement of personnel. Civil service examinations are good so far as they recognize proved merit and prevent a spoils system, but they may be an instrument of obstruction in a time of new emergencies. After all, examinations are based on abilities which have proved to be useful in the past. But when unexpected situations develop in which fresh talents are called for, the new leadership cannot be judged by old criteria. On the other hand, the methods of free appointment or of public election may make possible the rapid advancement of persons of exceptional talent, or the sudden surging to the front of men who are more responsive to the needs of the public. But they also leave the way open for political favoritism and for demagoguery. The solution of this problem in detail can be effected only by patient experimentation, but our main principles should be clear. We should provide in various areas for the operation of all these systems of procedure—seniority, civil service examination, appointment, public election—attempting to check the defects of the one with the merits of the other. And in our systems of examination we should distinguish between positions that call for talents of initiative and enterprise, positions that call for talents of a precise and routine character, and positions that call for a blend of both sets of qualities.

In a very special way, an experimental democracy has the problem of utilizing the expert. This problem does not really exist in a society with a favored and chosen class, because here the important experts are *ipso facto* the members of the favored class. These experts then diagnose the needs of society, prescribe what must be done, and are their own judges of the effectiveness of the cure. In our own society the process must be somewhat more complicated. One may use the analogy of the patient and the doctor. It is the patient who has a general idea of what is wrong with him, who selects his own doctor, who judges of the satisfactoriness of the cure, and who pays the bill. The business of the doctor is to make more specific the diagnosis of the ailment which the patient has understood only in a general way, and to prescribe and to supervise an effective treatment. If the patient is dissatisfied with what has been done for him, he must still pay the bill, but he has the privilege of selecting another doctor the next time.

Similarly, in a democracy, the public must acquire wisdom in selecting its experts for character as well as for talent. It must develop patience and trustfulness in permitting the expert to carry out his program to the point of fair trial. It must learn also that competent experts can anticipate difficulties of which, for the moment, it is not even aware. And in paying the bill, even for a misconceived and mismanaged program, it should recognize that this is the penalty and risk it incurs for the privilege of being allowed to select and to judge its own leaders. But it is monumental folly for the public to think that it understands its own problems in intricate detail as well as does the expert; just as it is monumental folly for the public ever to surrender its right to declare the general character of its needs, to choose its own experts, to judge of the consequences, and to pay the bill.

An equally crucial problem in personnel is that of converting the talents of the leaders in an old regime to service in the purposes of a new regime. In a static society, this problem is unacknowledged, because the possibility of a new regime is not admitted. In a revolutionary society, this problem is unacknowledged, because the leaders of the old regime are simply "liquidated." But the revolutionary technique of "liquidation," as we have witnessed it in Germany and in Russia, obviously wastes a good deal of talent. Of course, the revolutionary has two objections to the proposed conversion of personnel. It is said, for instance, that

in the change from a free capitalist economy to a more socialized state the predatory talents of the old leaders will not be pertinent to the new task of reconstruction; and, secondly, that the old personnel, if given power in the new order, will simply sabotage that order and prepare for the return of the old regime.

The answer to these objections must be in the nature of a qualification. Not all of the talents of the old leaders are predatory in character. They have talents in finance, in organization, and in administration, which are still needed by the new regime, even when the center of power has shifted from Wall Street to Washington. Also in our democracy there can be found, have been found, and are now being used, leaders of an old regime who are willing to alter the direction of their efforts, and to use their talents in the building of a new order. One need not pretend that this problem is an easy one. But the failure to solve it by experimental adjustment means a great waste of abilities that are needed in the service of the public and a resort to violence as the only possible means of social change.

V

Individualism and socialism, in their theories of the nature and function of the state, are polar opposites. The one holds that the functions of the state should be reduced to a minimum, and ideally, perhaps, should wither away altogether. The other holds that the state should be total in character, embracing and regulating every activity of the citizen. An experimental democracy may admit the relative value of either of these systems as need and occasion may require, but it must deny that either extreme represents a norm toward which we should continuously strive.

However, we should begin by observing that men live together in several forms of association and that the state is only one of these forms. Men are associated in the family, in the church, in the state, in the economic system, in organizations for sport and for relaxation, in scientific and educational pursuits, and in other less noteworthy ways. Each form of association has certain functions which are unique to it, and certain functions which it shares with other forms of association. Thus the church, the school, and the family, all share in the function of educating the young, but each makes a contribution that is distinctive of itself. Furthermore, the church, the school, and the family all carry on certain activities that are not in any way shared by one another.

The problem of an experimental society is to see that each form of association retains enough autonomy to do its unique work unmolested by outside interference, and yet retains sufficient connection with other forms of association that there may be fruitful interaction and cooperation all around. The danger of extreme individualism is that the church, or the state, or the economic system shall go off by itself and lose all organic contact with the rest of society. And the danger of extreme socialism is that the unique character of each form of association shall be obliterated in a totalitarian organization which subordinates all groups to one dominating purpose.

Historically, it would appear that the chief threat, even in allegedly individualistic societies, lies in the direction of totalitarian organization. In primitive, nomadic cultures, to be sure, it was the family or the tribe which dominated all activities. In modern fascist states, we have exemplified a narrowly tyrannical political totalitarianism, compared to which the ecclesiastical totalitarianism of the Middle Ages looks relatively mild and liberal. But even in the individualistic culture of capitalism, there existed a totalitarianism none the less potent and tyrannical because it was concealed: here it was the economic order that dominated all other forms of association. In an experimental democracy we cannot permit any one group—church, or state, or family, or labor union, or manufacturers' association—to get a strangle hold on all other groups. But at the same time, provision must be made for the temporary expansion of the functions of that form of association of which the activities are, for the moment, especially important to society.

If it be asked, what are the unique functions of the state which set it off from other forms of human association, the answer is twofold. It is the business of the state to regulate the relations between other forms of association so far as they need regulation to prevent undue isolation from one another or undue encroachment upon one another. It is also the business of the state to take care of those larger problems which are so inclusive of the general welfare that no other form of association may be said to be sufficiently representative to handle the situation.

This is deliberately a flexible theory of the functions of the state. It allows, for the moment, of considerable expansion of the powers of the state, and at another moment, for tremendous contraction of the powers of the state. In what have been called normal times, the state may

have relatively little to do. In time of emergency—like war—the state may have everything to do. When the economy of the nation proceeds at an even pace, the state may practice considerable *laissez faire*. On the other hand, when either the tyranny or the disruption of the economy extends to the point of affecting the welfare of other forms of human association, the state may step in to reorganize relationships. However, the state should not exploit such an occasion to effect a permanent extension of its own powers. Even as it introduces new regulations and controls, it should contrive the restoration of a planned liberty which should still leave unmolested, as much as possible, the unique functions of the economic form of association.

It also matters that the state should have flexibility in its own political structure. This involves not only the traditional separation of powers—the executive, the legislative, and the judicial—but also the possibility of expanding or of contracting the powers of specific branches of the government as need and occasion may require. Those who complain of the executive usurpation of power in the United States in the past decade need to remind themselves of the legislative usurpation of power in the preceding decade. If in the 1930's our Congress often looked like a pitiable thing, we might remember that in the 1920's our President often looked like a pitiable thing. Indeed, it is fairly reasonable that in so-called normal times the business of the nation should be largely in the hands of the legislature; and it is both reasonable and important that in time of crisis more power should go to the executive. So far as our American system of government is able to effect such shifts of power and such contractions and expansions of power, it already measures up to the requirements of an experimental democracy.

VI

Up to this point we have dealt with certain problems and with certain principles and techniques of procedure. But we have left untouched one all-important issue: Wherein lies the significant focus of the democratic way of life? Does it reside primarily in an economic system of free enterprise? in the instrumentalities of political democracy? in the family? in the church?

The only satisfactory answer that can be given to this question is to say that the democratic way of life has its roots in the mores. These

are the beliefs and ideals of the people so far as they are intimately incorporated into daily habits of living. The mores, to be sure, find significant expression and implementation in the political institutions, the economic organizations, and the religious customs of the people. But the mores are more widespread and more deeply rooted than any one institution. As John Dewey so aptly remarks, the American Constitution does not constitute American democracy. Our democracy began at least a hundred years before the Constitution, in the daily living habits of free men and women who learned to provide for their own material needs, to seek out their own religious truth, and to frame their own form of government. These mores, indeed, were partly a heritage from free men and women in the old world, who for centuries had worked out their own habits of independence and of self-reliance. The mores existed before the Constitution; they created the Constitution; and, to a large extent, they sustain the Constitution.

The fallacy of a purely political definition of democracy becomes evident when we turn to the case of China. The government of that country is a dictatorship; but the mores are fundamentally democratic. Like us, the Chinese have tended, in ordinary times, to place loyalty to the family above loyalty to the state. Living as citizens in a vast and politically unwieldy empire, they have learned habits of local autonomy and of local responsibility. In time of crisis, they have not been accustomed to wait for orders telling them what to do; and in time of difficulty they have not been accustomed to wait for help from some outside source. Long before Adam Smith, their economists preached the doctrine of *laissez faire* in business. And their principal aristocracy has been the only kind that is admissible in a democracy—the aristocracy of education. Indeed, all the essentials of democratic mores were gradually developing in China long before they appeared on the North-American continent, and at least as long as they have been developing in England. If China is not yet today a political democracy, it certainly has all the makings of an excellent political democracy.

The importance of a substratum of democratic mores is especially noticeable when in an allegedly democratic country those mores are absent. If political democracy failed to survive in Germany after the first World War, not all the blame can be placed on the Allies and on the Versailles Treaty. The fact is that the whole tradition of the German

mores ran counter to any such system of government. The Weimar constitution was an artifical imposition from above, and it had nothing to support it from beneath. No wonder, then, that as conditions became critical, the constitution fell, the natural tendency of the mores asserted itself, and the people returned to a form of political organization that was more congenial to their heritage of autocracy.

Democracy in France has always been handicapped in this respect. The French Revolution came upon a people that had long been accustomed to the tyrannical sway of personal caprice in social and political matters. There were no democratic mores upon which to build a political democracy. The consequence is that we have already witnessed the passing of three French republics, and are now watching, at Vichy, the third effort to restore the French government to a pattern more closely approximating their ancient tradition of aristocracy and monarchy. This does not mean that there are none of the makings of democracy in France. Surely, in their devotion to the family, in their regard for economic independence and security, in their love of certain personal liberties, in their recurring egalitarianism, there is to be found the stuff of the democratic way of life. But these elements have not yet spread widely enough into the structure of French life to make a firm and unshakeable foundation for political democracy.

Attention to the mores of a democracy, moreover, should disabuse us of the hysterical fear that in this second world war all our civil and religious liberties must be permanently obliterated. Many American liberties were curtailed in the first World War; but they were immediately taken back after the war. Indeed, our tradition of liberty was reasserted with such violence that it manifested itself as unbridled license in the two areas of financial speculation and of sexual experimentation. No mere war is enough to obliterate the liberties of a people if those liberties are well grounded in the mores. And whether we look at Athens, or at Switzerland, or at Great Britain, or at the United States, we find few democracies that have not fought a revolutionary war, survived a civil war, and waged foreign wars without going on more strongly entrenched in their liberties than they had been before.

The mores of a democratic people, then, are something more basic than their form of government, or than their system of economic activity. Of course, the mores are not utterly distinct from the church, the state,

the family, the economic order, the arts, and the sciences. It cannot be said that a people will remain democratic if only its mores are democratic and if none of these other institutions are democratic in form. The mores must express themselves in institutional form, and they receive reinforcement through that expression. But, according to season, there will be variations as to which institution offers the most effective expression of the mores. When, as in the later nineteenth century and in the early twentieth century, the principal interest of the American people was in economic expansion, then it was important that certain traditions of individual initiative and of free enterprise should manifest themselves in that area. When, as in the recent past, our interests have become more social and political in character, then it becomes important that the mores of democracy find full expression in these areas. And if, in the future, our chief concerns should lie in the direction of science, the arts, religion, and letters, then the emphatic expression of our mores must once again shift its field. In any case, it is the beliefs and ideals of the people as intimately incorporated into their daily habits of living that form the real bedrock of a democratic civilization.

VII

The principles of an experimental democracy which have been stated in this essay have a direct bearing on the contemporary scene. They throw light on the American domestic situation. They provide a clue to the nature of the international problem and to the method of its solution. And they constitute the leading ideas which should be built into our abiding attitude in social philosophy.

In the American domestic scene we are witnessing certain adjustments of a temporary character, and other adjustments that are long-range in scope. The expansion of the powers of the state for the prosecution of the war, the peculiar alignment of classes under the New Deal, and the extraordinary coalescence of class interests in the national emergency: these things are not permanent. We may expect some contraction of the powers of the state after the war, and fresh alignments of class interest in the future to carry on the political business of the nation.

The more significant change that is going on here is a redistribution of the areas of freedom and of control. The field of business enterprise, which for so long was regarded as par excellence the area of unfet-

tered liberty, is being brought under some degree of order and regulation. At the same time, we are accentuating the liberties that are civil and religious, and seeking to develop new liberties based on social and political security—freedom from want and freedom from fear. One can only hope that the regimenting of the economic order shall not go so far as to exclude all individual initiative and responsibility; and that the release of new liberties—social, psychological, and cultural—shall prove as rewarding in their way as was the achievement of economic liberty in its time.

In the international scene, too, we are about to obliterate *laissez faire* among sovereign states. The national state, indeed, brought order out of chaos within its own domain when it deprived the feudal lord of the right of free enterprise in fighting; but it simply projected chaos on a larger dimension when it insisted on practicing for itself the right of free enterprise in fighting with neighboring states. *Laissez faire* has exhibited the same logic in this area as in other areas: first, anarchy; then, the rise of monopoly. Right now we are engaged in a great war to determine who shall hold that monopoly. If it is held by fascist countries like Germany and Japan, then it will be totalitarian in character, with no significant shred of freedom left. If the monopoly is to be presided over by democratic countries, then their problem is that in bringing order out of anarchy they shall not entirely obliterate old liberties and that the new order they make shall become the basis of new and as yet unenvisaged freedoms.

In any case, we shall do better by our domestic problems and by the international problem, if we understand clearly in main outline what it is that we seek to do. To use and to trust the best talents of expert leadership without ever surrendering our own right of choice and of judgment; to retain the distinctive functions of all classes while reducing unfair inequalities between them; to combine stability in our democratic mores with flexibility in the institutions through which they are manifested; to cherish the family, religion, science, arts, letters, sports, and friendly intercourse as much as we do business and politics; to order old anarchies and to seek out new and more significant liberties: these are the enduring principles of an experimental democracy for us at home, and of an experimental society for the world at large.

THE WAR COMES TO INDIA

By TARAKNATH DAS

AT THE OUTSET it is well to remember that this war against Hitlerite Germany, as Winston Churchill terms it, can be compared in many respects with the Napoleonic Wars. Hitler is the new Napoleon, bent on creating a unified German-dominated Europe and on destroying all the forces of opposition to his program. Mr. Churchill is the new Pitt, determined to crush a powerful Germany which has upset the balance of power and endangers the very existence of the British empire. Stalin is not dissimilar from Alexander I, who was opposed to Napoleon until the Treaty of Tilsit, after which he cooperated with the French dictator to acquire territory in the Balkans at the expense of the Ottoman empire; later on Alexander joined Britain's grand alliance because Napoleon's policy was opposed to Russian interests and because Alexander was promised by the British a part of Persian territory adjoining the Caspian Sea. Likewise, after the Munich Pact, Stalin cooperated with Germany to avoid any possibility of German invasion of Russia and to acquire Bessarabia, and parts of Poland, Transylvania, and Finland; but he joined the allies of Britain after the Nazi invasion of Soviet Russia to preserve Russian national interests. In this war, it may be said also that the United States of America, from a military point of view, has taken the place of the combined strength of the Austrian empire and Prussia, at the same time countering Japan.

Just as the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars helped to bring about the conception of the national state in various European countries and to eliminate many frontiers, similarly the present revolutionary war will bring about limitation of sovereignty among small states and there will be formed various regional state federations of continental proportion eliminating tariff barriers. Just as the French Revolution and its war cry of "liberty, equality, fraternity" stimulated the struggles for freedom among the subjugated European peoples within the Ottoman empire, similarly it may be expected that the present war will eventually

serve as inspiration for emancipation of the peoples of Asia and Africa now under alien domination and exploitation.

There is no doubt that the peoples of the United Nations are fighting to destroy the possibility of world domination by the Axis and to preserve their own freedom from foreign tyranny. Thus this war has an aspect of struggle for world freedom. Yet there is a strong tendency to limit this ideal of world freedom to "white men" or to the peoples of Europe. There are those who advocate that world freedom will be furthered by a program of Anglo-American world mastery. Britain herself is fighting to restore the balance of power in Europe, to preserve her economic system based upon colonial exploitation, and to maintain her system of imperialism. It should be kept in mind, however, that a limited or partial world freedom, or world domination by any group of powers, will not uproot the cause of the next war.

India's Position in World Politics

The internal and international policies of a nation are interwoven and interdependent. Great Britain's European and colonial policies and its imperial expansion in extra-European regions are but different aspects of a single great national development. Let us examine this development as it is linked with India.

The end of feudalism, the urge for commercial expansion, and the Industrial Revolution led Britain's imperial expansion toward India by means of the East India Company. This is clear enough. But the supreme importance of the position of India in the development of British imperialism as a whole—and in Asia and Africa in particular—is not generally well understood. As long as several decades ago Sir John Seeley pointed out that the English conquest of India had produced results even more strange than the Spanish conquest of America. The Indian empire is comparable to the Roman empire at its peak. In area and population it is greater than any European country except Russia; politically, economically, and strategically it is the heart of the British empire.[1]

To retain control over India, Great Britain had to control the sea route to it—Africa and the Mediterranean—for India has been, and still is, the central point of British world policies. The British, through the

[1]Sir John R. Seeley, *The Expansion of England* (New York: Macmillan, 1931 [first published in 1893]).

East India Company, secured control over Bengal in 1757 after Clive's victory—through treachery and forgery—in the Battle of Plassey. Although Anglo-French rivalry in India and elsewhere had its effects long before this time, it was when the Peace of Paris was concluded (1763) after the Seven Years' War that Great Britain not only secured absolute command of the seas and drove the French out of Canada, but broke the French power in India as well.[2]

History points to British adherence to this policy. Napoleon was determined to end British supremacy in India, and attacked Egypt because "it was the road to attack the English power in India."[3] Not only would India have been a rich prize in itself, but as Professor Coupland points out, its acquisition would have cut off the main current of British trade at its source and have dried up the financial springs of British sea power. Pitt, moreover, made it clear that he would not return "the strategic positions, such as the Cape of Good Hope and Ceylon, the control of which by France would threaten the British hold in India." And the Dutch East India Company's rule in Ceylon was ended by British occupation in 1796.

Contrary to popular belief, the greatest naval victory for Nelson—the Battle of Trafalgar—was fought not to save England from invasion, but to assure her position in the Mediterranean, thereby safeguarding the overland route to India via the Levant.[4] Furthermore, Napoleon's strenuous and persistent efforts for control of the Levantine stepping-stones to India convinced the British government of the importance of retaining control over Malta. In 1800 an Anglo-Indian expedition was sent under General Abercrombie to Egypt. And to check the march of Napoleon (as well as the threat of Russia) through Persia to India, the East India Company sent Captain John Malcolm from Calcutta to Teharan (Persia) to negotiate an alliance with Britain.

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[2]To avenge the loss of Canada and of French power in India, the government of Louis XVI decided to aid the anti-British revolutionary movement of the British colonies in North America. India was therefore a factor in influencing French policy toward the establishment of the United States of America.

[3]*The War Speeches of William Pitt,* selected and edited by R. Coupland (Oxford University Press, 1940), p. 259.

[4]J. Holland Rose, "The Struggle with Napoleon, 1803-1815," *The Cambridge History of the British Empire* (New York: Macmillan), II, 102.

In 1810, Lord Minto, then Governor-General of India, sent a small force to capture Bourbon as the first step toward seizing Mauritius. Mauritius was duly captured by an expeditionary force of ten thousand men from India, headed by General Abercrombie. It was from India that an expeditionary force of twelve thousand combatants, Indians and British, was sent to the Dutch East Indies, where Java was taken from a superior Franco-Dutch force.

Thus, as early as the Napoleonic Wars, India was supplying men and financing the wars of Great Britain outside of India.

Between the Napoleonic Wars and the present time Great Britain's foreign policy and international relations have reflected its aim of security in India. India itself has become the central point for British expansion in Asia and Africa; Great Britain became a Pacific power through eastward expansion from India. The Opium War against China (through an expedition paid for and manned by India), expansion in the Malaya Peninsula, the establishment of the Singapore naval base, the annexation of Siamese territories, the annexation of Burma, the establishment of a virtual protectorate over Tibet, the formation of Anglo-Japanese alliances, the formation of the Triple Entente, and a number of other similar developments in world politics—all were influenced by Britain's concern for the protection of India.

After the formation of the Holy Alliance—in fact, after the conclusion of the Napoleonic Wars and the Congress of Vienna (1815)—Anglo-Russian rivalry began. Not only has rivalry with Russia in the East been plainly marked on the history of British India, but British foreign policy in relation to the Ottoman empire, the Straits, Egypt, the Near East, and the Middle East—the whole region between the Suez Canal and India—has been influenced by India as well. The foreign policies of Palmerston and Disraeli were based upon "British control of routes to India."

One of the causes of Anglo-German rivalry in world politics was the German program of penetration into the Near East and the Middle East by establishing a close alliance with Turkey (if not reducing the latter to the status of a vassal state) and by controlling the communication system—the road to India—of the Berlin-Bagdad Railway. The German *Drang nach Osten* policy of expansion conflicted not merely with Russian ambitions in the Straits, but also with French and

British vested interests in Asiatic Turkey, French political interests in Syria, and British interests in the Islamic world and India. It was to check the German menace that an Anglo-Russian understanding was reached by partitioning Persia into British and Russian spheres of influence.

During World War I, desire for the security of Egypt, the Suez Canal, and other way stations on the road to India led to a British-Indian campaign in Mesopotamia and the promotion of an Arab revolt to dismember the Ottoman empire and to establish British protectorates in the form of Arab states. After the conclusion of World War I, the British tried, but failed, to make Turkey and Persia into vassal states.

Among the many factors influencing Britain's appeasement of Nazi Germany were Anglo-French rivalry in the Near East, the conflict of Anglo-Italian policies in Africa and the Near East, open disagreement between Soviet Russia and Great Britain in world policies, and political and economic Anglo-Japanese rivalry in eastern Asia. Great Britain wanted to protect her empire, and she needed help—outside help. Today Great Britain is seeking American, Chinese, and Russian aid to protect India from a German and Japanese attack. India is the strategical center of the British empire, and without Indian support—strategical, economic, and military—Great Britain cannot maintain her empire. Without Indian support the United Nations may lose the present war.

The Evolution of Indian Nationalism

It is possible here to sketch only in the merest outline the growth of Indian national consciousness. In the hundred years after the Battle of Plassey, the British East India Company thoroughly consolidated control of India by such methods as using certain Indian princes against other Indian princes, reducing those princes who became their allies to vassalage, and building an Indian army, in which the proportion of Indians to British became as high as five to one.

In 1857 came the Sepoy Mutiny, which the Indians regard as the War for Indian Independence. To strike terror among the people, the British burned Indian villages by the hundreds, they hanged thousands of people—many of them not participants in the revolt—and other thousands were blown from the mouths of cannon. These atrocities are the root of the question why the Indians today do not so bitterly hate

the Nazis or the Japanese, but hate the British more—with whose ill treatment they have so long had personal experience.

After the Sepoy Mutiny, the number of Indian soldiers and Indian officers was greatly reduced, the mechanized branches of the armed forces were closed to Indians (a policy pursued today when the air force and chemical warfare sections are open to native soldiers on a very limited scale), and to check the possibility of revolt radicals were repressed on the one hand and certain moderates were given concessions on the other. In 1858 Queen Victoria issued the Proclamation to the People of India assuring them that there would be no discrimination against them because of race, religion, or color. The Indians looked on the Proclamation as their Magna Carta, but they soon found that hand in hand with the declaration went racial discrimination, suppression of Indian publications, and punishment of those Indians demanding self-government.

A generation later (1885) was formed the All India National Congress, chiefly by a group of English-educated Indian leaders committed not to revolutionary ends but to securing concessions through "constitutional agitation." After the turn of the century, however, there grew up within the Congress a younger and more radical group who favored the abandonment of "begging" in favor of "organizing a national state within a state." Because of the revolutionary activities of this inner group and their determination to go to jail and face hanging for their cause, the British conceded in the Morley-Minto reforms of 1909 the very limited right of the Indians to make law, so inadequate a move that many moderates of the Congress become more radical. It was in the midst of a subsequent struggle between the left and right wings of the Congress that World War I broke out. Tens of thousands of radical Indian nationalists were interned and hundreds were shot or hanged on the charge of sedition and revolutionary activities among Indian soldiers. But Gandhi and other Indian moderates wholeheartedly aided the British government in the hope that Britain would make substantial concessions leading to dominion status.

In World War I, India supplied more than a million soldiers in the fighting lines in Europe, Africa, and Asia; she contributed more men, food, and materials than all the rest of the colonies and dominions. Yet after the war not only was there no concession looking toward dominion status, but a repressive measure was enacted whereby any person sus-

pected of sedition could be put in prison without a trial by jury. Out of agitation for repeal of this law came the Amritsar Massacre, in which an open air protest meeting of unarmed men and women was fired upon, several hundred being killed and more than a thousand wounded. Thus was opened the old wound of the massacres of the Sepoy Mutiny.

Agitation for full Indian independence continued but Gandhi and the elder statesmen of the Congress did not look beyond the "substance of independence" or "dominion status as interpreted by the Statute of Westminster." To counteract the movement for independence and the growing discontent as shown in the civil disobedience movement of 1930-31, the British called a round table conference on India out of which presently came the Government of India Act, regarded as the constitution of the Indian government. The Act did not confer dominion status on India. And its provision for self-government in the provinces was pretty well emasculated by the absolute veto power which it gave to the provincial governors, appointed by the British government in England. Furthermore, by this Act, the Viceroy, responsible not to the Indian people but to the British Cabinet, was given not only the veto power over the actions of the central legislature but the right to rule by ordinances. The constitution of the central government was thoroughly reactionary —the Indian princes, for example, being given undue representation in the legislature, and their representation being given through the power of appointment.

The Indian National Congress refused to accept this constitution of India. But when the British government put that part of the constitution which was concerned with the provincial government into operation and the British authorities gave assurance that the governors of the provinces would not use their veto power on measures passed by majorities of the legislatures, the Congress Party participated in the government of the provinces and proved its worth and its responsibility. The Party did well in the election of 1935, electing an outright majority in seven out of eleven provinces and electing a substantial number of legislators in the others. It could do better today, but the British do not dare to hold an election.

Since 1920 the Congress Party has cultivated its foreign relations. While Mr. Amery, the present Secretary of State for India, was supporting Japan against supposed "aggressions of Chinese nationalism," the

Congress denounced the Japanese campaign against China. When the British government was letting Mussolini get away with murder in Abyssinia, the Congress unqualifiedly took the side of the Abyssinian people. While the British government was appeasing Franco in Spain and collaborating with Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy against the Loyalists, the Congress supported the cause of Spanish democracy. While the British government was appeasing Germany and pursuing the policy of isolating Soviet Russia and signing the Munich Pact, the Congress denounced this pro-fascist policy and took the side of the Czech people. The attitude of the Congress was not mere empty, pious expressions of sympathy. It raised funds for the Abyssinian cause. It sent aid to the Spanish Loyalist cause. Mr. Jawaharlal Nehru, as foreign secretary of the Party, visited Spain, Czechoslovakia, Russia, and Chunking and laid the foundation for Indo-Chinese-Russian collaboration to uphold the cause of democracy against fascism and imperialism. In this program, Mahatma Gandhi and the Congress were solidly united and are today unanimous.

When the present war broke out in 1939, the Viceroy of India, by himself declared war against Germany. The All India National Congress was anti-Nazi and might have supported the declaration of war; but it could not support the Viceroy's autocratic policy of ignoring the right of the Indian people to decide whether they should go to war or not. The Congress asked the British government to declare its war aims, and demanded that if this war was for world freedom and India was to fight for it, then she should be given definite assurance of her own freedom by the British government.

The All India National Congress raised these fundamental issues but it showed its anti-Axis attitude by denouncing the Axis and at the same time adopting the policy that India must not oppose Britain's war efforts in India. Those who talk of the Gandhi-Nehru-Azad section of the All India National Congress as pro-Axis and pro-Japanese should remember that the left wing of the Congress—the so-called "Forward" bloc, led by Mr. Subhas Chandra Bose—advocated that this was not India's war but Britain's and that India must not support it in any form whatsoever. Mr. Bose also suggested that the Congress should start a civil disobedience movement to paralyze British war efforts in India and to acquire India's independence by direct action. At this juncture, through the influence of Gandhi-Nehru-Azad, the Congress adopted a policy

against civil disobedience as a way of embarrassing the government of India, but suggested that those who had objection to the British policy, might exercise the individual right of freedom of speech to express their own views. Thus the Congress, under the leadership of Gandhi-Nehru-Azad and others, in 1939 checked a national civil disobedience movement and offered a chance to the British government to come to an understanding with the Indian Nationalist Party. But the British authorities declared that they would not have any discussion on the future of India nor would they give any guarantee for Indian freedom at any definite date.

Hopes were raised again by the Atlantic Charter of August, 1941. It seemed probable that the declaration of freedom in that document would logically apply to India. But in September Mr. Churchill made it clear that the Atlantic Charter did not apply to India, Burma, or other parts of the British possessions. The Churchill statement created tremendous dissatisfaction in Burma as well as India. The Burmese premier, the late U. Saw, received no assurance in London of dominion status at any time, and when he arrived in Washington, he was accompanied on his visits to Mr. Hull and Mr. Roosevelt by Lord Halifax. When it became obvious that Mr. Roosevelt was not going to question the Churchill stand, any faith that was left in Burma about Anglo-American good intentions was finally undermined. Thus was paved the way for the later debacle in Burma.

When it became clear after the fall of Singapore last February that the Japanese would conquer Burma and that China's lifeline, the Burma Road, would be severed, General Chiang Kai Shek knew that without the full cooperation of the Indian people as a whole and especially the Indian Congress Party leaders, there would be no chance of checking Japan in southeast Asia.

Thus, after consultation with President Roosevelt and also the British leaders, General Chiang went to India and visited the Viceroy of India, Gandhi, Nehru, Azad, and other nationalist leaders and publicly stated his views that the British authorities should make the necessary concessions for Indian freedom and Indian cooperation. The visit and the words of General Chiang—a landmark in Indo-Chinese collaboration in world politics and in the cause of Asian independence—paved the way for the mission of Sir Stafford Cripps, who was taken into the British govern-

ment to strengthen the position of Mr. Churchill after the fall of Singapore.

The Crisis in India

Sir Stafford Cripps's effort to settle the Indo-British dispute, was hailed by liberals in all parts of the world and by the political leaders of India themselves. Sir Stafford was not only well known in India, but was regarded as a friend who believed in Indian freedom. Previously, in 1939, he had visited India and talked with Indian leaders, especially with Mr. Nehru, who was a schoolmate and an old friend. At that time he had also visited China, holding very sympathetic views toward the Chinese in their struggle. Afterward he visited the United States, where he freely stated, in public and private conferences with responsible Americans, that he favored Indian freedom and even advised Indians to have influential Americans bring pressure to bear on the British government with regard to the Indian issue. [5]

Because Sir Stafford's mission to India failed, it is necessary to keep in mind the change that occurred in his views about the Congress, the Moslem League, and the demand for Indian independence between 1940 and 1942. In 1940, before he held the office of Lord Privy Seal, Sir Stafford made the following points clear: (1) Gandhi is moderate in his methods and demands. (2) Nehru is a great statesman. (3) The Congress Party is not solely a Hindu party, but has large Moslem support and stands for the masses and a democratic India. (4) The Moslem League is led by reactionary, well-to-do Moslems who are anxious to establish a Moslem rule in India and who otherwise prefer an undemocratic British rule. (5) The idea of a "partition of India" is impractical, and the majority of Indian people should not be denied self-rule in a united India. (6) The British government was consciously or unconsciously supporting the Moslem League on the issue of partition to prevent a settlement of the Indian question on the basis of Indian self-rule.[6]

To the amazement of Gandhi, Nehru, Azad, and other Indian leaders, however, Sir Stafford Cripps—in 1942, after the Japanese conquest of

[5]See Krishnalal Shridharani, *My India, My America* (New York, 1941), p. 545.

[6]Eric Estorick, *Stafford Cripps, Prophetic Rebel* (New York: John Day, 1941), pp. 203-232. One should also consult here Kate L. Mitchell's *India Without Fable—a 1942 Survey* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1942), the best book available on the present situation in India.

Burma—not only proposed the partition of India to satisfy the Moslem League leaders, but proposed that Indian princes who did not want to join the Indian federation could remain out of it and still enjoy their present relations with the British government. Thus India would be divided into a half a dozen or more "Ulsters." In opposition to this proposal Gandhi, like Lincoln, said in substance that he would prefer chaos in India to partition.

The question of the "partition of India" has great significance for India and world politics. The Moslem League leaders advocate the formation of separate Islamic states under the name of "Pakistans" in those provinces of India where the Moslem population is in a majority because Moslems do not wish to be dominated by Hindus. But how can Moslems in those provinces where they have a majority (such as Punjab, the northwestern frontier provinces, Beluchistan, Sind, and Bengal) be dominated by a Hindu minority? In fact, Hindu domination in these provinces is impossible, for the Moslems will have a dominating position through the majority rule of the democratic process.

A second reason why the Moslem League leaders want partition is that, if these provinces join a federation forming a united India, they will be dominated by a central government which will have a Hindu majority. The argument boils down to this: because of their religion, the Moslems want to secede from a united India. But if the idea were accepted, then Moslems in China (thirty millions) might also secede from a united China, and Moslems in Soviet Russia might ask for the same right. By the same argument, Jews, Protestants, Catholics, or various racial elements in the United States might establish separate states and break up the federal union.

Mr. Jinnah, the leader of the Moslem League, presented his idea of Pakistan in 1940, a time when the British authorities, in order to counteract the efforts of Mussolini and Hitler to use the Arabs against British interests in the Middle East, took serious steps to appease the Moslem world. By catering to the Moslem League's plan for the partition of India, the British authorities believe they are killing two birds with one stone: first, they are widening the gulf between Hindus and Moslems, thereby checking the movement for Indian independence; and second, they are convincing the Moslem world that the British are not only willing to give up the cause of the Jews in Palestine, but also are

willing to partition India, thus creating a Moslem state which will politically strengthen the international Islamic world. The move may possibly have served those purposes, but it has widened the gulf between Indian Nationalists and the British. There is every reason to believe, however, that the Moslems of the Middle East still may aid the Axis powers in a crisis.

Sir Stafford's proposals offered no opportunity for the formation of a national government of India at the present time. Furthermore, they did not provide for Indian control of Indian national defense. Sir Stafford's mission therefore convinced the Indian people as a whole that the British were not sincere in their offer of Indian independence after the war. Some of the people, in fact, openly said that if the British won the war with American, Russian, Chinese, and Indian aid, it would be easy for the British to put down a postwar rebellion in India if they did not agree to Indian independence. This feeling has been expressed, for example, by leaders of the Indian peasants.

Gandhi, who is in closest touch with the masses of India, felt at that time that it would be wise to demand that the British, Americans, and Chinese quit India now. Like many other Indians, he was not certain of the role of American soldiers in India. But after careful consideration of the whole situation, he modified his "quit India" program: India was to have freedom at once; and if the British and Americans made India an ally, then the British and American forces could stay in India, not only to defend India but to aid China and Russia. Gandhi made it clear that he would do nothing to jeopardize the freedom of China.

The Working Committee of the All India National Congress made the position of the Congress clear in a resolution which was published in *The New York Times* on July 18. Its substance was as follows:

> The All India National Congress and its leaders are for world freedom and are therefore anti-Axis and particularly in favor of Chinese and Indian independence; (b) [the Congress] has no objection to receiving the support of Britain and the United States for the defense of India provided Indian independence is recognized and India is accepted as an ally; (c) the only way India can be defended effectively is through a National Government of the Indian people who will be willing to make every sacrifice for their own freedom—India must not be another Burma, where the people did not have any faith in Britain; (d) if Britain refuses to relinquish her political authority over India and recognize Indian independence, the All India Congress will

start non-violent non-cooperation against the British Government in India, under the direction of Mahatma Gandhi.

This resolution was formally approved on August 7, when Gandhi said that he would try to arrange a conference with the British Viceroy. Gandhi also suggested that the Congress should seek the support of China, Russia, and the United States for mediating the Indian problem on the basis of the recognition of Indian independence. But before any steps could be taken for the settlement of the Indian situation by the leaders of the United Nations—even before Gandhi could write a letter to the Viceroy—he and all of the important leaders of the All India National Congress were arrested.

The arrest and imprisonment of Gandhi and other leaders without trial is hardly in line with the Four Freedoms and the Atlantic Charter. The arrests and the following acts of repression (such as use of the "flogging edict") have provoked indignation and greater unrest.

Meanwhile, a Japanese attack on India from Burma is to be expected. The Japanese already have established a form of provisional government for an Indian revolutionary government at Bangkong and will use this movement to create revolutionary outbursts in India whenever the Japanese attack. It is also to be expected that a German attack in Egypt, the Near East, and the Middle East will occur at the same time that the Japanese attack Bengal. This twofold attack will divide the forces in India. The necessary strength for Indian defense can be gained only with India's full cooperation. In *The New York Times* of August 29 Frederick Schuman noted that unless the Indian question is solved now, the whole war may be lost.

Instead of dropping bombs on Indians from airplanes, shooting down unarmed mobs, and taking other measures of repression the British government might well follow Russia's example. The Soviet Russian government (which, as a virtual ally of Nazi Germany, raped Poland) has changed its policy toward that country. First it recognized Polish independence, then it made an alliance with Poland. It is giving aid to the Poles in developing a national army. The establishment of a provisional national government of independent India—with certain modifications of the existing machinery and civil and military positions—is not an impossibility, provided the British rulers undergo a change of heart and

are willing to give up their domination over the nearly four hundred million Asiatics in India.[7]

It is claimed that it is unwise for Indians to ask for a change of government now: if India were conquered by Japan and Germany, she would be treated much worse than she has been by the British. This argument does not go to the root of the Indian question. Indians do not want to *change* masters—they believe the British have treated them as an "inferior people," and they want to rid themselves of British domination now. If the British are sincere about giving freedom to India later, why not now? The Indians do not ask the British to get out of India now. But they do ask for considerably more responsibility for their own defense and their own government than they have had to date.

India—One of the United Nations?

The greater part of the world has now expressed itself as opposed, in varying degrees of vigorousness, to fascism as a world order, and thoughtful people in all lands have indicated not only the necessity for liquidating the present fascist drive for power but the need for clearing the way to a new society in which men everywhere may find security from want, from special privilege, and racial discrimination. Yet Britain, one of the powers committed to fighting fascism, is also committed to imperialism, and surely no one can pretend that imperialistic domination of colonial peoples, imposition of rule from above, and denial of civil liberties differ essentially from some of the principles of fascism.

Truly there should be a "United Nations"—to promote freedom and a just international peace and to replace the existing state of chaos and anarchy that has prevailed among civilized nations (especially of the West).[8] But are the "United Nations," as they are now constituted, the

[7]For the British attitude of racial imperialism which has been a stumbling block in Anglo-Indian relations, see Harry W. Laidler, *The Role of the Races in Our Future Civilization* (New York: The League for Industrial Democracy, 1942), and Pearl S. Buck, *American Unity and Asia* (New York: John Day, 1942).

[8]It is amusing (or is it?) that these nations often assume the responsibility for promoting "law and order" among the so-called backward peoples—especially those of Asia and Africa—whom they mercilessly exploit. The Great Powers in two wars during the last quarter of a century have brought about the destruction of tens of millions of lives and hundreds of billions of dollars' worth of property.

instrument to establish a new world order based upon the ideal of freedom for all? Judging from actual practice rather than from professions and speeches, the "United Nations" seem to be merely a loose-jointed combination of powers, a kind of *grand alliance* hurriedly thrown together to defeat the rival alliance of powers—the Axis alliance under the leadership of Hitler, Mussolini, and the Japanese war lords.

The Atlantic Charter is the only foundation of the United Nations so far in existence. Mr. Churchill, of course, has said that the principles of the Charter were worked out for those European states now under Nazi rule and do "not qualify in any way the various statements of policy which have been made from time to time about the development of constitutional government in India, Burma, and other parts of the British empire." But President Roosevelt, Vice-President Wallace, Secretary of State Hull, and Under-Secretary Welles have asserted that the Charter's provisions would apply to all nations and all parts of the world. Is this the natural momentary confusion of desperate allies or is it something else?

If it is set down as confusion, what becomes of later expressions by international authorities about India? Soviet Russia, by the Molotov-Churchill agreement, consented not to interfere in Great Britain's internal affairs, and on the present crisis in India has remained silent. Even the Chinese government with its recognition of the need for a Pacific Charter, helplessly looks on the situation in India as Great Britain's "domestic affair." And the warning sent by the American State Department to the American armed forces stationed in India not to interfere or participate in internal affairs also indicates (at least to Indians) that America's official stand is: "Britain owns India; Britain is our ally. Therefore, we cannot interfere with Britain's private affairs in India."

This is not to indicate that American opinion is at all unified on the question. On August 17 Senator Elbert D. Thomas, member of the Senate Foreign and Military Affairs Committee, called for a showdown on India, and added that "it is time for the United Nations, who say that they are fighting for the right, to settle some of these international or inter-United Nations questions on the basis of ethics and moral right." Two days later Senator Robert R. Reynolds, chairman of the Senate Military Affairs Committee, maintained that "we can convince the people of the world of our seriousness and good faith only by requiring our ally, Britain, to grant immediate independence to the 370,000,000 people of

India." However questionable were Senator Reynolds' motives in making the speech, there was no doubt in the replies which it evoked from Senators Barclay, Connally, George, Bridges, and Norris that in their opinion Indian independence was still "Britain's affair."

It is also true, of course, that not all the people of Britain agree with Mr. Churchill. The Very Reverend Hewlett Johnson, Dean of Canterbury, remarked recently that "we might invite all the Allied Powers to join in a guaranty to India that we are really sincere this time in the intention to give the people of India a postwar constitution they desire."[9] But in spite of such friendly protests, the Indians and other Asiatic peoples note that the British government still acts to maintain its system of empire. They still take account of the refusal of the United Nations to recognize the provisional government of Korea established at Chungking as the European governments in exile have been recognized. And from these and other bits of evidence Asiatics ask among themselves: Is it true that this war is being fought to end imperialism? Is it really true that this war is being fought to promote world freedom? Is it really true that this war is being fought to crush the doctrine that *Herrenvolk*, or a superior race, is to dominate the world?

To these peoples the most convincing answer will lie in the attitude of the leaders of the United Nations. If Indian independence is denied, then the peoples of Asia will be justified in regarding the United Nations, like the League of Nations, as an organization to maintain the *status quo*, as supporting Anglo-American imperialism and not forming a solid basis for a new world order.

Postscript

Since the above was written, Mr. Churchill has made it clear that the British government's settled policy will be to stick by the Cripps proposals. Mr. Amery has charged the Congress Party with indirectly aiding the Japanese invaders and has characterized Mahatma Gandhi as an "arch-saboteur." And Mr. Cripps has blamed Mr. Gandhi for influencing the Congress to adopt the policy of civil disobedience. The British government refuses to deal further with the Congress leaders or to do other than continue its policy of repression. Its collective mind is closed.

[9] "India—a Solution," *The Protestant*, September, 1942.

Nevertheless the successful defense of India must in the nature of the case take some other form than forced dispersal of mass Indian demonstrations, levying collective fines on those cities where civil disobedience takes place, public flogging, and shooting. Now the big rains in Bengal are ended, and the Japanese are at the gates. Even if the Indian resistance to British suppression deteriorates in force and as few as ten per cent of the people remain in opposition, the situation will be critical. An American reporter in India has suggested that it is unlikely that the British can take on the Japanese and any part of the Indian people at the same time.

How are the Indians to be rallied to their own, their country's, and the United Nations' defense? The following, not perhaps in natural chronological order, are my suggestions:

a) The British government should be induced to abandon its policy of repression and unconditionally release all Indian political prisoners, including the leaders of the Congress.

b) The British government should make a declaration, approved by the Parliament, recognizing Indian independence. The declaration should be reaffirmed by the United Nations. The civil disobedience campaign will then be automatically called off.

c) To take the place of the present government, arrangements should be made to form a national coalition government in India, represented by all political parties and minority interests. (India will frame her own permanent constitution by an elected constituent assembly on a later date.)

d) The Viceroy of India should at once abandon his veto power and agree to act as governor general, responsible to the Indian legislature.

e) The defense of India in this war affects not only India but others in the United Nations. Therefore a defense council or advisory board, composed of experts from Nationalist India, Great Britain, the United States, China, and Soviet Russia, should be appointed to explore all possibilities of developing India's military strength in the cause of the United Nations.

f) The above five developments are most likely if President Roosevelt, General Chiang Kai Shek, Premier Stalin, and other leaders of the United Nations take the initiative to see the Indian impasse settled by negotiation and mediation. The British government and the political

parties of India should be asked to present their case before a commission of representatives of the United States, China, and other members of the United Nations. The Congress Party would ask, of course, that the case be settled in conformity with the basic principles of freedom for all peoples, recognition of legitimate minority rights (but without partition of India), and recognition of India as an independent nation in alliance with other United Nations.

For the defense of India and the United Nations, negotiations must be reopened. Will the United States, China, Russia take the necessary initiative? Will Britain be induced to accept mediation? Or will it again be "too little and too late"?

WE NOTE . . .

WE ARE SICK . . .

What's wrong with this country and with the United Nations? It is now nine months since the attack at Pearl Harbor and the record of our prodigious muddling grows apace. For nine long months we have been playing at total war and we are growing sick of the nonsense.

We are sick of dollar-a-year men who continue to be more concerned with the protection of their own industry or their own company than with the defeat of the Axis.

We are sick of "reorganizations" in the War Production Board which always eliminate the Board's critics and never blast its bottlenecks.

We are sick of the commercialism which equates the Four Freedoms with the comforts to be enjoyed in a well-known hotel, or debases the V-for-Victory sign by making it the hallmark of a brand of whiskey.

We are sick of full-page advertisements proclaiming the patriotism of American industry and of the endless columns of propaganda which are the principal product of the National Association of Manufacturers.

We are sick of $200,000 salaries and $300,000 bonuses, and of all the big and little chiselers who are gypping the government or outsmarting their local rationing boards.

We are tired of business-as-usual, politics-as-usual, and thinking-as-usual.

We are sick, too, of the Senate farm bloc and of spokesmen for the National Grange and the Farm Bureau Federation, who would endanger the economic structure of the country if that would get farmers more than parity prices.

We are sick of labor racketeers, and of wildcat strikes, and of the enforcement of union apprenticeship restrictions in the face of the national shortage of manpower.

We are sick of ignorant columnists and pontificating radio commentators and of the perpetual distortion of the news.

We are sick of Henry Ford—of his obstructionist tactics in the matter of public housing and of his publicity tactics in the matter of the Willow Run Some-Day-to-Produce-a-Complete-Bomber Plant.

We are sick of racial and religious discrimination in the conduct of the war effort and of the notion that this is a white man's war.

We are sick of administrative confusion in Washington and of the President's chronic addiction to temporization.

We are sick of British policy toward India and of our policies toward France, Britain, and Russia. We do not want this to be an Anglo-Saxon war and we cannot win it on that basis.

We are sick of the Disunited Nations, the Disunited Command, and the Disjointed Strategy. We want to win the war. We are sick of losing it.

J.D.K.

INDIA

As late as last June, most Americans, even the better informed, would probably have denominated as the chief characteristic of India a lack of unity that custom had hardened into an insoluble problem, a political and religious confusion that even time seemed powerless to undo. True, the ineptitude of the English in Burma was already raising questions as to the strength and efficiency of English control in India. True also that the tremendous emotional surge of many Indians toward freedom (grounded in history as Dr. Das's article in this issue so well exemplifies) was beginning to make itself known and felt everywhere. Yet what connection these factors had with the basic obstacle of Indian chaos was not apparent. How representative, one asked, was the All India National Congress Party? What elements of reaction and even of appeasement did the Party include? What did it have to offer the Moslem minority? What, the Untouchables? And what, after all, could India, subjected throughout its history to authoritarian influence, suddenly learn of democracy, Congress Party or no Congress Party? These questions still persisted.

Then came the events of July, August, and September. At first the old chaos was heightened. The propaganda of Gandhi and the other Congress leaders, whatever its effect on Indians, was too confusing and too contradictory to persuade the Western world of anything but its own confusion and contradiction. On one day Gandhi demanded that all British, Americans, and Chinese retire from India. But on the next he retracted and said that all outsiders could stay, provided India received "freedom now." And what did "freedom now" mean? To Western minds it meant what it said, immediate Indian control of defense and civilian government. Only slowly did it begin to be clear that the phrase meant chiefly freedom from the power of the Viceroy and the certain promise of self-rule after the war.

It seemed impossible, in any case, to condone the action of the Congress Party in rebelling on the eve of military defense and in giving the Japanese the promise of indirect, if not direct, assistance. Wherever there was sympathy for the Indians, it had to be diluted with regret or disapproval.

But then into the boiling Indian cauldron the English suddenly dropped the reagent of absolute repression. The "rebellion" was put down forcibly and the British government resolutely turned its face from all compromise. The effect on the outside world was immediate. From the day that Mr. Churchill made clear his last stand, American opinion has been prevailingly hostile to it and sympathetic to the Indian cause.

For the Indians the British stand has done much more. Where once there was division and confusion, there is now going on the greatest effort at unity in Indian history. In the Indian Legislative Assembly, members of other parties, including a spokesman for the Moslem League, have embraced the Congress doctrine of immediate independence for India. Indian distrust of British promises is now total. And the civil disobedience movement, to date spontaneous and premature, may very well in another month or two arrive by underground methods at successful organization.

In the present impasse the Indians seem ready to accept a compromise in which the principal conditions would be the release of Indian political prisoners, the abdication of the Viceroy from his present position of absolute power, and the setting up of responsible government and a powerful system of Indian defense. India may well be a chief battleground in the war, and in any case its defense is quite as much the job of the United Nations as it is of Britain alone. Mediation is clearly called for, or if necessary, direct intervention on the part of the United States. P.B.

WHY IS KALTENBORN?

The voice sounds like nothing else. It isn't Wisconsin; it isn't honest Brooklyn. At its best, it is a monstrous caricature of the genial Jerry Colonna; at its worst, it has everything of the cheap, ugly pomposity of a Boake Carter.

And day in and day out, the Dean of Commentators (ugh!) sings out his quavering Hymn of Hate against labor. Somewhere, a strike involving some 600 men drives him into hysterics, and it's labor in general that ought to be put in chains. You would think that the 59,000,000 people who work as they have never worked before are ready to commit treason against themselves.

Leon Henderson's statement on inflation was a godsend to the Dean. The Henderson press conference indicated labor is collecting 70 per cent more wages than in 1939. The people who were accused of working only 40 hours a week, who were to be compelled to work 48, had increased their purchasing power by 11 per cent. It's the end of the world!

Occasionally, though very seldom, Mr. Kaltenborn also mentions that farm prices went up even higher, to 72 per cent above 1939. ***But he is strangely reticent about profits, which have gone up 400 per cent during that time.*** It is true that the daily press was just as brazen in its mutilation of the story. But it remained for the good Dean to draw the most remarkable conclusion the story has yet elicited.

He was weeping bitterly over the fiendish crimes of labor against agriculture. Here, said the Dean, rolling his r's with his wonted elegance, is a farmer in Oklahoma. The fellow runs a modest little establishment of 2000 acres. Now these piratical defense workers come along and force the poor fellow to pay his help $3 a day. The worst of it is that this help is Mexican. "And no Mexican is worth $3 a day," writes Mr. Kaltenborn's correspondent.

And we're supposed to be fighting for freedom from want! And the Mexicans are our allies in this war! I doubt if the ineffable Dr. Goebbels could have invented anything more divisive, more subversive, more useful to the cause of the "Herrenvolk." *Good* night!

H. S.

MEN AND MAPS

One of the Nazi propaganda offensives with which we have not yet come to grips is the theory of geopolitics. Power politics or force is one part of the theory. Geography is a second part. A third part is the idea that a nation is not strong and powerful unless it continues to conquer other nations.

Before the war the Berlin geopoliticians popularized their ideas by publishing maps of rivers, mountains, seas,

and continents and showing to every German his country's great destiny. They proved to Hitler and the other Nazis that whoever rules East Europe commands the "Heartland" (central Eurasia), that whoever rules the Heartland commands the "World-Island" (Europe, Africa and Asia), and that whoever "rules the World-Island commands the world." Thus were Hitler and Germany launched on a sea of blood.

Geopolitics is a big and insidious idea. It is so big that it has attracted the interest of certain Americans. If Germany can have her theory of geopolitics, argue these Americans, we ought to have a bigger and better one. We ought to make of the Americas a single continental unit in order to protect ourselves against the continental powers of Europe, Asia, and Africa. Of course, they say, such a theory will demand power politics and some form of imperialism and a tremendous army, but these forces will be American, not German, and they will be harnessed to "a better purpose."

With all due regard to these American geopoliticians, some of whom are brilliant and full of knowledge, we disagree. It is quite probable that power politics will not be wholly destroyed by this war. We shall always have to be realistic about that. But if we ever go in wholeheartedly for military alliances ourselves, if we ever get a vested interest in geopolitics or come to depend on it for our national safety, then we shall lose most of what we are fighting for today.

This may be an "American century," as some of our American imperialists have suggested, but if we try to cram our Americanism down anybody's throat in the geopolitical manner, our "century" is likely to be cut short by many years. And our century or not, it hardly opens up a panorama of the postwar world that is inviting to the eye.

The truth about geopolitics can be gathered from the kind of world it is based on. Nicholas Spykman, the leader of the American geopoliticians, supposes in his book, *America's Strategy in World Politics,* that the present war in which we are engaged will not destroy German militarism. He supposes that we must fear the power of Russia. He supposes that we must fear the power of China.

If our war is not to destroy German militarism, what is it for? If at the end of this war we are merely going to substitute the bogy of Russia and the fear of China for the bogy of Germany and the fear of Japan, what are we fighting for anyhow?

Geopolitics is a theory we must understand. But we must learn about it only in order to take its measure, for in full it leads inevitably to laying the basis for future wars. P.B.

AMERICAN HISTORY

A survey by *The New York Times* turns up the fact that 82 per cent of our colleges and universities do not require the study of American history by their undergraduates and that 72 per cent of them do not require the subject for admission to college. Thus many a college student graduates without any formal exposure to what is sometimes considered one of the half dozen basic courses in the curriculum of higher education.

Already the announcement has brought both approval and disap-

proval of the present state of affairs from college officials, and before any general decision is reached the debate is likely to grow still livelier. It is probable that before long the debate will reach even into the high schools.

It is always possible to pick one or more subjects in a curriculum and insist that every student take them. A few years ago mathematics was often the preferred subject which no student could escape. A couple of generations ago it was Latin and Greek. These subjects were supposed to have qualities for mental discipline not inherent in other subjects—a theory which is no longer held valid.

The suggestion that American history should be generally required of more if not of all students is put on another basis. America is a democracy, the argument runs, and democracies are run by public opinion. No sound public opinion is possible without an understanding of democratic principles as they have been hammered out on the anvil of our history.

The argument is especially pertinent now. Because of the present war and the peace to follow, there has been thrust upon America the responsibility for democratic leadership. In the future we are going to have to interpret our democracy to the whole world. For this job our history can give us much of the necessary knowledge.

To such a proposition it is easy to agree. It seems clear that too many students in the recent past have missed the human drama of this nation's upward growth. Some have caught a good part of the story in related courses in political science but others have missed even that. It behooved education to give American history a more important spot in the curriculum.

We assume, however, that the history taught should be no slavish scraping and bowing to the past, that there should be no self-serving or shallow nationalism in it, or anything that belittles the accomplishments of other peoples and misrepresents their efforts and struggles.

It can be said, further, that students will be likely to resent the sort of sugar coating that has sometimes been given our history, the kind of writing which has spoiled first-rate men by making them into second-rate gods, the glossing over of unpleasant chapters in our national record. That record is too vital and too human to need any whitewashing or violent scouring with soft soap.

It is likely that emasculated writing and teaching was responsible for much of the subordination of American history in other years. If a thing becomes too prettified, it is debunked as much of our history and many of our heroes were in the 1920's. And debunking does not lead to a true appreciation of the facts any more than sugar coating does.

American history is the story of struggle between many men and many forces, some successful and some not. It is the story of institutions, some maintained and some abandoned. No one would ask today for the resurrection of the Electoral College, once a revered part of our political structure. No one should castigate or ignore the Populists, who were largely unsuccessful in their own day but most of whose reforms are now a firm part of our everyday life.

Let us by all means have more American history in the schools and colleges. But let us remember that today we are writing history ourselves with every daily event and that we are not writing it wholly in imitation of the past. P.B.

FREE ITALIANS

One of the political developments of the war which we approve is the Free Italian movement. Not much is known of the movement as yet but as the United Nations get nearer the time when the Axis countries will be invaded, it is safe to say that more will be heard of it.

Like the organization of the Free French, the Free Italian movement has been organized outside the home land and has been designed to destroy the home land's despotic political rule. It is more explicit than the French, however, on the subject of liberty and the democratic principles required for postwar government.

After guaranteeing freedom of organization, of association, of press, and of religion it puts forward five provisions:

1. Those who are responsible for Fascism and its crimes must be punished.

2. Wealth unjustly accumulated must be confiscated, the nation becoming the beneficiary.

3. The working classes are to be guaranteed a decent standard of living.

4. Social legislation must be developed which will make it impossible to go back to pre-Fascist conditions.

5. All debts, decrees, agreements, and alliances made by the Fascist regime will be annulled.

The program is sponsored by the Mazzini Society in this country and its appeal to Americans of Italian birth or parentage may be very general since many such Americans who once looked on Mussolini with a disinterested or friendly eye were outraged when Italy declared war on the United States. The Italian-born and Italian-fostered American is particularly appreciative of the opportunities he has received in this country.

Quite as important is the group favoring such a program in Italy itself if we can believe underground sources of news. Undoubtedly the group will grow as the possibility of Allied invasion increases. And when invasion actually arrives the internal assistance to the United Nations may well be considerable.

Both for the successful prosecution of the war and for a democratic peace the Free Italian movement is to be encouraged. P.B.

EYEING THE NEEDLE TRADES

From Mark Starr, educational director of the International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union, we have received a note about literature on the needle trades. Edited for reasons of space, the substance of his remarks is as follows:

Aside from the textbooks written for vocational schools and designers, there are few adequate technical treatments of the evolution and present methods of New York's largest manufacturing industry. Of course, the industrious student may assemble and interpret the data from the files of *Women's Wear* and the *Daily News Record*. But *Advance* and *Justice,* the

chief union journals in the needle trades, in contrast, say, to union journals in printing, building, and even barbering, rarely ever describe the technical procedures of the industry. One of the rare readable jobs was Helen Everett Meiklejohn's "Dresses: Impact of Fashion on an Industry." Union pictorials in recent years, also, have used good shots of workshop scenes. But references are usually incidental and occur only when economic effects create changes in wage rates or provoke a strike. In other industries, powerful employer organizations tell the technical story of their industry but the "minnows" of the needle trades have only within recent years awakened under union stimulation to modern publicity methods and organized, for example, into the New York Dress Institute to make New York replace Paris, now under Nazi control, as a world style center. Perhaps the employers' showmanship (which landed some of them into the movie producers' class) was exhausted in the hectic marketing of ever-changing and competing styles.

The needle trade unions themselves have fared better than their industry both in general history books and in special monographs. Their history is now brought down to 1942 in *The Needle Trades* by Joel Seidman.[1] This book covers the unions formed by the hat workers and the makers of men's and women's clothes with the exception of shoes and gloves. It is the first successful attempt to group these unions for collective treatment. A wealth of statistics is included by tables in the appendix, and a survey of the economic development of the industry is given.

[1]Farrar and Rinehart, $2.50; available to union members for $1.10.

It replaces and supplements such books as the outmoded *New Unionism in the Clothing Industry* by J. M. Budish and George Soule; the tailored-to-the-party-line *Clothing Workers* by Jack Hardy (Dale Zysman); the official compendious I.L.G.W.U. history down to 1924, *Women's Garment Workers* by Louis Levine (criticized by some of the old-timers as being too much influenced by Morris Sigman's viewpoint); the pedestrian study by Charles E. Zaretz, *Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America: A Study in Progressive Trade-Unionism* (1934); the popularly and well written *Clothing Workers in Philadelphia* by Edden LaMar; Wilfred Carsel's well documented *History of the Chicago Ladies' Garment Workers Union,* and Earl D. Strong's *Amalgamated Clothing Workers.*

Seidman has used these but has further read and summarized innumerable reports, proceedings, and journals to give an excellent start to this first of the series of monographs, "Labor in the Twentieth Century," undertaken by Farrar and Rinehart. Such a book was needed because the needle trades unions in the New Deal period of American labor history have used their opportunities more than most. Particularly in the case of the I.L.G.W.U., Levine's history—stopping before the years of the Communist trouble, the dark days after the crash of 1929, and the dramatic comeback starting with the N.R.A. in 1935—badly needed an adequate supplement.

One is impressed with Seidman's honest scholarship. Even in the chapter, "Civil War in the Needle Trades," the author bends backward to present both sides and gives the student leads

to investigate the contested questions. Jack Rich in his otherwise highly laudatory review in the *Hat Worker* thinks that he bends too far back in excusing Communist behavior. But the book has been endorsed by such historians as Professor Paul F. Brissenden, Dr. Harry J. Carman, and Dr. Henry David.

Seidman knows and cares enough about the well-being of the needle trades unions to warn against possible dangerous trends:

> Constant attention must be paid, moreover, to the achievement and maintenance of effective democratic control of their organizations by the rank and file. . . . Though the needle trades unions as a whole have a better record in this respect than most other unions, the record is far from perfect and there is no automatic assurance that the future will be better than the past. Indeed, there are certain disquieting tendencies, such as the holding of less frequent conventions in some instances, and their conversion largely into demonstrations in other cases. Not always is it possible for a delegate to say frankly what he thinks; opposition may be construed as disloyalty and, as in other types of organizations, there are ways in which an administration can punish disloyalty and reward faithful machine service. . . . In the educational programs fostered by some of the unions lies the best guarantee that the rank-and-file members will know how to participate in the life of their unions, and insure their democratic control.

Like all human efforts, Seidman's book is not without blemish. The endeavor to treat all the unions in a single book of 356 pages is bound to lead to disproportionate space for some unions and their activities. Each section of the industry and each union deserve a more extensive and intensive study. For lack of material, other markets outside New York City are only scantily covered. Perhaps it was the necessity to condense the early years before 1910 and the lack of detailed acquaintance with the Jewish press which explains the unwarranted neglect of Meyer London. Justice is by no means done to Morris Hillquit by a single mention of his name as founder of the United Hebrew Trades. Only a detailed biography of Hillquit with full access to his private papers could justly show the constant service given for over three decades to the clothing unions, particularly in the "years of the trouble" and also in writing and promoting the N.R.A. code for the coat and suit division as the greatest contribution of his last days. (And may we here give the future historian a tip: Follow through the continuing influence of Hillquit in the activity of Frederick F. Umhey, executive secretary of the I.L.G.W.U., who was trained by the former and whose work shows the same pattern of loyal competency outside the glare of the spotlight. There must also be similar connecting links in the other needle trades unions.)

Then too, Seidman takes over the usual but unfair attribution of the A.C.W.A. success almost exclusively to Sidney Hillman. In every division of the clothing industry, at least in New York City, every business agent and shop committeeman rightly considers himself top leadership timber. Hillman himself would agree that he is not the faultless, infallible hero painted by George Soule (Cromwellian warts omitted, but not by request). Further, the role of David Dubinsky in combatting the Communists and rallying the shattered forces of the I.L.G.W.U. as well as his skill as the driver for a union team of strong and vigorous egos will, in the minds of

some readers, have deserved more adequate coverage.

These omissions, however, are minor flaws, in part resulting unavoidably from the compression of many vivid years, of complicated issues, and of great happenings in various associated trades into this trustworthy and admirable survey which will lead not only to a better evaluation of the past but help the needle trades unions to continue their pioneering role in the United States. It is a good start for this series of much needed monographs.

P.B.

CONTRIBUTORS

JOHN CUNNINGHAM SPARKS, whose unorthodox analysis of the problems of war finance opens this issue, will be remembered for his essay on civil liberties in the present crisis published in our Spring number this year. Professor Sparks is a member of the Department of Government in Antioch College. A part of his present article appeared earlier in *The Nation*.

LUIS ALBERTO SANCHEZ Y SANCHEZ—lawyer, professor, writer—is a native of Peru. A one-time member of the National Executive Committee of the Peruvian Aprista party, he has more recently served as assistant director of "Ercilla," a well-known publishing house of Santiago, Chile. His article is part of a book which he has been writing about the United States for publication and distribution in South America.

EARLE K. JAMES is an American citizen who was born and reared in Chile and who completed his education in Britain and the United States. His experience of Latin America has been of the broadest sort. For some time he edited a Latin-American news magazine; he was formerly a member of the Puerto Rican Commission and Assistant Editor of the Commission on Cuban Affairs. His published work in this country includes a number of Foreign Policy Association reports on Latin America, as well as articles in *The Yale Review, Current History, The Christian Science Monitor,* and other papers. Mr. James is at present Lecturer on Latin American Affairs at the New School for Social Research.

EDWIN BERRY BURGUM is Associate Professor of English in the Graduate School of New York University and an established literary critic. His essay "Aldous Huxley and His Dying Swan" was published in our Spring number. Professor Burgum is one of the editors of *Science and Society*.

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BOOKS ABROAD

An International Quarterly of Comment on Foreign Books

Edited by Roy Temple House and Kenneth C. Kaufman

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The only really new weapons thus far utilized in the present war have been ideological ones. In total war the symbols which mobilize men and for which they fight become of prime importance. JAMES M. BURNS's article deals with some important aspects of modern ideological warfare. Mr. Burns is a member of the Department of Political Science in Williams College.

CHARLES A. MADISON is college editor of Henry Holt and Company. He has published work in *The American Scholar, Menorah Journal,* and *Twice a Year.* His article on Margaret Fuller is a chapter from a book he is writing on American social rebels and reformers.

It is probable that WILLIAM ZUKERMAN has taken too optimistic a view of the impact of the war on anti-Semitism in his article in this issue. On the other hand, the situation is certainly not as dark as it is often depicted and Mr. Zukerman makes a number of points which merit wide recognition. As a long-time resident of Europe and the author of *The Jew in Revolt,* he speaks with more than usual authority. Readers will remember his parable, "The Galilean and the Rabbi," which we published last year.

ROBERT E. FITCH, who holds degrees from Yale, Columbia, and the Union Theological Seminary, teaches philosophy at Occidental College. His articles on problems of social philosophy have appeared frequently in *The Hibbert Journal, The Journal of Philosophy, The Journal of Religion,* and other philosophical and religious reviews.

TARAKNATH DAS, who writes about India not only with spirit but out of a long training in scholarship, is an authority on world politics and oriental history. He has lectured frequently in American universities, contributes regularly to scholarly and semi-popular magazines in his field, and has published more than a dozen books, of which one of the most distinguished is *India in World Politics.*

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